When people hear the word “dictatorship,” they often picture a supreme leader wielding near-absolute power, standing before cheering crowds, controlling the military, and governing an entire country by personal will alone.
However, How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse by political scientists Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz reveals a far more complex reality.
Dictators rarely act alone. They are often propped up by military institutions, political parties, family networks, and allied power groups that helped elevate them to the highest office—actors who can simultaneously pose the greatest threat to a regime’s survival.
Drawing on data from roughly 200 authoritarian regimes since World War II, the authors do not merely ask how dictators rule. They explore more profound questions: Who brought these leaders to power? With whom must they share this power? And what happens when the delicate balance of power collapses?
The Paradox of Power
The 1980 coup in Turkey serves as an example of this dynamic.
When the Turkish military seized control of the government under the leadership of Kenan Evren, power did not immediately become the personal property of one individual.
Because Evren emerged from a military institution with its own strict hierarchy and influential generals, he did not rule like an absolute monarch. The very allies who helped him secure his position were equally capable of forcing him to share authority.
This paradox runs throughout the book: dictators require allies strong enough to protect them, yet these same allies can eventually become the forces that overthrow them.
The Trap of Absolute Power
Understanding the threat posed by their allies, many leaders attempt to free themselves from this dependence.
After taking power in Uganda, Idi Amin became a prime example of what the authors term the “personalization of power.” Despite his military background, Amin systematically reduced his reliance on his initial supporters. By reshuffling personnel, eliminating potential rivals, and building networks of personal loyalty, he increasingly tied the regime’s survival entirely to himself.
However, absolute power creates its own trap.
When a leader’s inner circle survives solely through loyalty, access to honest information steadily declines. Competent individuals are viewed as dangerous threats, leaving authority in the hands of loyal but less capable figures. As a result, a regime that appears externally strong may actually be growing more fragile from within.
The authors illustrate an entirely different path toward dictatorship through the case of Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Unlike regimes born from military coups, UNIP began as an organized political movement with grassroots networks and broad public support during the struggle for independence. Over time, however, this once-competitive political party gradually transformed into a system of domination.
As space for opposition narrowed and power became increasingly concentrated, the UNIP apparatus turned into a tool dedicated to preserving the regime. Through this case, the book demonstrates that dictatorships do not always arrive via tanks rolling through city streets; they can also emerge from political organizations that once operated in a competitive environment. Ultimately, institutions that outwardly resemble democratic structures can be repurposed to prolong the life of an authoritarian regime.
Collapse Begins From Within
Even the most seemingly stable authoritarian systems are vulnerable to collapse. However, the authors argue that the end of a dictatorship rarely begins with dramatic protests in the streets. Long before external pressures shake a government, internal cracks begin to form.
When economic conditions worsen and the military or political elites begin to doubt the regime’s viability, interest groups no longer see their futures tied to the current leader. The loyalty that previously bound the system together evaporates. Once the very people who built a leader’s power withdraw their support, a seemingly irreplaceable ruler can lose everything.
The greatest strength of How Dictatorships Work is its refusal to portray authoritarian politics as a simplistic struggle between rulers and the ruled. Instead, the book exposes the complex web of cooperation, suspicion, mutual interests, and betrayal among elite factions.
History consistently demonstrates that while a coalition often builds absolute power, those same people frequently tear it down.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese as part of the “Reading with Đoan Trang” series, published every Tuesday, and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 9, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
