Why Phan Châu Trinh’s Ideas Remain Unfulfilled in Việt Nam

The national growth (and democratization) movement that Phan Châu Trinh initiated in Việt Nam at the beginning of the 20^th century (1905-1907) was both comprehensive and just. 

Phan Châu Trinh’s main ideas have also been confirmed in theory and in practice on a global scale by a new modernization theory set out by Christian Welzel (2013). This new modernization theory is considered one of the most comprehensive theories of democratization to date.

So why did both the movement led by Phan Châu Trinh and democratization stall in Việt Nam even a hundred years later, after his passing?

This article will elucidate some of the reasons based on the framework of Welzel’s new modernization theory.

I. The Political Thought of Phan Châu Trinh

I have previously written two essays, “Phan Châu Trinh and the new theory of modernization” (2017) and “Tiananmen Protests and Lessons for Democratization in Vietnam” (2019), summarizing Phan Châu Trinh’s main ideas regarding national development and democratization of Việt Nam. Here are the main points:

1. Develop the Economy

Phan Châu Trinh adopted the slogan “support the people’s livelihoods,” which we updated at the Civil Society Forum to “improve the people’s livelihoods.” 

He had long focused on helping the Vietnamese develop economically, whether by establishing enterprises or promoting trade and tourism at home and abroad. 

Phan Châu Trinh encouraged people to start businesses through both ideas and action, setting an example in 1906 when he established his Liên Thành Co. in Phan Thiết.

2. Improve Popular Knowledge 

Educational development was a core part of Phan Châu Trinh’s policy of increasing popular knowledge levels. Not only did he initiate the policy, but he also actively mobilized to establish schools (e.g., Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục in 1907 in Hà Nội, where he taught, and the Dục Thanh Học Hiệu School in 1907 in Phan Thiết). 

The increase of popular knowledge occurred not only through formal education but also through practice and Phan Châu Trinh’s policy of practical learning, which is critical, through the reading of books and newspapers, the writing of books and articles, and the establishment of associations and businesses (i.e., economic development, as stated in point 1 above).

3. Invigorate Popular Morale

Arousing and nurturing the people’s spirit of liberation and freedom is a critical stance of Phan Châu Trinh, as exemplified by Liên Thành Thư Xã, which was established in 1905 in Phan Thiết to disseminate patriotic publications.

4. Mobilize

Phan Châu Trinh advocated organizing social movements to force the (colonial French) government to reform. 

5. Espouse Non-Violence

He also advocated non-violence in all circumstances, stating that only peaceful methods should be used to promote all of the above to deliver Việt Nam a new civilization and the strength to face down enemies (non-violently) and gain political independence.

6. Advocate Self-Reliance 

Finally, Phan Châu Trinh advocated against both rejecting and relying on foreigners, stressing the necessity of self-reliance. 

Between 1905 and 1907, Phan Châu Trinh formulated his stances and ideas, put them into practice, and encouraged and mobilized the people to embrace them. 

This was a modern approach, even by today’s democratization scholars’ theoretical and practical standards. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Phan Châu Trinh wanted to implement the above policies so that the whole Vietnamese people would become wealthy, knowledgeable, and willful, rather than just a few individuals enjoying these benefits.

II. The Theory of Neo-Modernization

Modernization theory, as put forth by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), posits that “democracy is the direct result of economic growth” and that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” 

Modernization theory has had a significant influence on democratization worldwide (and is still followed by some politicians), although it was later criticized, modified, and supplemented by many. 

In short, according to Lipset’s theory, modernization does not automatically lead to democracy; rather, it creates certain necessary—yet on their own insufficient—conditions for democratization. 

The experiences of wealthy Gulf states and China illustrate that economic, scientific, and technological advancements do not inherently produce democratic systems.

Nevertheless, Lipset’s modernization theory remains a major contribution, offering a foundational framework for understanding the complex relationship between development and democratic change.

Christian Welzel (2013) condenses his research and his collaboration with Ronald Inglehart to develop a new modernization theory, whose main thrust can be summarized as follows:

1. Action Resources

According to Welzel, three action resources are of the utmost importance: material resources, intellectual resources, and connectivity resources.

Material resources are the equipment, tools, and money needed for action.

Intellectual resources are the understanding, knowledge, information, and skills needed for action.

Connectivity resources are the activities and mechanisms that create the ability to connect, contact, cooperate, and organize for action. 

For example, urbanization and working in factories help workers connect with one another, coordinate with each other, and organize for action.

A robust transportation network facilitates travel and assembly while strengthening connectivity resources; the same holds true for the expansion of communication networks.

Connectivity resources also have an institutional dimension: freedom of association enhances them, whereas restrictions diminish them. 

Modernization and tech development can create action resources for capitalists and the masses, but not automatically.

They generate such resources for the masses only when oriented toward human needs and designed to complement, rather than replace, human labor and agency (see Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, 2023).

Importantly, collective struggle itself can produce action resources for the masses; modernization alone does not guarantee their emergence. This marks a key distinction between the new modernization theory and its earlier formulation.

While all three forms of action are important, intellectual and connectivity resources are more consequential than material ones. 

Ultimately, these resources underpin successful popular mobilization—where emancipative values assume a decisive role at the cultural level, constituting a second major distinction.

2. Emancipative Values

Emancipative values are those that promote human freedom.

They can be measured through surveys that emphasize four core dimensions: personal autonomy, freedom of choice, equality, and voice.

The World Values Survey has assessed these values across roughly 100 countries, covering more than 90% of the world’s population. 

Since 1981, it has conducted seven waves of surveys (through 2024), on the basis of which Christian Welzel developed the Emancipative Values Index (EVI).

Việt Nam has participated in three of these seven waves—in 2001 (fourth wave), 2006 (fifth wave), and 2020 (seventh wave).

Nguyễn Quang A (2017) has underscored the EVI’s potential as a measure of popular morale. 

In this sense, public sentiment can be systematically assessed across countries, providing a foundation for comparative analysis.

3. Social Movements

At the psychological level, emancipative values empower individuals. They encourage people to exercise universal freedoms, engage actively in social movements, and demand that the state uphold their legitimate rights and interests through legal guarantees that enable the full exercise of those freedoms.

4. Democratization

Without social movements, there is no democratization.

Social movements provide expression to people’s aspirations—their emancipative values—yet these values themselves are the most powerful force driving individuals to participate in collective action and to struggle for human rights and democracy.

Sustained popular pressure compels authorities to enact laws that create favorable conditions for the exercise of rights. Laws that guarantee civil and political freedoms—and, crucially, their effective enforcement—form the foundation of democracy.

But democracy can only be consolidated and advanced if people continue to improve their livelihoods, expand their knowledge, strengthen their civic spirit, engage in social movements, and maintain pressure on those in power to uphold and extend existing rights. Democratization, in this sense, is an ongoing and never-ending process.

The most comprehensive contemporary theory of democratization, published in 2013, clearly echoes the core ideas that Phan Châu Trinh articulated more than a century ago.

Phan Châu Trinh may thus be regarded as one of the most visionary reformers and radical thinkers in early 20th-century Việt Nam—if not among the most influential reformers of his time globally. 

Why, then, did his vision not succeed, and why does Việt Nam still lack a democratic system today?

III. Why Had Phan Châu Trinh Yet to Succeed?

There are many reasons why Phan Châu Trinh did not succeed in his efforts to democratize Việt Nam.

His ideas far exceeded the intellectual horizons of the time—surpassing the understanding of contemporary intellectuals, patriots, and the broader public, as well as the country’s level of development and its political and social conditions.

Only by recognizing these constraints can we fully appreciate his vision and significance.

It is worth noting that Phan Châu Trinh was three years younger than Mahatma Gandhi and that both introduced the method of nonviolent struggle at nearly the same time—Phan Châu Trinh in 1905 and Gandhi in 1906.

Yet global recognition has favored figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., the Dalai Lama, Václav Havel, Thích Nhất Hạnh, and Aung San Suu Kyi, while Phan Châu Trinh remains comparatively overlooked.

At the time, most Vietnamese patriots and intellectuals did not fully grasp his ideas and instead pursued approaches that diverged sharply from his own—from Phan Bội Châu’s advocacy of armed struggle and reliance on foreign powers to Hồ Chí Minh’s later revolutionary path.

The broader populace was not an exception. While Phan Châu Trinh called for absolute nonviolence, even people in his hometown struggled to sustain such a course.

The anti-tax movement of March 1908 began peacefully but soon escalated into violence beyond the organizers’ control (Phan Châu Trinh himself was not among them).

The French colonial authorities responded with brutal repression, crushing the movement. Although he did not take part in its organization, Phan Châu Trinh—along with many prominent figures—was arrested and exiled to Côn Đảo, while others were sentenced to death.

Fortunately, following intervention by the French Human Rights League, he avoided the harshest penalties and was placed under house arrest in Mỹ Tho before being exiled to France in 1911 (see Chu Hảo, 2023).

More broadly, both the colonial administration and the imperial court systematically suppressed patriotic intellectuals through arrests, imprisonment, executions, and exile, including Phan Châu Trinh.

Beyond these immediate factors, it is also useful to examine the deeper structural causes of his failure by situating his ideas within the framework of the new modernization theory. 

We begin with the necessary conditions—action resources—before turning to popular morale.

• Material Resources

Unfortunately, there have been no comprehensive historical studies on this issue in Việt Nam, at least for the period spanning the 19th century to the mid-20th century (though some younger scholars may draw on French archival materials to help reconstruct the country’s economic history during this time).

In the absence of such data, we must rely on a proxy: GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), expressed in constant U.S. dollars to facilitate comparison.

This measure shows Japan consistently outperforming other countries in the region from the 19th century through the end of the 20th century. South Korea and Taiwan later caught up—and even surpassed Japan—dramatically in the early decades of the 21st century.

It is also important to note that the global threshold for extreme poverty (the minimum income required for subsistence, measured in PPP) was $694 in 2011. 

For more than a century and a half, Việt Nam’s material resources remained only slightly above this level: GDP per capita stood at $1,132 in 1975 and remained below $1,500 until the onset of Đổi Mới in 1986.

The figure stayed under $2,000 until 1993, reaching just $2,018 in 1994. Up to that point, the Vietnamese population’s material conditions were severely constrained, with most people focused on basic survival rather than broader social or political concerns.

In contrast, when the Philippines transitioned to democracy in 1986, its GDP per capita was $3,161—more than double that of Việt Nam. South Korea, at the time of its democratization in 1987, had reached $9,756 per capita, a level Việt Nam would not attain until 2018.

Taiwan presents a similar trajectory. When Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, its GDP per capita had reached $5,614. Thereafter, the authoritarian Kuomintang regime began gradually loosening its grip, elevating Lee Teng-hui—a Taiwan-born senior party leader—within its ranks.

By 1986, when the then-illegal “Tangwai” (“outside the party”) movement founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and was allowed to operate, Taiwan’s GDP per capita had risen to $11,918. 

Fourteen years later, the Kuomintang’s monopoly ended with the election of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian as president, by which point GDP per capita had reached $26,787.

It is worth noting that in 1820, the starting points of these countries were broadly similar: Japan ($1,321), Taiwan ($966), Malaysia ($960), the Philippines ($931), Thailand ($909), and Việt Nam ($840). 

By 1913, the pattern remained comparable—aside from Japan—with GDP per capita at $1,159 in Việt Nam, $1,171 in Korea, $1,286 in Taiwan, $1,289 in Malaysia, $1,341 in Thailand, $1,575 in the Philippines, and $2,431 in Japan.

However, from the 1950s and 1960s onward, the divergence became increasingly pronounced, reflecting the different development paths and policy choices adopted by each country.

• Intellectual Resources

Similar to material resources, detailed historical data on intellectual resources remain limited.

We can still use proxy indicators like literacy rates, levels and length of education, the number and types of schools, the production and consumption of books and newspapers, and the number of recorded inventions.

Under the traditional education system—prior to French colonization—formal institutions such as the Quốc Tử Giám primarily served the royal household, while village teachers provided instruction largely centered on Chinese characters and Confucian teachings. Temples were places where people could learn about Buddhism.

Identifying what additional subjects were taught across these public, private, and community settings reveals a significant gap in the historical record. 

Documentation on disciplines such as mathematics, astronomy, and what we would now consider modern science and technology remains scarce.

According to Dân Việt [The Vietnamese People], there have been three Vietnamese mathematical geniuses: 

• Vũ Hữu (1437-1530), who left behind the work Lập Thành Toán Pháp (立成算法) [Establishing Mathematics]—the oldest mathematics book in Việt Nam; 

• Lương Thế Vinh (1441-1496), who placed first in mathematics during imperial examinations; and 

• Nguyễn Hữu Thận (1757-1831) researched calendar making, translated Chinese mathematical works, and authored the book Ý Trai Toán Pháp [Ý Trai’s Mathematics, with Ý Trai being one of his alternate names]. 

All three of these mathematical prodigies went on to serve as high-ranking officials in the royal courts of their time.

Had they devoted themselves instead to studying, teaching, and writing mathematics—rather than pursuing official careers—Vietnamese mathematics might have developed along a completely unique path. 

Yet the overriding aim of education in that era was to produce court officials or to bring talented individuals to the attention of the monarchy.

As Gail Paradise Kelly (2000) argues, within Việt Nam’s traditional education system, Confucian teachers functioned not only as instruments of the state—teaching Chinese characters and Confucian doctrine and preparing gifted students for official service—but also as nodes in broader intellectual networks. 

Through these scholarly ties, they could mobilize anti-government resistance when necessary. In this sense, Confucian teachers formed the backbone of a wider political network.

Understanding this role of the traditional Vietnamese education system, the French colonial government began to organize one of its own. 

The fact that Vietnamese intellectuals then built their own education system, such as the archetypal “Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục” movement, was considered dangerous. 

Therefore, the French closed the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục after only eight months. However, it put significant pressure on the colonial government to reorganize education, in particular, forcing the use of the Latin character system in schools and reforming the examination system.

Gail Paradise Kelly (2000) provides a fairly comprehensive analysis and data about the Vietnamese education system from 1906 to 1939. 

A unified national education system only began to take shape after 1917 with the reform decrees of Governor-General Albert Sarraut. 

The system comprised five years of elementary school, five years of middle/high school/primary college, and a university level with a single school in Hà Nội (established in 1906). 

Citing a database in 1926, the year Phan Châu Trinh passed away, Gail Paradise Kelly (2000) provided that Việt Nam at that time had a total of 3,053 elementary schools (providing three years of education) with 153,737 students; 244 full elementary schools (providing five years of education) with 65,329 students; 17 primary colleges (providing 10 years of education) with 3,656 students; and two secondary schools/lycées with 56 students (in 1923, there were 83 students).

However, here are some figures summarized by a World Bank 2010 Report (page 2):

“During the most prosperous period of French-conquered Indochina, Vietnam only had 2,322 elementary schools that taught the first 3 years of primary education, with a student population accounting for 2% of the total population; 638 elementary schools that taught the last 2 years of primary education, with a student population accounting for 0.4% of the total population; 16 primary colleges that taught the 4 years after elementary school, with a student population accounting for 0.05% of the total population; and 6 high schools, including 3 state schools, with the number of students attending public schools accounting for only 0.019% of the population. 

In all of French Indochina, there were only three universities (law, medicine, and science), all located in Hanoi, with a total of 834 students, of whom 628 were Vietnamese. With such an education system, 95% of Vietnamese people were illiterate.”

Compare this state of affairs with Japan in the early 20^th century. 

According to estimates by Professor Tsujimoto Masashi (2000), the literacy rate in large Japanese cities in the early 19th century was over 70%, while in rural areas it was about 10–20% or lower. 

Despite these figures, in 1909, the attendance rate of compulsory education (which was 6 years at that time) was over 98%. The difference between Japan and Việt Nam was truly dreadful.

In other words, the economic, social, and political circumstances in early 20th-century Việt Nam were entirely inconducive even to increasing popular knowledge. Phan Châu Trinh knew this reality clearly and advocated for change from the very beginning.

• Connectivity Resources

Connectivity resources can be effectively gauged through indicators such as the urbanization rate, the proportion of people working in factories and offices—where social interaction is more concentrated than in rural or remote areas—transportation infrastructure, and, in contemporary contexts, the number of internet users, and the extent of internet censorship.

By these measures, Việt Nam’s connectivity resources from 1960 to the present have consistently lagged behind those of other countries in the region. 

For example, when the Philippines transitioned to democracy in 1986, its urbanization rate stood at 43.2 percent; South Korea’s reached 68.56 percent at the time of its transition in 1987. Việt Nam’s current urbanization rate, by contrast, is only 38.77 percent.

Moreover, Việt Nam exhibits more limited freedom of thought, fewer opportunities for connection, and a smaller number of networking nodes—such as civil society organizations, conferences, and public forums—than these countries. In some respects, these constraints may be even more pronounced today than in Phan Châu Trinh’s time.

• Popular Morale

Unfortunately, we lack historical measurements of popular morale—closely associated with the Emancipative Values Index (EVI; see Nguyễn Quang A, 2017)—as such values have only been systematically measured since 1981 across seven survey waves.

To illustrate, we can examine EVI trends in selected countries in the region. Values are largely formed during early childhood (ages 0–8), making the socio-economic environment—particularly family conditions—and education during the preschool and adolescent years critically important. 

At the societal level, values—understood as the aggregate average within a population—evolve primarily through generational replacement. 

As younger cohorts enter adulthood and older ones pass, both cultural values and popular morale tend to shift gradually.

Accordingly, most countries exhibit a long-term upward trend in EVI, driven largely by generational change. At the same time, short-term fluctuations can occur within age groups, reflecting changes in available action resources. 

Because EVI is normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, even small variations are meaningful; a shift of 0.05 is already substantial and often reflects generational turnover.

However, with limited data points—Việt Nam has only three, compared to South Korea’s seven spanning four decades—it is difficult to extrapolate reliably into earlier periods, such as the 1960s. 

To address this limitation, Christian Welzel (2021) and his collaborators employ “cultural zones,” drawing on datasets with hundreds of observations to produce more robust estimates of EVI for 1960–1980, alongside directly measured values for 1981–2020.

Việt Nam is located between the Indic East and Sinic East (China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) zones. We can speculate that its EVI was as low as 0.3 in the early 20^th century during Phan Châu Trinh’s time, increasing to 0.34 in 2001, 0.36 in 2006, and 0.41 in 2020.

• Social Movements

The most enduring and powerful motivations for participation in social movements are emancipative values and the broader sense of popular morale.

Other drivers—such as material interests, inequality, discontent, or even resentment—can also mobilize people, but they are generally weaker and less sustainable. 

Emancipative values, by contrast, tend to give rise to nonviolent movements, as experience shows that such approaches are often the most effective.

When both action resources and popular morale are low, however, the masses can be easily incited to join movements driven by other motives—whether by populist agitators or government-backed provocateurs. 

Under these conditions, social movements are more likely to turn violent and spiral beyond the control of those advocating nonviolence, providing authorities with a pretext for harsh repression.

Authoritarian regimes, as Welzel (2013, p. 219) notes, rely on propaganda and coercion to sever the link between emancipative values and collective action. 

Where popular morale and levels of knowledge are low, these tools are especially effective; as they rise, the power of propaganda and repression correspondingly declines.

In short, both action resources and popular morale remained very limited across the region up to the time of Phan Châu Trinh’s death in 1926, and no country in the region achieved successful democratization in the six decades that followed.

In terms of methods, contrary to Phan Châu Trinh’s advocacy of non-violence, authorities in Việt Nam throughout the 20^th century have used violent means.

Despite Phan Châu Trinh’s advocacy against both rejection of and reliance on foreign countries, the remnants of xenophobia and undue dependency on them exist to this day, sometimes in extreme form.

IV. A Few Reflections

Thus, we easily understand that while Phan Châu Trinh did not succeed, he has also not failed; his works do and will continue on. 

To this day, especially since the 1990s when Đổi Mới truly began, Việt Nam has increasingly embraced the ideas of Phan Châu Trinh, even if many people prefer to deny it.

Regarding material resources, Việt Nam remains the most impoverished of the listed countries in the region. Although South Việt Nam encouraged a market economy until its demise in 1975, the incoming government then tried to eradicate it. 

It wasn’t until 1986, when Việt Nam had to either “reform or die,” that the government was forced to return to the people a portion of their entrepreneurial rights. 

The actual Đổi Mới only started in the 1990s, when businesses were untethered, barriers to markets were removed, a focus on trade was developed, entrepreneurs became valued, and economic cooperation with foreign countries was encouraged. 

Ultimately, we are today following the ideas proposed by Phan Châu Trinh nearly 100 years ago, which have brought spectacular economic development to Việt Nam over the past 30 years. 

However, in terms of total material resources, we are still weak compared to other countries in the region.

In terms of intellectual resources, since the 1945 literacy movement, Việt Nam’s literacy rate has improved significantly, today reaching 98.85%. 

Nevertheless, if we take into account the quality of education (measured by the number of years of schooling and its results, which include the number of books written or the number of patents filed, for example), as well as real contributions to human intelligence and economic development, then Việt Nam’s level of popular knowledge today is still very low. 

For example, according to Wikipedia, on average, a person in Việt Nam reads 0.8 books per year (excluding textbooks), compared to Malaysia, where the average person reads 10–20 books per year (2012), or Thailand, where it’s five books per year.

Now and forever into the future, we must continue Phan Châu Trinh’s advocacy of enlightenment.

Việt Nam’s urbanization rate today remains the lowest among the compared countries. Other elements of connectivity resources, such as associations, independent trade unions, civil society organizations, and meetings, are discouraged or controlled in a manner that is perhaps worse than in Phan Châu Trinh’s time. 

Regarding Phan Châu Trinh’s policy of non-violence, the Vietnamese, having lived for thousands of years in a culture of struggle against foreign invaders, are perhaps too familiar with martial vocabulary (soldier, assault, front, campaign, attack, launch, destroy, search, avenge, etc.).

Many leaders even “invent” new words that carry a martial flavor, such as “industry commanders.” The press widely propagates these terms, so accepting non-violent methods may not be easy. 

It remains a challenging task to actively and continuously educate our people about the spirit and methods of non-violence.

We should consciously pay attention to those negative cultural and historical relics and slowly but intentionally change them.

We have not yet considered international and geopolitical factors that may be favorable or unfavorable for Việt Nam’s development and democratization. 

Some people have raised the question: who do we rely on in relation to this issue? We should use the help of other countries and the opportunities the world and region create for us, but we must still rely on ourselves. 

This principle is also Phan Châu Trinh’s main precept: “Placing hope on others leads to imprudence; inflicting violence on others leads to death.”

In other words, internal strength remains key, and we must rely on ourselves. 

If action resources and popular morale are both low, then even if someone (a benevolent dictator or an international force) hands us democracy, it would be ephemeral, blooming, and fading. 

Democracy can only be formed through our people’s continuous and tireless struggle to develop the economy, raise popular knowledge levels, invigorate popular morale, and actively participate in social movements—that is, following the ideas of Phan Châu Trinh.

In summary, Phan Châu Trinh was unsuccessful because the Vietnamese people did not understand his ideas. 

In fact, since his passing, Việt Nam’s rulers have often acted in direct contradiction to his ideology—employing violence, relying on foreign support, neglecting the development of essential resources, and at times even destroying them. 

This agenda includes remolding trade and industry, dismantling the private sector, damming rivers, restricting markets, stifling economic and material growth, hindering the healthy development of civil society, weakening networks of social connectivity, and suppressing social movements.

To develop Việt Nam, we must continue supplementing, developing, and enriching the ideas of Phan Châu Trinh, implementing them now and in the future. 

We are continuing on the path set by Phan Châu Trinh. History doesn’t repeat itself, and there are no “ifs,” but it offers us valuable lessons if we choose to learn and grow.

V. Acknowledgements

The author thanks poet Hoàng Hưng, former ambassador Nguyễn Trung, and several young contributors for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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Dr. Nguyễn Quang A wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 8, 2024. Will A. Nguyễn translated this for The Vietnamese Magazine.