China’s New Air Base in Laos: A Dilemma for Việt Nam

While China’s air base in Laos may seem physically distant, its geopolitical proximity to Việt Nam raises serious questions about the potential effects Hà Nội could face.

Việt Nam and Laos share a long border and maintain close political ties, cooperating extensively on defense, security, cadre training, and infrastructure development. During a meeting in June, the leaders of the two countries reaffirmed their “great friendship, special solidarity, comprehensive cooperation, and strategic cohesion” while agreeing to continue their defense and security cooperation plan. [1] 

Việt Nam is currently emphasizing concrete links to keep this bilateral relationship moving forward. These efforts include the Hà Nội–Vientiane road connection, the Vũng Áng–Vientiane railway, and ongoing plans to help Laos become a regional logistics hub.

To underscore this determination, Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng specifically proposed turning their “strategic cohesion” into concrete action, focusing on connecting institutions, policies, transport infrastructure, logistics, energy, science and technology, and digital transformation. [2]

Despite these positive developments, China’s expanding military cooperation in Laos forces Hà Nội to question the extent of Beijing’s influence over Vientiane’s security choices. If China continues to assume additional roles regarding training, equipment, maintenance, and logistics, it could gain greater influence over the defense decisions of Laos. 

Although Laos is a sovereign nation and its relationship with Việt Nam is developing positively, it cannot be assumed that Vientiane will retain autonomy in its security and defense policies. In any competition for influence, a great power inherently possesses a louder voice and longer-lasting reach. 

The historic relationship between the two countries will maintain its value only if Laos determines that strengthening ties with Việt Nam offers greater benefits than moving closer to China.

Ban Keun as a Security Foothold for China

During a Southeast Asian crisis, such as a land conflict between Việt Nam and China, Ban Keun could serve as a springboard for Chinese training, resupply, transit, or surveillance. Consequently, this facility adds another variable that Việt Nam must account for on its western flank, compounding its existing security concerns in the South China Sea to the east.

Because Laos is landlocked, any expanded Chinese air operations face major logistical constraints. These include the airfield’s physical layout, the types of aircraft it can accommodate, its maintenance and refueling capacity, and broader decisions regarding airspace use. In any combat scenario, these logistical factors would prove crucial.

While Ban Keun is not currently equipped for China to launch a major military campaign against Việt Nam, Beijing could eventually overcome these limitations through its technical and technological strength. 

Ban Keun may simply be the latest addition to China’s expanding network of military outposts, which already includes artificial islands in the South China Sea, a logistics base in Djibouti, and port access at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand.

What Should Vietnam Observe?

To date, Việt Nam has refrained from making any public statements specifically regarding Ban Keun. When dealing with a close neighbor like Laos, Hà Nội prefers discreet, careful exchanges designed to protect its security interests without damaging bilateral relations.

However, Việt Nam cannot sustain its influence in Laos by relying solely on diplomatic language, friendship, or historical memory. China boasts a significantly larger economy and far more extensive infrastructure links than Việt Nam.

As Laos grows more economically dependent on China, Vientiane may deliberately play its two partners against one another to maximize its incoming capital, technology, and security support. If forced to make a definitive choice, Laos would likely favor the partner possessing greater economic and military power, and China is clearly stronger than Việt Nam in those metrics.

The immediate test will be how Vietnamese diplomats navigate raising these concerns with Laos. Hà Nội is keen to avoid damaging relations with China, particularly given that its leaders explicitly call Việt Nam–China relations a “top priority” of the country’s foreign policy. [3]

This was emphasized last year at the Việt Nam–China Friendship Palace in Hà Nội, where party General Secretary Tô Lâm affirmed that “the stable, sustainable, and long-term development of relations between the two parties and two countries is the ardent aspiration and fundamental interest of the two peoples, in line with the major trend of the times.” [4]

In the near future, Việt Nam is unlikely to broach this sensitive issue in near-term bilateral meetings, news conferences, or official statements. Instead, it will likely rely on existing channels to speak with Laos while continuing to monitor the Ban Keun base’s development.

Specifically, Việt Nam should closely follow these key indicators:

1. Runway extensions, new fuel or ammunition depots, or the installation of radar and air defenses at Ban Keun.
2. New agreements on Laos’ training, aircraft purchases, maintenance, and logistics.
3. The frequency and scale of joint China–Laos military activity at Ban Keun.
4. Any signs of a “gradual rift” or of Laos’ “indifference” toward its relationship with Việt Nam.

As the newest joint military aviation facility in mainland Southeast Asia, Ban Keun marks a clear expansion of China’s defense presence in Laos. Its current utility lies primarily in widening cooperation, creating operational access, and establishing a foundation to deepen China’s military influence over the long term. Because there is not yet a permanent military force or a large-scale dedicated surveillance and reconnaissance system present, Ban Keun currently serves more as a political symbol than concrete preparation for actual combat.

Nevertheless, this development bears directly on Việt Nam’s relations with both Laos and China. It holds the potential to shift the regional balance of influence in a manner that “benefits Beijing and harms Việt Nam.” With China positioned to take on a deeper role in Laos’ training, equipment, and security decisions, Việt Nam must watch Ban Keun’s operations closely, even if Hà Nội has not publicly voiced “concern,” as it often does regarding the South China Sea. 

Việt Nam must assess whether its own cooperation with Laos produces substantive, lasting ties, as this will determine if Laos is actively “distancing itself from Việt Nam and moving closer to China.”

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Quốc Huy & Thái Hà wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on October 21, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine translated it into English.