The Three Deadlocks Blocking To Lam’s 'Era of Aspiration'
A clear and balanced perspective on the new “Era of Aspiration” is necessary, steering clear of both excessive criticism and exaggerated praise.
A clear and balanced perspective on the new “Era of Aspiration” is necessary, steering clear of both excessive criticism and exaggerated praise.
Viễn Đông wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luat Khoa Magazine on Feb. 27, 2025. Jason Nguyen translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
The slogan “Vietnam’s Era of Aspiration” has gained traction across various media platforms. General Secretary To Lam emphasized that this time will be one of the “development, prosperity, and strength under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully building a socialist Vietnam where the people are wealthy, the country is strong, and society upholds democracy, justice, and civility.” [1]
To usher in this era, the head of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam, declared: “Every Vietnamese citizen — all 100 million as one — must remain united and unanimous under the Party’s leadership, seize opportunities, overcome risks and challenges, and propel the country forward with strength, breakthroughs, and development.” [2] A common theme in Lam’s words is the unwavering leadership of the Communist Party.
Did he introduce a new vision for the party and the country in his so-called ‘Era of Aspiration’? The answer is a resounding no.
Strength, prosperity, and development have long been staples in official speeches and political discourse. Former Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, in particular, was famous for his formulaic rhetoric, frequently declaring that every province must become an “economic locomotive.” [3] This prompted a wave of sarcasm, with many asking: If every province is a locomotive, which ones are the train cars?
Ironically, Nguyen Xuan Phuc was reprimanded in December 2024 by the Politburo for “violating Party and state regulations in carrying out his duties, failing to prevent corruption and misconduct.” State media reported that his violations “caused serious consequences, public discontent, and damaged the reputation of the Party and the state.” [4]
Becoming an “economic locomotive,” driving development and progress, or even becoming an “economic dragon” is a legitimate aspiration. After all, dreams and ambitions come at no cost. However, the people must judge their leaders by actions, not just words. Therefore, the real question, however, is whether To Lam’s lofty calls to action are grounded in reality, given the country’s three deep-rooted structural deadlocks, the challenges that frustrate the public and severely limit the nation’s progress.
Traffic congestion has been a persistent issue in Vietnam since well before the enactment of Decree 168 on January 1, 2025. As the economy expanded, urban traffic pressures have become unbearable. What were once isolated traffic jams have worsened into citywide gridlocks.
Decree 168/2024/NĐ-CP — officially titled “Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Traffic Violations, Points Deduction, and License Point Restoration” — was introduced to alleviate congestion and promote traffic discipline. However, its shortcomings have become glaringly obvious.
Instead of providing clear guidance and installing proper signage — such as right-turn allowances at intersections — authorities only acted after heavy traffic had paralyzed the roads.
According to Báo Giao thông (The Traffic Newspaper), by Jan. 19, 2025, Ho Chi Minh City’s Department of Transport had finally installed 486 green right-turn signals at 200 intersections. [5] This long overdue measure should have been implemented much earlier rather than relying on a reactive, “fix-it-as-we-go” approach.
The absurdity of this situation has left many frustrated. A viral Facebook comment stated:
“In 2024, traffic jams stretched from the roads to the sidewalks. In 2025, the roads are jammed, but at least the sidewalks are clear!” [6]
Another user posted: “I’m spending my entire youth getting stuck in traffic.”
Traffic gridlocks are more than just inconveniences — they are economic burdens, wasting countless hours as citizens endure long, tedious commutes.
Critics of Decree 168 on social networks may also face administrative fines. [7] By silencing dissent, the Ministry of Public Security has consolidated its power like never before. Báo Công an Nhân dân (The People’s Public Security Newspaper), its mouthpiece, also condemned opposing views or complaints as “tricks to distort and disrupt Decree 168.” [8]
Another media outlet, Báo Tin tức (Information Newspaper), argued that Decree 168 had brought positive results and urged the public to move on from discussions questioning its viability. [9]
Regardless of how news outlets frame this issue, traffic congestion is a reality that the general public cannot ignore. Studies estimate that gridlocks cost Ho Chi Minh City $6 billion annually and Hanoi $3 billion. [10] In a $476 billion economy (2024 GDP), the combined losses from these two cities because of traffic congestion amount to nearly 2% of the national GDP.
When compared to one of Vietnam’s key industries, such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), these losses are staggering. The $9 billion lost to congestion in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City amounts to nearly a quarter of the country’s ICT sector GDP in 2023 — an industry the government envisions as a pillar of economic growth. [11] If left unchecked, this problem will only worsen.
So far, the government has neither listened to the people’s concerns nor offered any concrete, long-term solutions.
General Secretary To Lam has acknowledged Vietnam’s technological issues — including dependence on foreign R&D, weak talent retention, and the limited capacity of domestic firms. [12]
While the country’s digital economy is expanding, many challenges persist. Digital adoption in rural areas remains low [13], regulatory and institutional frameworks remain weak, and skilled tech workers are in short supply. [14]
To Lam has made bold declarations to address these issues, but turning words into immediate action is an entirely different story. The real question is: who will take responsibility for solving these impending matters, and who will be held accountable if they fail?
On Jan. 15, 2025, Minister of Information and Communications Nguyen Manh Hung delivered an overly optimistic speech about Vietnam’s digital future, confidently declaring: “Technology is the key for Vietnam to stand among global powers. Vietnam is also a cradle for tech enterprises to go global and solve global problems.” [15]
Compared to Lam’s acknowledgement of limitations, Hung’s statement feels entirely disconnected from reality. These two leaders offer starkly different portrayals of Vietnam’s technological landscape.
Is Vietnam a technological powerhouse or not? Which leader should the public believe?
Vietnamese policymakers often idolize Silicon Valley, hoping to replicate its success. However, they see only the skyscrapers, banks, and office parks—the “hardware”—while failing to recognize the “software” that makes Silicon Valley thrive: an institutional foundation of freedom, innovation, and rule of law developed over centuries.
Without these foundations, billions of dollars in investment will not transform Vietnam into a regional — let alone world-class — technological hub. And in reality, Vietnam does not even have those billions to begin with.
Corruption remains a major public grievance. Although the anti-corruption campaign under former General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong won public praise, it also exposed deeper systemic flaws.
According to Báo Điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (VCP News Portal), Minister of Public Security Lương Tam Quang reported 956 corruption cases in 2024 — an increase of 20.55% from 2023. [16]
Corruption thrives in a non-transparent system tangled in bureaucratic red tape, where bribery is necessary for efficiency. Low salaries, entrenched greed, and a deeply rooted culture of kickbacks only worsen the problem.
Studies highlight persistent structural issues: ineffective performance evaluation, poor incentives, lack of transparency, and an unappealing work environment. [17]
While anti-corruption efforts show several positive developments, they have also created a chilling effect within the government, leaving officials paralyzed by fear of making decisions. [18] Considering the risks of political repercussions, it is difficult to blame them solely; a single misplaced signature could be enough to land them in court.
Simply put, Vietnam’s bureaucratic dysfunction lies at the heart of the problem. The current political system has not only fostered corruption but enabled it to fester and spread. At the same time, it suppressed genuine talent, nurtured the career advancement of corrupt officials, and politicized the administrative apparatus. Until democratic oversight and real checks on power are established, talented individuals outside the Party will remain locked out of public policy, and corruption will continue to thrive.
Ambition for aspiration is good, but unchecked optimism risks turning ambition into delusion.
For Vietnam’s leadership, facing reality and fully acknowledging its flaws and challenges is the only path to genuine progress. A nation cannot move forward by downplaying its problems; doing so is nothing more than self-deception and wishful thinking.
1. Châu, M. (2025, November 25). Kỷ nguyên vươn mình của dân tộc Việt Nam! Báo Điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam. https://dangcongsan.vn/xay-dung-dang/ky-nguyen-vuon-minh-cua-dan-toc-viet-nam-684307.html
2. See [1].
3. Long, T. H. (2021, April 7). Vị trí chủ tịch nước: Đầu tàu mà không phải đầu tàu. Luật Khoa. https://www.luatkhoa.com/2021/04/vi-tri-chu-tich-nuoc-dau-tau-ma-khong-phai-dau-tau/
4. Chung, T. (2024, December 13). Bộ Chính trị kỷ luật cảnh cáo ông Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, Trương Hòa Bình, khiển trách bà Trương Thị Mai. Tuổi Trẻ. https://tuoitre.vn/bo-chinh-tri-ky-luat-canh-cao-ong-nguyen-xuan-phuc-truong-hoa-binh-khien-trach-ba-truong-thi-mai-2024121313471259.htm
5. Quỳnh, M. (2025, January 19). 500 giao lộ ở TP.HCM được lắp biển báo phụ cho phép rẽ phải. Báo Giao thông. https://atgt.baogiaothong.vn/500-giao-lo-o-tphcm-duoc-lap-bien-bao-phu-cho-phep-re-phai-192250119135530727.htm
6. Nghệ, N. Á. (2025, January 12). Câu chuyện kẹt xe. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/groups/otosaigon2023/permalink/919694390036458/
7. RFA. (2025, January 16). Bộ Công an xử lý người dân vì chỉ trích Nghị định 168 trên mạng xã hội. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/bo-cong-an-xu-ly-nguoi-chi-trich-nghi-dinh-168-01162025103203.html
8. Huân, N. (2025, January 6). Thủ đoạn xuyên tạc, gây nhiễu Nghị định 168 về xử phạt vi phạm an toàn giao thông đường bộ. Công an Nhân dân. https://cand.com.vn/Chong-dien-bien-hoa-binh/thu-doan-xuyen-tac-gay-nhieu-nghi-dinh-168-ve-xu-phat-vi-pham-an-toan-giao-thong-duong-bo-i755667/
9. Vinh, T. Q. (2025, January 15). Nghị định 168 - Chỉ bàn tiến, không bàn lùi! Báo Tin tức. https://baotintuc.vn/thoi-su/nghi-dinh-168-chi-ban-tien-khong-ban-lui-20250115083204865.htm
10. Minh, H. (2025, January 19). Ùn tắc giao thông, Việt Nam chịu thiệt hại hàng tỷ USD mỗi năm? Vietnam Finance. https://vietnamfinance.vn/un-tac-giao-thong-gay-thiet-hai-hang-ty-usd-moi-nam-d121516.html
11. Giang, N. K. (2024, April 16). Cooling the “Blazing Furnace” of Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption Drive. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/cooling-the-blazing-furnace-of-vietnams-anti-corruption-drive/
12. Hà, T. (2025, January 15). Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm: Thời cơ vàng để khẳng định năng lực cạnh tranh công nghệ trên trường quốc tế. Tuổi Trẻ. https://tuoitre.vn/tong-bi-thu-to-lam-thoi-co-vang-de-khang-dinh-nang-luc-canh-tranh-cong-nghe-tren-truong-quoc-te-20250115145059373.htm
13. Quân, A. (2024, June 18). Trình độ công nghệ thấp đang cản trở Việt Nam ứng dụng số. Thanh Niên. https://thanhnien.vn/trinh-do-cong-nghe-thap-dang-can-tro-viet-nam-ung-dung-so-185240617235422929.htm
14. Thực trạng và giải pháp phát triển kinh tế số tại Việt Nam. (2024, June 21). Ban Kinh tế Trung ương. https://kinhtetrunguong.vn/web/guest/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/thuc-trang-va-giai-phap-phat-trien-kinh-te-so-tai-viet-nam.html
15. Nguyễn, N. (2025, January 15). Bộ trưởng Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng: "Việt Nam không còn là nước nhỏ". Dân Trí. https://dantri.com.vn/suc-manh-so/bo-truong-nguyen-manh-hung-viet-nam-khong-con-la-nuoc-nho-20250115104419234.htm
16. Anh, V. (2024, November 26). Năm 2024: Phát hiện, xử lý gần 1.000 vụ tội phạm tham nhũng, chức vụ. Báo Điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam. https://dangcongsan.vn/phap-luat/nam-2024-phat-hien-xu-ly-gan-1000-vu-toi-pham-tham-nhung-chuc-vu-684352.html
17. Giang, N. K. (2024, April 16). Cooling the “Blazing Furnace” of Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption Drive. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/cooling-the-blazing-furnace-of-vietnams-anti-corruption-drive/
18. Giang, N. K. (2023, October 18). Hot “Furnace” at Home, Cool Relationships Abroad. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/hot-furnace-at-home-cool-relationships-abroad/
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