Key Events * Vietnamese Man Arrested for Alleged Ties to Overseas Group Tập hợp Dân chủ Đa nguyên (Pluralistic Democratic Association)
Thiện Trường wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Jan. 6, 2025. Thúc Kháng translated it into
Ngọc Giàu and Huỳnh Kha wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Mar. 4, 2025. Thúc Kháng
On Mar. 18, 2025, the Đồng Nai Provincial Police initiated legal proceedings and detained Quách Gia Khang, a 28-year-old resident of Bình Minh Commune, Trảng Bom District, for alleged activities aimed at overthrowing the people's administration.
According to the investigation, Khang had been in participated in the overseas organization "Tập hợp Dân chủ Đa nguyên" founded by Nguyễn Gia Kiểng, who resides in France. Authorities allege that Khang actively drafted and disseminated materials with anti-state orientations, calling for the overthrow of the government, abolishing the leadership role of the Communist Party, and infringing upon national security and social order.
Despite previous efforts by functional agencies to educate and persuade him, Khang allegedly maintained a defiant attitude and continued his involvement with the organization.
Authorities have expressed concern over the increasing activities of overseas organizations that they claimed to be “reactionary.”
According to the government, these organizations allegedly exploit social networks to recruit youth, students, and citizens into groups opposing the state. These actions include distorting information, inciting unrest, denying the leadership role of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defaming leaders, and advocating for political pluralism—all of which are considered serious violations of Vietnamese law.
On Facebook, Tập hợp Dân chủ Đa nguyên strongly rejects the Vietnamese government's allegations that Quách Gia Khang was involved in any plot to overthrow the state. The organization emphasizes that since its founding over 40 years ago, it has never called for the violent overthrow of the Communist regime, nor has it promoted violence in any form. On the contrary, Tập hợp Dân chủ Đa nguyên upholds the principles of dialogue, reconciliation, and nonviolence as central to its mission for national unity and democratic reform.
The arrest of Khang underscores the Vietnamese government's ongoing efforts to suppress dissent and maintain strict control over political activities. This incident aligns with a broader pattern of arrests targeting activists, journalists, and bloggers in Vietnam. For instance, in recent months, individuals such as environmental activist Ngô Thị Tố Nhiên have been detained and tried on charges related to their activism and online postings.
The international community continues to express concern over Vietnam's human rights record, particularly regarding freedom of expression and association. Human rights organizations have documented numerous cases where activists and critics of the government face harassment, arbitrary detention, and imprisonment. The arrest of individuals like Khang highlights the challenges faced by those who engage in activities perceived as opposing the state.
As Vietnam continues its economic development and integration into the global community, the tension between maintaining political control and addressing calls for greater freedoms remains a critical issue. The outcome of cases like Khang’s may indicate the government's stance on political dissent and its approach to managing opposition voices in the future.
Former political prisoner Vũ Quang Thuận is reportedly in critical condition after being released from prison just eight days before the end of his sentence. He was sent home from Nam Hà Prison on February 22, 2025, after prison officials were warned he could die at any moment due to severe illness.
Thuận, 59, suffers from late-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), respiratory failure, and other chronic ailments. His lung capacity is reportedly only 8% of normal. During his eight-year imprisonment, medical neglect, misdiagnoses, and a lack of proper treatment left him severely emaciated—he now only weighs only 38 kg (84 pounds).
Despite his urgent need for surgery in Hanoi, local police in Thái Bình Province have allegedly blocked him from accessing hospital care. On March 17, police reportedly forced him to return home from a Hanoi hospital. He soon collapsed and was rushed to emergency care; his current condition is unknown, though some sources say he is in a coma.
Thuận was arrested in 2017 under Article 88 of Vietnam’s Penal Code for "anti-state propaganda" alongside two colleagues, after producing online content critical of the government and advocating for democratic reforms. He received an eight-year prison sentence and five years under house arrest.
Human rights advocates view his current situation as a continuation of persecution—what some are calling a "death sentence extended beyond prison walls." Observers warn that his case is part of a disturbing pattern in which critically ill prisoners of conscience are released only to die shortly after.
RFA Vietnamese reports that political prisoners at Xuân Lộc Prison in Đồng Nai Province have raised urgent concerns about poor medical care, a lack of clean water, and insufficient food—conditions they say are worsening and threatening their health.
The allegations were made public after Nguyễn Thị Huệ, the mother of political prisoner Huỳnh Đức Thanh Bình, visited her son on March 18 and spoke to RFA.
Huỳnh Đức Thanh Bình was arrested in 2018 along with Trần Long Phi and U.S. citizen Michael Minh Phương Nguyễn on charges of “activities aimed at overthrowing the government” under Article 109 of Vietnam’s Penal Code. Bình was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while the other two political prisoners were released early.
According to Bình, prisoners in Division 2 of Xuân Lộc Prison are provided unfiltered water directly from underground wells. This water, often muddy and untreated, has led to widespread skin infections and kidney stones among inmates. His mother described the conditions as “horrific,” stating that access to clean water and basic healthcare is grossly inadequate.
The food situation has also deteriorated. In February, Bình and several other prisoners staged a partial hunger strike, refusing prison rations for several weeks to protest the substandard meals and unsanitary conditions. Since then, prison officials have changed the food distribution system: instead of delivering meals to each cell, they now leave food carts at the front of the cell block, requiring inmates to fetch it themselves.
This change has created a hierarchy of access—those in cells furthest from the cart often receive little or no food. “Some inmates eat until they’re full, while others go hungry,” Huệ told RFA.
To compensate, Bình has had to purchase overpriced food from the prison canteen—where prices are reported to be three to four times higher than market rates—and share it with fellow inmates. However, as of March, the prison has capped monthly purchases at 1.94 million dong ($76), making it harder for prisoners to supplement their diet.
Bình and another inmate, known only as Tấn, recently resorted to a week-long hunger strike, drinking only water. The protest is part of a growing outcry among political prisoners across Vietnam, who say they are being mistreated and denied basic human rights.
Former inmate Nguyễn Ngọc Ánh, who was released in August 2024, confirmed similar problems. “During the dry season, they pump untreated groundwater full of sediment and mud,” he said. “I complained to every officer I could find, but nothing changed.”
As international attention increasingly focuses on Vietnam’s human rights record, these firsthand accounts from Xuân Lộc Prison raise new concerns about the treatment of those imprisoned for peaceful dissent.
RFA Vietnamese reports that Trần Long Phi, a young Vietnamese man who has lived much of his life in exile, has once again been forced to flee his homeland—this time after serving a prison sentence for participating in a peaceful protest. His story, featured by Radio Free Asia, reflects the harsh realities faced by political dissidents in Vietnam.
Born into a family of political refugees, Phi first fled Vietnam at age 11 in 2011, when his parents sought asylum in Thailand. Though young, he quickly learned the hardships of stateless life: economic precarity, cultural adjustments, and eventual heartbreak. After the UNHCR denied his family’s asylum claim in 2014, Phi’s mother fell gravely ill and passed away two years later, she is buried in Thailand. Phi left school after 10th grade to care for her.
In 2018, with hopes of starting over, Phi returned to Vietnam. But he found a nation plagued by what he described as “a lack of freedom and justice.” That year, he joined mass protests across the country opposing the controversial Special Economic Zones bill, which many feared would give China undue influence through long-term land leases.
Phi’s act of dissent led to his arrest on July 7, 2018. He was later sentenced to eight years in prison and three years of house arrest under Article 109 of Vietnam’s Penal Code for “activities aimed at overthrowing the government.” He maintains his actions were peaceful and patriotic: “I simply wanted to speak the truth… but in Vietnam, truth is often silenced.”
Released in February 2024, Phi once again found himself surveilled and restricted. In early 2025, he fled Vietnam a second time, rejoining the ranks of overseas Vietnamese political exiles.
His story is emblematic of the broader repression facing activists and rights defenders in Vietnam. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have repeatedly criticized the Vietnamese government’s use of vague national security laws to criminalize peaceful dissent.
As Vietnam deepens its global economic ties, stories like Phi’s continue to raise questions about its commitment to human rights—particularly freedom of expression and political pluralism.
Vietnamese religious refugees in Thailand are expressing cautious optimism after the United States sanctioned Thai officials for their role in the forced repatriation of Uyghur Muslims to China. Many hope the move will deter Thai authorities from cooperating with Hanoi in future deportations of Vietnamese asylum seekers.
On March 15, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced visa restrictions on current and former Thai officials, along with their family members, for their involvement in the Feb. 27 deportation of over 40 Uyghur refugees back to China. The decision signals Washington’s growing concern over Thailand’s handling of religious and political refugees, especially under pressure from authoritarian governments.
Among the estimated 1,500 Vietnamese asylum seekers currently in Thailand are Montagnard Christians from Vietnam’s Central Highlands and Hmong Protestants from the Northwest. Fleeing persecution and forced to renounce their faith, they remain in legal limbo. Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, leaving many without the right to work and vulnerable to arrest, detention, and potential deportation.
One of the most high-profile cases is that of Y Quỳnh Bđăp, a Montagnard rights activist and co-founder of Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ). Despite being granted refugee status and progressing toward resettlement in Canada, Y Quỳnh was arrested by Thai police last year at Vietnam’s request. He had been sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison in Vietnam on terrorism charges—a conviction widely condemned by human rights groups. In late 2024, a Bangkok court approved his extradition, ignoring appeals from the UN and civil society advocates.
Adding to the tension, Thai authorities last month detained over 60 Montagnards as they gathered for a memorial prayer. Forty-three remain in detention, facing high bail demands of up to $1,500 per person. Reports also allege that Vietnamese officials have visited detainees at the Immigration Detention Center (IDC), pressuring them to “voluntarily” return to Vietnam under threat of forced repatriation.
Refugees and their advocates now hope that the U.S. sanctions will restrain Thai cooperation with Vietnam and signal greater international scrutiny of forced returns. Thoan Siu, a Montagnard asylum seeker from Gia Lai Province, told RFA he remains fearful but encouraged by the U.S. action. “We don’t want to be sent back to a place where we were hunted for our beliefs,” he said.
As the geopolitical spotlight sharpens on Southeast Asia’s handling of refugees, the future of Vietnam’s religious minorities in exile remains uncertain—caught between the indifference of host countries and the reach of the regime they fled.
Radio Free Asia (RFA), one of the most prominent U.S.-funded international broadcasters, is facing an uncertain future after the Trump administration unexpectedly terminated its federal funding, citing structural reforms within the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM). The funding halt follows an executive order that calls for the dissolution of several federally funded institutions deemed "non-statutory."
RFA, established by Congress in 1994 through the International Broadcasting Act, is one of several independent news organizations under USAGM. It broadcasts in nine languages, including Vietnamese, Korean, Uyghur, and Mandarin, reaching audiences in countries with limited or no press freedom. Its reporting on authoritarian regimes has made it a vital source of uncensored information, particularly in regions like China, North Korea, and Vietnam.
On March 15, RFA received official notice from USAGM special counsel Kari Lake that its federal funding had been cut and that any unspent funds must be returned. The letter also noted that RFA could appeal the decision within 30 days. The move has raised concerns among press freedom advocates, international human rights organizations, and millions of listeners who rely on RFA’s independent reporting.
In a public statement, RFA President Bay Fang condemned the decision, warning it would benefit authoritarian regimes. “Cutting RFA’s funding is a gift to dictators and despots—especially the Chinese Communist Party—who seek unchecked control of information,” Fang said. “This decision not only silences nearly 60 million weekly listeners who turn to us for the truth, but it empowers the enemies of democracy at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.”
Among those most impacted would also be the VOA Vietnamese Service, which has long played a vital role in delivering independent news to Vietnamese audiences inside and outside the country.
Known for its coverage of human rights, corruption, and civil society, VOA Vietnamese reaches millions of Vietnamese through shortwave radio, social media, and its website. Analysts warn that defunding VOA and RFA at a time of increasing repression in Vietnam would leave a dangerous vacuum in information access—particularly as state media tightens its grip and silences domestic critics.
While it remains unclear whether RFA will be able to continue operations or for how long, the organization has vowed to fight the decision and protect its mission. “RFA will challenge this order and continue to serve the millions who depend on our reporting,” Fang said.
As media watchdogs and lawmakers weigh in, the future of RFA, VOA —and the broader role of U.S. public diplomacy through media—hangs in the balance.
Luat Khoa Magazine reports that the National Assembly will be required to pass a resolution on the annexation of provincial boundaries by June 30.. This follows the latest directive from the Communist Party of Vietnam to the National Assembly, outlined in Dispatch 43-VC/BCM, dated March 20.
Interior Minister Pham Thi Thanh Tra announced that the provincial mergers are expected to be completed before Aug. 30.
On Feb. 14, the Politburo of the Communist Party met and approved a plan to reorganize all local governments under a two-tier administrative model: provincial and grassroots levels.
The Politburo also confirmed that “it is already clear” how many provinces will be reorganized, though it did not publicly disclose the number. Some maps and unofficial documents circulating online suggest that the country may be left with only 32–34 provinces and centrally-governed cities.
Commune-level administrative units will also be reorganized, with the number of communes reduced to approximately 2,000—down from the current 10,035—by June 30.
Previously, the Party Committee submitted a proposal to reduce the number of provincial-level units by 50%. At the commune level, the plan would reassign one-third of responsibilities to the provincial level and the remaining two-thirds to lower-level authorities.
Beginning March 17, the Party Committee began collecting feedback from localities, ministries, and agencies in order to report to the Politburo and submit final recommendations to the central government before April 1.
The 9th session of the National Assembly is scheduled to begin in early May 2025. This session is expected to include amendments and supplements to the Constitution, as well as the official announcement of new provincial names following the mergers.
Luat Khoa Magazine has reported that the Ministry of Public Security concluded its investigation of a case involving violations of accounting regulations at Phúc Sơn Group Joint Stock Co.
The case file was then forwarded to the Supreme People's Procuracy with a recommendation to prosecute the chairman of Phúc Sơn Group, Nguyễn Văn Hậu (also known as Hậu “Pháo”).
According to the investigation, Hậu allegedly paid 132 billion dong in bribes to officials in several provinces to help his company evade taxes, falsify financial information, and commit other violations.
Among the officials who received bribes, two senior leaders from Vĩnh Phúc Province reportedly received the largest sums.
In Quảng Ngãi Province, Hậu also allegedly paid bribes to three former officials:
Regarding Nguyễn Văn Hậu, the police confirmed the seizure of 534 taels of gold, USD1.1 million, VND41.5 billion in cash, and three luxury vehicles.
Additionally, authorities froze 24 bank accounts in Hậu’s name. One account contained 200 billion dong, another more than 18 billion dong, and a third over 10 billion dong. Several other accounts held balances exceeding 2 billion dong each.
So far, the case has reportedly caused a loss of 960 billion dong to the state budget, along with tens of thousands of billions of dong in unpaid taxes owed by the Phúc Sơn Group.
The company currently holds 21 projects with a total investment exceeding 40,000 billion dong.
The scandal is widely believed to have contributed to the resignation of one of Vietnam’s “Four Pillar” leaders, Võ Văn Thưởng, who stepped down as the country’s resident and a Politburo commissioner in March 2024.
The Ministry of Public Security has stated that it will continue investigating the Phúc Sơn case.
Hue Radio and Television issued a private apology after mistakenly broadcasting an old program showing a yellow flag with three red stripes—the former flag of South Vietnam. The image appeared as a tattoo on a chef featured in a re-aired episode of Street Food, originally produced by Netflix. The station admitted the “sensitive image” had been previously removed but was accidentally re-broadcast due to an internal editing error. Although it apologized in private messages, no public apology had been posted on its official platforms as of March 17.
On March 18, a 41-year-old man in Lạng Sơn Province was administratively fined 7.5 million dong ($293) for “spreading false information” online. Authorities allege that this man used his Facebook account to post misleading comments about the government’s proposed provincial mergers. Police stated that after being “educated on legal regulations,” the man deleted the comments and pledged not to repeat the offense. The suspect's name was only listed as Đ.Đ.C by the police, and his actual identity was not given.
On March 17, the Hanoi People’s Court held a trial involving 13 defendants in a corruption case involving the Vietnam Computer Emergency Response Center (VNCERT). Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nhàn, CEO of the AIC Group, was sentenced in absentia to 30 years in prison for bribery and bidding violations. This marks the eighth time she has been tried in absentia. The court found that Nhàn directed her subordinates to falsify bidding documents, embezzling 70 billion dong.
Radio Free Asia/Zachary Abuza/Mar. 16
“[Tô] Lâm is doing something fundamentally different, turning the general secretary into an executive position. He’s not just setting the bookends in which policy can be deliberated, he’s proactively leading policy, formulation, and implementation.
Tô Lâm’s method is not brute force, but institutional reordering. He is moving to concentrate power by tightening control over appointments, promoting loyalists, and reshaping the party's internal rules to favor a more centralized, top-down leadership model.”
Ngọc Giàu and Huỳnh Kha wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Mar. 4, 2025. Thúc Kháng
Huỳnh Kha wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Mar. 5, 2025. Thúc Kháng translated it into
Huỳnh Kha wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Mar. 3, 2025. Thúc Kháng translated it into
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