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In Việt Nam, an old adage has long shaped public perception: “Whatever is the problem, let the police take care of it.” This ingrained trust has gradually expanded police oversight into areas that are not problems at all. The latest example of this trend is the proposal that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) should manage KOLs—a clearly misplaced and unnecessary extension of state power.

Using Shackles to “Encourage” Freedom A KOL, or Key Opinion Leader, is an individual who shapes public sentiment. Colloquially known as “influencers,” some of them are experts or respected voices in their fields, and their words carry weight precisely because of their hard-earned credibility and professional standing.

Việt Nam’s MPS’s move to classify these KOLs within its framework for controlling public discourse has created a paradox unlike anything seen before. Why? Because influencers—especially in an era when anyone can open a Facebook account or stream live on YouTube—need their creativity and effort. Without the ability to create content that genuinely captivates an audience, no one can truly shape public opinion.

Creativity, by its very nature, is born from freedom: freedom of style, of content, of expression. To confine people inside a cage is to defy this fundamental principle.

Moreover, the more influence and status a person has, the greater their desire for freedom becomes—to live, speak, and express themselves on their own terms. If that freedom is already scarce, and one must now wear the invisible shackle of state control, who would still want to be a KOL?

At its core, the relationship between KOLs and their audiences is a voluntary civil relationship. It is not—and must never be—a domain where police have the authority to intervene with coercive power.

Do the Police Have the Legal Authority to Manage KOLs? The public needs to stop normalizing the idea that the Ministry of Public Security should have authority over everything. Legally, its powers are limited. According to Article 16 of the 2018 Law on the People’s Public Security, the Ministry’s mandate is to protect national security, handle crimes, and manage public order—not to manage public opinion.

The legal definition of “national security” is itself narrow. Article 3 of the Law on National Security focuses on just two areas: the stability of the political regime and the inviolability of national sovereignty.

Despite these clear limits, when someone sees the world through the lens of a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Under this mindset, any act, no matter how benign, can be reinterpreted as a potential “threat to national security.”

By stretching the definition to cover anything affecting the regime’s “survival,” the sword of the security apparatus has already cut down prominent voices like Atty. Trần Đình Triển and journalist Trương Huy San .

To see how far this term can be abused, one need only look at the ban on ViruSs ’ livestreams—a case involving nothing more than romantic gossip. The takeaway is that the scope of “national security” has become virtually unlimited, creating fertile ground for the abuse of power. Once it becomes an all-encompassing umbrella concept, it can swallow everything.

Under such logic, putting KOLs under police supervision not only devalues individual achievement but also reinforces the dangerous notion that freedom itself is a threat to society.

A Pretext for Overreach Officials have attempted to justify the proposed oversight by citing concerns over the digital age. Nguyễn Tiến Cường , a representative of Department A05, claimed that issues like fake news, misleading ads, and “deviant content” create a need to manage KOLs. But this rationale does not hold up to scrutiny.

First, the justification rests on vague terminology. What exactly counts as “deviant content”? And who has the authority to define what is “standard” for a society?

Second, the argument about misleading ads misidentifies the responsible authority. If KOLs are involved in product promotion, that activity falls squarely within the realm of commerce and advertising. These are not police matters.

The legal responsibility belongs to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (under Article 2 of Decree 96/2022/NĐ-CP ) and the Ministry of Information and Communications (per Clauses 8–9, Article 2 of Decree 48/2022/NĐ-CP ).

Assigning this role to the MPS would create a clear overlap of authority and represent a blatant overreach of power. Legally, the ministry's scope is security, not commercial credibility. Expanding into “reputation scoring” would be a meddlesome intrusion into areas far beyond its mandate.

Learning from China It is no secret that Vietnamese officials often look to China for policy “inspiration.” Indeed, China took the lead in perceiving the “danger” of online personalities, tightening control over KOLs, influencers, and livestreamers through a complex regulatory system.

Chinese regulations require influencers to register, obtain identification codes, and in some sectors—like finance, law, or healthcare—hold professional licenses to livestream. Their speech and conduct are also monitored through ranking systems and credibility scores.

A key component is the “ Code of Conduct for Online Hosts ,” which lays out specific legal norms. Article 13 mandates that livestreamers in specialized fields must hold valid certifications, and platforms are responsible for verifying them. Further, Articles 17–18 of the Code establish a credit-based supervision mechanism, complete with reputation scores, yellow and red card warnings, and blacklists. This effectively functions as a social credit system for online speech.

These rules are reinforced by regulations like the 2016 “ Measures for the Administration of Internet Live-Streaming Services, ” which require platforms to verify identities and report to authorities. In essence, China’s system does not merely censor content—it categorizes, ranks, and filters individuals, turning livestreaming into a heavily regulated profession.

While this framework may be presented as a “risk management” tool, its true function is to homogenize diversity of thought and reduce all opinions to a single “standard” defined by the state.

Police State and Parallels with Absolute Monarchy A defining trait of Việt Nam’s emerging police-state model is the overreach of the Ministry of Public Security, which is concentrating power in an apparatus designed more to control society than to serve it.

Viewed through a historical lens, this system resembles an absolutist monarchy. In those regimes, kings wielded supreme authority, relying on secret police and repression to protect the throne. Vague terms like “treason” or “insulting the sovereign” were used to justify the elimination of dissent, and law existed not to uphold justice, but to enforce the king’s will.

The modern parallels are clear. Vague concepts like “national security” or “abuse of democratic freedoms” have become the new catch-all justifications for silencing speech. In this framework, law enforcement evolves into a mechanism for protecting the regime first, and the people second. Police power seeps beyond combating crime into the realms of expression, assembly, and culture.

The only difference is the source of legitimacy. While monarchies relied on the divine “Mandate of Heaven,” today’s police states rest on ideology and security anxiety. Yet, both share the same underlying logic: the survival of the regime is equated with the survival of the nation, thereby rationalizing any and all forms of control.

Đan Thanh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Sept. 10, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

When Even KOLs Need Policing: The Paradox of Control and Freedom in Việt Nam

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