Merging Power, Claiming Legitimacy: The General Secretary in Việt Nam’s Constitutional Order

Under the leadership of General Secretary Tô Lâm, 2025 marked a decisive new phase of power centralization in Việt Nam’s political system. [1] Reports from foreign media ahead of the 14th Party Congress indicated that Tô Lâm sought to hold both the General Secretary and President positions simultaneously. [2]

If realized, the merger of the two positions would represent the latest step in a decade-long drive to concentrate power at the center. Additionally, it would also constitutionally formalize the General Secretary’s role within the state structure.

Some observers view this as a constructive development, noting that the system’s most powerful figure is seeking a formal legal basis for his authority. However, legalization alone is insufficient to confer democratic legitimacy upon a party general secretary.

The Actual Constitutional Role of the General Secretary

While Article 4 of Việt Nam’s Constitution affirms the Communist Party’s leadership, it makes no reference to the general secretary’s role in state governance.

Party leadership does not automatically equate to state leadership. Under Việt Nam’s “four pillars” system, the general secretary sets political direction and ideology [3], while the other pillars hold clearly defined constitutional roles: the chair of the National Assembly oversees the legislature, the prime minister heads the executive branch, and the president represents the state in domestic and foreign affairs.

The president, specifically, is designated as the Head of State. Article 86 of the 1992 Constitution (as amended in 2025) states: “The President is the Head of State, representing the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam in domestic and foreign affairs.” [4] This provision raises questions of legitimacy when the general secretary represents the state internationally, effectively encroaching on the president’s domain. [5]

Merging the two positions would resolve this by legalizing the general secretary’s role as the head of both Party and state. With external relations becoming “crucial and regular,” assuming the presidency would give Tô Lâm’s diplomatic engagements clear constitutional legitimacy. [6]

Furthermore, this move would bring the general secretary within the constitutional framework—accountable to the National Assembly rather than standing outside and above it. He would also assume the powerful roles of “commander-in-chief of the people’s armed forces” and “chair of the National Defense and Security Council” under Clause 5, Article 88. [7] 

Whether this merger occurs will largely depend on Tô Lâm’s negotiations with the military and current president, General Lương Cường. [8]

Merging the Roles Would Not Require a Constitutional Amendment

Such a merger would not necessitate a constitutional amendment, as this move would merely alter an unwritten convention within Việt Nam’s political order. [9] There is no constitutional provision preventing the general secretary from simultaneously holding the presidency.

This is similar to many parliamentary systems where the leader of the majority party becoming prime minister is a political convention rather than a strict legal requirement. Likewise, Việt Nam’s Constitution does not stipulate that the Communist Party’s Central Committee selects the president, prime minister, or National Assembly chair prior to the legislature’s vote. [10] Yet in practice, under the system of “democratic centralism,” the National Assembly functions primarily to formalize these predetermined decisions.

Because these are conventions, they are not immutable. A future general secretary could choose not to hold the presidency, particularly if state representation or foreign affairs is a lower priority. However, if Tô Lâm intends to permanently institutionalize the general secretary’s role within the state structure, a constitutional amendment would eventually be required to mandate that the party leader also serves as president.

Legal Does Not Necessarily Mean Legitimate

The Communist Party’s move to legalize its role within the state apparatus and on the international stage may represent a step forward in legal consciousness, regardless of the underlying pragmatic motivations. However, acknowledging this shift is not an endorsement of the party’s exclusive leadership.

Article 4 of the Constitution, which enshrines the Party as the leading force of state and society, fundamentally conflicts with democratic principles by depriving future generations of genuine political choice. Similarly, the principle of democratic centralism in Article 8 reinforces the concentration of power at the center while weakening voter choice in both internal party selection and National Assembly elections. [11]

Nevertheless, a constitution that reflects political reality is preferable to a dual power system where critical decisions occur outside the legal framework. The 2025 amendment to the 1992 Constitution illustrates this tension by explicitly acknowledging the Party’s leadership over the Việt Nam Fatherland Front in Article 9. While this makes power relations more transparent, it continues to violate principles of equality before the law and freedom of association. [12]

Ultimately, legalizing the general secretary’s role within the state system does not confer democratic legitimacy on the party’s monopoly. In a republic, legitimacy flows from the free vote of the people. If the Communist Party competed on equal terms for a parliamentary majority, the general secretary’s assumption of the presidency would be democratically valid. However, as long as the Party remains the sole legal political entity and tightly controls the electoral process, no constitutional provision can manufacture democratic legitimacy.

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Hoàng Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on January 21, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights of its English version.