Nguyen Phu Trong’s Ultimate Endgame: Grooming A Police Strongman As His Successor

General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong passed away on July 19, 2024, at the age of 80. Since then, numerous articles have explored his legacy in Vietnam. The legacy of a strong leader often becomes a topic of intense discussion both before and after their death. For Nguyen Phu Trong, this legacy is frequently associated with the "furnace-burning" campaign, his fight against corruption.

However, fighting corruption is not his only legacy, perhaps not even his greatest one.

Summary

• Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-corruption campaign has resulted in a significant political boost for the Ministry of Public Security and President To Lam, where police leaders, instead of technocrats, dominate the Politburo.
• Trong’s decision to serve as general secretary beyond the term and age limit might have set a dangerous precedent. His decision to take over the presidency in 2021 might also enable To Lam to hold two permanent positions among the “four pillars,” endangering the tradition of collective leadership in Vietnam.
• While To Lam is in an extremely strong position, he will face the challenge of measuring up to Trong’s reputation as a traditional Communist ideologue.

A day before General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s ultimate passing, the Politburo announced that President To Lam would resume the responsibility as the interim party chief of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). While there were rumors of Trong’s passing earlier this year, the fact that the Politburo came out with a statement this time and the decision to award Trong with the Gold Star signaled to observers that the ultimate news of Trong’s death was coming this time.

Following Trong’s passing, many articles have been about his legacy as he served as party chief for over 10 years. The official government narrative praised him for cleaning up the government (“internal enemies”) through the “blazing furnace” campaign. Foreign policy analysts praised him for supporting the flexible “bamboo diplomacy” policy, which promoted Vietnam’s trade with Western partners, despite his personal feelings towards China as a Marxist ideologue.

Building on these discussions, I want to make the case that Trong’s ultimate legacy is the rise of a strongman: former Minister of Public Security To Lam. While To Lam's ascendance may stabilize the political environment among Vietnam’s top leaders, it is also experiencing a concerning autocratic shift largely enabled by Trong.

To Lam’s Consolidation of Power

Only time will tell whether To Lam will be confirmed as the permanent party chief between now and the Party Congress in 2026. Still, General Secretary Trong’s hyper-fixation with eliminating corruption has directly contributed to To Lam’s rise to power - and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). 

The appointment of To Lam as interim general secretary has been a long time coming because of the power struggles that have plagued the VCP in the last few years through the anti-corruption campaign. Earlier this year, the campaign axed multiple senior members of the Politburo within a few months - including former President Vo Van Thuong, National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and Standing Member of the Politburo Truong Thi Mai. 

Half of the leaders of the “four pillars” and a high-ranking VCP member were removed, and they were all conveniently To Lam’s rivals for the party chief position. The only remaining person with enough seniority to challenge To Lam is Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, though it seems unlikely that Chinh has gathered enough support to launch his bid to become party chief.

In addition to benefiting To Lam, the anti-corruption campaign also significantly boosted the MPS's power. The campaign has removed those seen as “economic technocrats,” like former National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and the Politburo is now dominated by leaders with a police background.

Nikkei Asia correspondent Toru Takahashi pointed out that the anti-corruption campaign - Nguyen Phu Trong’s most important legacy - has become a power play instead of serving its original purpose of cleaning up the government. Zachary Abuza subsequently argued that the anti-corruption campaign has served its purpose as To Lam’s consolidation of power, which means that we can expect more stability at the highest level of the government from now on.

While it is true that elite politics in Vietnam is expected to be stabilized following Lam’s successful consolidation of power, it also means that we are witnessing an unrivaled strongman ascending to the highest position of the country.

An Authoritarian Shift

The Vietnamese government has never been considered democratic, but there has always been a sense of collective leadership. Nguyen Phu Trong, however, has set many authoritarian precedents that might enable To Lam to become even more of an authoritarian leader.

The “four pillars” - the party chief, the prime minister, the president, and the National Assembly chairman - are responsible for dividing power and working collectively alongside other members of the Politburo. Like China, Vietnam has long tried to enforce the norm of party secretaries serving no more than two terms due to concerns about authoritarian policy-making.

All hell broke loose with Trong’s decision to run for the third term despite his advanced age and his decision to become “dual-hatted” as he assumed the presidency in 2021 following President Tran Dai Quang’s passing. By choosing this course of action, Trong has set a dangerous precedent for any successors to become a Vietnamese version of Xi Jinping.

First, To Lam is 67, already two years above the age limit for the party chief position. If he secures enough support within the Politburo, he can gain a similar exemption to Trong. While it is hard to predict what will happen in the next ten years, one can imagine that Trong’s precedent would be followed if Lam decides that he, too, wants to remain in office until his 80s.

Second, as Trong created the precedent of holding both the presidency and the general secretary positions (similar to China’s Xi Jinping), To Lam can do the same. In fact, To Lam is currently similar to Xi in that he is the president and interim party chief. Vietnam has tried to avoid having the same leader holding two positions in the “four pillars,” but we might witness a shift in that thinking if To Lam remains in both positions moving forward.

Third, and perhaps the most alarming circumstance in To Lam’s rise to power, is that To Lam effectively controls both the police and military.

Lam abandoned his powerful position as the leader of MPS to assume the symbolic presidency once he ensured he could maintain his influence on the MPS. He was successful in that regard by appointing his protégé Luong Tam Quang as the current head of MPS.

As the interim party chief, constitutionally, To Lam is also the secretary of the Central Military Commission - the ideological head of Vietnam’s People’s Army, which asserts political influence over the Ministry of National Defense.

One can only imagine the immense power of To Lam’s current position, though only time will tell if he can maintain this favorable position.

To Lam’s Reputational Problem

While I have argued that To Lam becoming party secretary represents an authoritarian shift, To Lam also faces a unique problem: his reputation, which will be compared and contrasted to that of his predecessor, Trong.

Trong is known as a Marxist ideologue with a simple lifestyle, either through his personal choices or through the VCP propaganda machine (or, most likely, a combination of both).

During his funeral, the propaganda machine published articles praising him for having only used the same car - the Toyota Crown 1998 - for over two decades or his former 25-square-meter apartment with a shared bathroom with his neighbors and kitchen, where he and his family lived for ten years. 

In a way, the portrayal of Trong’s lifestyle is eerily similar to how Ho Chi Minh’s lifestyle used to be portrayed, which might explain why Trong is so popular among the Vietnamese public.

In contrast, the public knows of To Lam for the “Salt Bae” incident in 2021. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, a leaked video showed To Lam being hand-fed a piece of gold-crusted steak at over a thousand USD in the famous “Salt Bae” restaurant in London during his official visit to the United Kingdom. The video was said to have been taken after To Lam paid tribute at the grave of the late philosopher Karl Marx in London, adding to the irony of the situation.

If To Lam succeeds Nguyen Phu Trong, we are witnessing a shift of Vietnam’s paramount leader from a traditional Communist writer (Trong was the editor-in-chief of the Communist Review for a long time) to a power-hungry, greedy police officer. Lam will face the impossible challenge of measuring up to Trong’s squeaky-clean reputation, which might challenge him in gathering support among the public and the government in the long term.

Trong is widely called “the last Communist” by many Vietnamese commentators. In a way, if To Lam ultimately succeeds him, perhaps Trong was indeed the last Communist.