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On Dec. 19, 2025, Hà Nội broke ground on the Olympic Sports Urban Area, a massive project spanning more than 9,000 hectares with a projected investment exceeding 925 trillion đồng. [1] Its centerpiece is “ Trống Đồng Stadium, ” a 73.3-hectare venue designed to hold 135,000 spectators. Marketed as a FIFA-standard facility with a retractable roof, it aims to rank among the world's most modern stadiums. [2]

If the stadium is completed by August 2028 and the full complex by 2035 as planned, it would become the world’s largest stadium by area. [3]

However, the project aims to be more than just a monumental sports facility. Planners seek to create a new “growth pole” in the southern capital, utilizing transit-oriented development (TOD) to stimulate services, commerce, and tourism, and to enhance Việt Nam's standing as a host for international events.

Nevertheless, precisely because of this massive scale and long-term impact, the project cannot be evaluated solely on architectural aesthetics. What demands scrutiny are the deeper implications of this investment policy on everyday livelihoods.

When “Modernity” Becomes a Slogan

Research by Bent Flyvbjerg on large-scale infrastructure identifies a recurring pattern known as “optimism bias by design.” Megaprojects are frequently sold through compelling narratives of “growth engines” and “development breakthroughs,” yet in practice, they tend to experience cost overruns, deliver fewer benefits than forecast, and systematically underestimate risks. [4]

The projects that appear most impressive on paper are often the most prone to deviation upon implementation. This is driven not just by flawed forecasting but by political incentives, reputational concerns, and symbolic competition—factors that prioritize excessive optimism over a sober assessment of reality.

This raises several questions regarding Hà Nội’s Trống Đồng Stadium. Has the project demonstrated a credible capacity for risk control? Has the appraisal process been sufficiently independent and transparent to counter bias and rein in over-optimism? Furthermore, who will bear responsibility if assumptions about demand, revenue, and socio-economic benefits fail to materialize?

If these questions remain unresolved, “modernity” risks becoming little more than a media label. Meanwhile, governance and financial risks will persist long after the groundbreaking ceremony, potentially crystallizing into substantial future social obligations.

The Demand and Utilization Puzzle

A stadium capacity of 135,000 seats is exceedingly rare worldwide. Facilities of this magnitude typically exist only in markets with highly commercialized league systems and dense event calendars. In Việt Nam, while football is undoubtedly popular, the broader “event economy” required to support such a venue remains limited.

Crucially, the revenue streams that sustain massive stadiums elsewhere—broadcasting rights, matchday income, and diverse multi-event operations spanning concerts and exhibitions—have not yet coalesced into a stable ecosystem in Việt Nam. Without high utilization rates, a facility with such enormous operating costs faces a precarious financial future.

If the strategy for filling these seats relies on hosting mega-events like the ASIAD, Olympics, or World Cup, the project rests on a high-risk, low-sustainability assumption. These events are infrequent, and securing hosting rights requires navigating intense financial, diplomatic, and geopolitical competition.

An investment strategy anchored in rare mega-events may generate fleeting moments of national spectacle, but it risks leaving behind an “expensive-to-idle” structure for the vast majority of its lifespan.

International lessons and Hà Nội’s ambitions

Global experience with post–mega-event stadiums offers no shortage of cautionary tales. Research on South Africa's Cape Town Stadium , for instance, reveals a project driven by the ambition to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup and create an iconic landmark. However, once the event concluded, the venue struggled with low utilization and heavy operating costs, sparking prolonged debates over its financial burden on the public. [5]

Other reports suggest that such expensive stadium solutions often saddle the public with long-term subsidies , while alternative options with greater “developmental” or “value-for-money” potential are overlooked. [6] The common failure in these “supersized” projects is not poor construction, but a fundamental mismatch between investment scale and real demand. Without a dense event calendar and a clear business model, these stadiums inevitably become liabilities.

Against this backdrop, the public still lacks clarity on whether Hà Nội has developed a concrete operating plan. Who are the primary clients, and what event pipeline exists? Which revenue streams can realistically cover operating and depreciation costs?

If the answers limit themselves to broad slogans about "attracting tourism, services, and jobs," the project may fall into the same cycle of risk. This lack of detailed information is both a technical oversight and a serious issue of accountability.

Misplaced Priorities

Any project costing hundreds of trillions of đồng entails systemic opportunity costs, regardless of the funding source. When land, infrastructure incentives, and public resources are mobilized on this scale, they crowd out other possibilities.

As Hà Nội struggles with chronic traffic congestion, severe pollution, and a lack of public space—alongside mounting pressure on schools, hospitals, and housing—is betting on a sports symbol the best use of resources?

True “modernity” is a matter of governance, not aesthetics. A modern city invests within its means, prioritizes clearly, and is transparent about policy trade-offs.

Modern urban policy cannot be driven merely by symbolic competition or the desire for glory. Instead, cities must balance economic goals with social welfare and environmental quality. Failing to do so risks skewed growth patterns that deepen inequality and fuel urban discontent. [7]

***

For a project of this magnitude—a 135,000-seat stadium and a mega-scale urban sports complex—policy standards must be rigorous. A successful approach should rest on three pillars:

Transparency : There must be full disclosure of the financial structure, budgetary obligations, and risk-sharing mechanisms. Megaprojects rarely disappear; they often merely transfer risks from investors to society in subtle ways.

Viability : The operating model must be grounded in conservative scenarios rather than a dependency on rare mega-events. Post-investment performance indicators should be publicly released to allow independent assessment.

Balance : The project must fit within a coherent urban strategy, ensuring that investment in symbolic landmarks does not crowd out essential public welfare.

If these conditions are met, Hà Nội could turn the Trống Đồng Stadium into a demonstration of strong governance capacity. If not, this “world-class modern” stadium risks becoming a costly lesson: brilliant at its inauguration but ultimately a burden on the budget that distorts planning and erodes public trust.

Tiến Trung wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 26, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

Hữu Chánh, H. N. (2025, December 19). Khởi công dự án KĐT lớn nhất Việt Nam, có sân vận động 135.000 chỗ ngồi đẳng cấp quốc tế. Lao Động . https://laodong.vn/xa-hoi/khoi-cong-du-an-kdt-lon-nhat-viet-nam-co-san-van-dong-135000-cho-ngoi-dang-cap-quoc-te-1627825.ldo

Hưng, V. (2025, December 20). Hà Nội duyệt quy hoạch khu vực xây sân vận động Trống Đồng của Vingroup. Dân Trí . https://dantri.com.vn/bat-dong-san/ha-noi-duyet-quy-hoach-khu-vuc-xay-san-van-dong-trong-dong-cua-vingroup-20251220144541668.htm

Đạt, Đ., & Minh, V. (2025, December 21). Hiện trạng dự án khu đô thị Olympic hơn 925.000 tỷ tại Hà Nội. CafeF . https://cafef.vn/hien-trang-du-an-khu-do-thi-olympic-hon-925000-ty-tai-ha-noi-188251220084341836.chn

Ludvigsen, J. A., Rookwood, J., & Parnell, D. (2022, January 13). The sport mega-events of the 2020s: governance, impacts and controversies. Sport in Society . https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17430437.2022.2026086

Flyvbjerg, B. (2017, September 6). Introduction: The Iron Law of Megaproject Management. Oxford Academic . https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28080/chapter-abstract/212102359?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Schoonbee, K., & Brümmer, S. (2010, April 29). Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’. https://serve.mg.co.za/uploads/2010/04/29/public-loss-fifas-gain.pdf

OECD. (2007). Competitive Cities: A New Entrepreneurial Paradigm in Spatial Development. OECD Territorial Reviews . https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2007/04/competitive-cities_g1gh7ddc/9789264022591-en.pdf