Blood Red Skies: Myanmar Circumvents International Jet Fuel Sanctions via Vietnam

On Aug. 23, 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed significant economic sanctions on Myanmar in response to the Junta’s violent use of airstrikes against its citizens. These sanctions targeted foreign individuals or entities supplying the fuel to launch these attacks. Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson stated that this action aimed to “further deprive the regime of the resources that enable it to oppress its citizens” and reaffirm America’s commitment to supporting the people of Myanmar. Despite these measures, the frequency and scale of these airstrikes have increased.

An article by Nikkei Asia, published on July 8, 2024, claimed that between January and April this year, the Myanmar military launched 819 airstrikes, killing 359 civilians and wounding another 756, including women and children. This amounts to an estimated average of nearly seven airstrikes per day during this period. They predict that if this trend continues, the total number of airstrikes 2024 could be the highest since the Junta seized power in February 2021.* 

Bypassing International Sanctions

A report by Amnesty International published on Jan. 31, 2024, revealed that the Myanmar military has managed to circumvent international sanctions on jet fuel, enabling the continued use of airstrikes to target civilians. Amnesty claims that instead of buying jet fuel directly from suppliers, the Junta now relies on multiple purchases through several intermediaries.

The constant changing of hands makes the fuel source harder to trace, providing some protection to Myanmar’s fuel suppliers from international pushback. Amnesty states that before 2023, Myanmar received fuel from direct purchases. It was only in 2023 that they began heavily using intermediaries, possibly in anticipation of these foreign sanctions. 

In the report, Amnesty claims that 7 fuel shipments, amounting to at least 67 kilotons of jet fuel, entered Myanmar in 2023. They also identified several fuel traders involved in these transactions, with BB Energy (Asia) Pte. Ltd. being the most prominent.

Notably, the report states that before reaching Myanmar, these shipments were held at the Cai Mep Petroleum Terminal in Vietnam, operated by Hai Linh Co. Ltd.. The fuel traders sold the shipments to a Vietnamese company, which then resold them to a buyer from Myanmar, with the final destination being the former Puma Energy Terminal in the Thilawa area port, Yangon.

Amnesty emphasizes that the current owner of this terminal,  Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Co. Ltd., is owned and controlled by the Myanmar military and is a target of international fuel sanctions, raising questions about the effectiveness of these measures. 

A more recent report by Amnesty International titled “Myanmar: ‘Reckless’ shipments of jet fuel continue as air strikes multiply,” released on July 8, 2024, delves further into how Myanmar circumvents international fuel sanctions and highlights their continuation in 2024. Amnesty claims that between January and June this year, at least 2 or 3 shipments have entered the country via the same Vietnam-Myanmar sea route.

These were delivered by the Chinese-owned HUITONG78 oil tanker, which was also responsible for delivering 6 out of the 7 oil shipments in 2023. Amnesty also implicates two more fuel traders in this supply chain: Singapore-based Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. and Chinese state-owned entity CNOOC Trading (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. 

Similar to the shipments in 2023, the deliveries made during the first half of 2024 involved multiple transactions and resales between several parties, making it challenging to pinpoint the original source of the fuel. Regardless, Amnesty was able to confirm that the shipments made stops in Vietnam before arrival in Myanmar. 

Airstrikes in 2024

The ineffectiveness of international sanctions on Myanmar’s jet fuel imports has enabled the junta to continue using airstrikes and scorched earth tactics in their attempt to quell the rebellion in their country. Their indiscriminate, or perhaps deliberate, targeting of civilians and public infrastructure has led to the deaths and displacement of thousands. 

On Feb. 8, 2024, Amnesty International reported one of these airstrikes on the morning of Jan. 7, 2024. Bombs were dropped near Saint Peter Baptist Church in Kanan Village, Sagaing Region. During this attack, over 20 people were injured, and 17 others were killed, including two children caught in the first wave of explosions. The church, a nearby school, and several houses were also damaged or destroyed. Amnesty stated that the Myanmar military denied responsibility for the attack despite video evidence proving otherwise. 

The Irrawaddy reported on another bombing that occurred on June 3, 2024, during a wedding ceremony in Sagaing Region’s Mingin Township. According to the news report, a Myanmar military aircraft dropped 3 500-pound bombs when the ceremony was taking place, resulting in 30 injuries and 27 deaths, including 3 children. The report adds that the attack was launched despite the absence of fighting or conflict in the area. 

More recently, on July 15, 2024, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on another junta airstrike in Laukkaing (Laukkai), a town in the northern Shan state. Before the attack, the town had been liberated by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an armed resistance group. RFA states that a fighter jet targeted several hotels and residential areas for around 20 minutes, resulting in the death of one civilian and injuries to ten others. Attempts by RFA to contact the Myanmar government for an official statement went unanswered.

The increased frequency of these airstrikes indicates that efforts to sanction Myanmar and its jet fuel suppliers are lacking. As a result, the junta can prolong its conflicts with various resistance groups, leaving innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. As such, the need for more effective international measures to cut the Junta’s access to these resources is paramount for the protection of the Myanmar people. 

Calls for Stricter Enforcement

In response to this situation, Justice for Myanmar (JFM) and The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, calling on the United States to better enforce Myanmar’s jet fuel sanctions. JFM urged the U.S. to strongly and consistently implement these sanctions against those involved in Myanmar’s acquisition of this critical resource. They noted that while the measures undertaken in August 2023 by the U.S. Treasury Department were a positive step, no new sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar despite the abundance of concrete evidence showcasing the inefficiency of the current sanctions. 

JFM also underscored the need to take action against the HUITONG78, the Chinese vessel that has consistently ferried jet fuel into Myanmar, the Vietnamese petroleum storage terminal operator, Hai Linh Co. Ltd., and all other entities involved in supplying the Junta. 

Amnesty’s Jan. 31, 2024 report states that “companies have a responsibility to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts by conducting human rights due diligence,” according to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. As such, those who supply jet fuel to Myanmar should meticulously scrutinize all aspects of their transactions to ensure they do not contribute to human rights violations or associate with harmful parties; ignorance cannot be used as an excuse in this regard, and international sanctions should be universally applied to ensure accountability across the board.

Montse Ferrer, the deputy regional director for research at Amnesty International, emphasized that the Cai Mep Petroleum Terminal, owned by Hai Linh Co. Ltd., is essential in Myanmar’s jet fuel supply chain. Hence, the Vietnamese government must ensure that its ports are not complicit in the willful and deliberate violation of human rights. However, the likelihood of Vietnam taking action on its own appears slim.

Vietnam has consistently shown support for the Myanmar Junta in the past by treating military officials in international gatherings as if they were the lawful representatives of the nation.

For instance, during the 2021 ITU Digital World online conference that was organized by the Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communications, Admiral Tin Aung San, the current deputy prime minister of Myanmar, was allowed to speak on behalf of the country.

Vietnam also sent representatives to Myanmar during a military parade in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. This cordial relationship with the junta makes it unlikely that the Vietnamese government will actively pursue the closure of the Cai Mep Petroleum Terminal or pressure Hai Linh Co. to cease dealing with Myanmar. 

Therefore, if additional sanctions are implemented regarding Myanmar's jet fuel supply, they should target not only business entities and individuals but also governments and nations, such as Vietnam; these countries' inaction or complicity allows these parties to operate with impunity freely.

* Nikkei Asia made this prediction using data from Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, a Burmese non-profit organization that collects information on Myanmar. The data can be accessed here.