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Residents of Việt Nam have recently been receiving messages from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) urging them to “Join hands for a drug-free community; all citizens should report drug-related crimes and social evils…”

Similar messaging is densely displayed on banners and posters outside commune offices and village administrative centers, calling for “drug prevention and control."

This raises the question: why do the authorities, and the MPS in particular, appear so “enthusiastic” about combating the “social evils” of drugs?

In countries with high levels of political control, anti-drug policies often extend beyond public health and national security. Drugs are treated as a societal taboo, and users are viewed not just as consumers of illegal substances but as individuals with diminished morality and dignity who are “a danger to society.”

As a result, anti-drug campaigns serve as effective tools for authoritarian states to build political legitimacy.

For instance, when the Communist Party took over in China in 1949, anti-drug campaigns became a major part of public policy. These initiatives strengthened local control and reinforced state legitimacy, particularly following the Tiananmen events in 1989. [1]

Similarly, in Iran, the banning and regulation of drug use allows the government to demonstrate political and social control by establishing a clear boundary between “good citizens” and “bad citizens.” [2]

What functions might anti-drug policies serve in Việt Nam, especially during a period described as “mobilizing the entire strength of the Party and the people"?

The state stands to gain four main political benefits from these initiatives.

Media, “Moral Panic,” and the Legitimization of Repression and State Violence

Propaganda and education have long been crucial methods in anti-drug campaigns. Through these efforts, drugs are framed as a “social evil” and a serious threat to national security, closely linked to dangerous crime and other social problems such as prostitution and gambling.

Consequently, media discussions regarding drugs do not simply refer to legal violations but rather to acts of “moral degradation” that actively undermine social norms and cultural values.

This phenomenon mirrors the concept of “moral panic” proposed by sociologist Jock Young. In his study on the public condemnation of drug users during the Notting Hill hippie movement, Young argued that “a spiral of fear and outrage in public opinion pushes control agencies into action.”

When “moral crusaders” amplify public fear and anger about drugs, the policies aimed at controlling drug users tend to become significantly more severe. [3]

In the case of Việt Nam, this process does not emerge independently from the press or civil society. Instead, it operates under the direct guidance of the state—the very authority that promotes the suppression of drug-related crimes and “social evils.”

Through this orchestrated messaging, the state is able to legitimize its interventions into groups it labels as “risky.”

From Identifying Drug Users to Broader Social Control

Successful stigmatization of these groups makes it much easier to defend policies that target drug users and their behaviors. Hence, law enforcement shifts its primary focus from disrupting supply to policing demand.

The MPS released Plan 483 in October 2024. It launched a nationwide initiative to review, identify, classify, and monitor known drug users and individuals under post-rehabilitation supervision.

This directive tasks police forces with “screening every neighborhood, every commune and ward” to identify confirmed users, suspected users, and even those merely suspected of possible use. [4]

Furthermore, authorities are required to integrate this surveillance data directly into the national population database.

During the “month of action for drug prevention and control,” Lê Thành Long, chairman of the National Committee for AIDS, Drug, and Prostitution Prevention and Control, notably instructed that monitoring must expand to “high-risk groups.”

This vaguely defined category targets youth in difficult circumstances, including school dropouts, the unemployed, the homeless, and individuals with prior criminal records. [5]

As a result, anti-drug programs extend far beyond the clearly defined categories of drug offenders. By encompassing suspected users and “high-risk” youth, these initiatives target groups that represent a significant portion of society.

With a wide range of activities that include checking every community and unclear guidelines about “high-risk groups,” anti-drug programs allow law enforcement to carry out broader social control that goes beyond just drug problems.

Expanding Detention Without Judicial Process

In March 2025, the MPS officially assumed responsibility for drug rehabilitation and post-rehabilitation management from the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs.

Reinforcing this shift, Lê Thành Long emphasized : “Focus on sending the maximum number of drug users eligible under the law, and those at high risk of committing crimes or legal violations, to compulsory rehabilitation” (even where not yet fully codified in law). [6]

In practice, this compulsory rehabilitation closely resembles outright detention. According to Decision 1567/QĐ-BCA 2025 , issued by the MPS in March 2025 to regulate these centers, individuals must surrender all personal belongings upon entry, including money and identification documents. [7]

Inside these closed facilities, they are held under exceedingly strict conditions. Inmates are permitted to meet relatives only once per week for a maximum of two hours and make phone calls of no more than ten minutes per month—privileges that depend entirely on their compliance with facility rules.

Furthermore, staff monitor all visits and phone calls and strictly censor all incoming and outgoing correspondence.

Imposing these severe measures does not always require standard criminal proceedings; the deprivation of personal liberty can frequently occur through administrative mechanisms.

Therefore, if the state expands this application to vaguely defined groups, such as those “at high risk of committing crimes,” its arbitrary power of detention may expand correspondingly.

Strengthening Public Trust in the Military and Police

Law enforcement's role in suppressing drug-related crimes closely ties to its public image. Combating drugs, framed as a major social threat, can overshadow past police misconduct and enhance their overall reputation.

By defining drugs as an “ evil ,” the authorities who help “eliminate” them are naturally portrayed as a “source of trust and support for the people.” [8]

The MPS describes the anti-drug police force as playing a "commanding role" within the sector. [9]

While the public may frequently criticize traffic police as “daylight robbers” or condemn instances of police violence, most people openly accept the necessity of drug crime investigation forces in maintaining “public order and security.” Presenting anti-drug efforts as successful elevates the broader image of the police.

In turn, this rise in credibility facilitates the expansion of police presence and authority. The police seamlessly frame the localization and growth of these forces as necessary steps to "protect the peaceful lives" of the people. [10]

Thus, the recent intensification of anti-drug movements allows the police sector to “better justify itself” to a public that has grown increasingly discontented with its expanding powers . [11]

Sa Huỳnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 19, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Roberts, Bill, and Yu Chen. 2013. “Drugs, Violence, and the State.” Annual Review of Sociology 39 (July): 105–125. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145554 .

2. See [1]

3. Tosh, Sarah. 2019. “Drugs, Crime, and Aggravated Felony Deportations: Moral Panic Theory and the Legal Construction of the ‘Criminal Alien’.” Critical Criminology 27, no. 3: 329–345. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09446-8 .

4. Vov, B. Đ. T. (2024, December 14). Bộ Công an: Kỷ luật trưởng công an quận, huyện nếu địa bàn phức tạp về ma tuý. VOV.VN . https://vov.vn/phap-luat/bo-cong-an-ky-luat-truong-cong-an-quan-huyen-neu-dia-ban-phuc-tap-ve-ma-tuy-post1142077.vov?jskey=gublNUPY44NBZJstWZmowsOu9HN65y7kAg%3D%3D

5. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2025, May 27). Tháng hành động phòng, chống ma túy 2025: “Chung một quyết tâm – Vì cộng đồng không ma túy” baochinhphu.vn . https://baochinhphu.vn/thang-hanh-dong-phong-chong-ma-tuy-2025-chung-mot-quyet-tam-vi-cong-dong-khong-ma-tuy-102250527203122814.htm

6. See [5]

7. LuatVietnam. (2025, November 27). Quyết định 1567/QĐ-BCA 2025 Quy định Nội quy của cơ sở cai nghiện ma túy . LuatVietnam. https://luatvietnam.vn/giao-duc/quyet-dinh-1567-qd-bca-2025-quy-dinh-noi-quy-cua-co-so-cai-nghien-ma-tuy-395510-d1.html

8. Hiền, M. (2025, January 6). Lực lượng CSĐT tội phạm về ma túy phải thực sự là điểm tựa, niềm tin, chỗ dựa của người dân – Báo Công an Nhân dân điện tử. Báo Công an Nhân Dân Điện Tử . https://cand.com.vn/lanh-dao-bo-cong-an/luc-luong-csdt-toi-pham-ve-ma-tuy-phai-thuc-su-la-diem-tua-niem-tin-cho-dua-cua-nguoi-dan–i755748/

9. See [8]

10. Khu, Q. (2025, April 19). Kiên quyết đấu tranh, trấn áp tội phạm ma túy, bảo vệ cuộc sống bình yên của nhân dân . baoquankhu4.com.vn. https://baoquankhu4.com.vn/chinh-tri/tin-tuc-su-kien/kien-quyet-dau-tranh-tran-ap-toi-pham-ma-tuy-bao-ve-cuoc-song-binh-yen-cua-nhan-dan.html 11. Trường An. (2026, February 5). Scoring Citizens via VNeID: Is Việt Nam’s Draft Resolution Unconstitutional? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/02/scoring-citizens-via-vneid-is-viet-nams-draft-resolution-unconstitutional/