Việt Nam’s Pivot to Beijing in its Green Energy Transition 

Graphic: S.B./The Vietnamese Magazine.

When the U.S. withdrew from Việt Nam’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) on March 5, 2025, it took with it over $3 billion in pledged American support. This included a $1 billion World Bank loan guarantee and a $1 billion commitment via the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, while several major American banks also left the Net Zero Banking Alliance.

Because the climate pact was already suffering from bureaucratic delays and sluggish disbursements, Washington’s departure initially caused widespread alarm. However, Việt Nam has other means to secure funding, such as through engagement with Chinese financial and industrial partners led by Beijing’s Green Belt and Road Initiative (GBRI).

Given the ongoing delays from its Western partners, it seems reasonable and pragmatic for Việt Nam to seek support from China. However, as International Rivers warns in its October 2026 evaluation, “Energy Transition at Whose Expense? Justice, Finance, and Public Participation in Vietnam’s JETP Three Years On,” leaning on Beijing’s financing model threatens to strip the “just” out of Việt Nam’s transition by jeopardizing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards.

Civic Space Without Pressure

Nowhere is the appeal of Chinese financing more evident  than in Việt Nam’s suffocating civic space, which CIVICUS Monitor classifies as closed. While Western and multilateral donors—led by the European Union since Washington’s retreat—may have their share of shortcomings, they at least maintain formal governance guardrails on paper. For instance, Brussels promotes its Global Gateway as a “values-based” alternative that pairs infrastructure with human rights, and its January 2026 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Hà Nội explicitly incorporates  labor protections alongside the EU–Việt Nam Free Trade Agreement.

Western agencies have certainly dodged accountability regarding Việt Nam’s blatant human rights violations. Yet in 2025, UN Special Procedures found that no Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) pledges formally conditioned on human rights existed. Meanwhile, Germany’s GIZ hid behind its label as a “service provider,” and the Asian Development Bank pleaded ignorance beyond media reports. Yet, sustained international advocacy and European trade scrutiny still had an impact.

This influence is best illustrated by Hà Nội’s treatment of six climate advocates, who were arrested between 2021 and 2023 on alleged “tax evasion” and “unlawful document possession charges” right as the JETP was taking shape. Paradoxically, these were the same coalition members whose advocacy helped secure Việt Nam’s 2050 net-zero pledge in the first place. Following relentless global pressure, all six have now been freed, culminating with the release of environmental lawyer Đặng Đình Bách in June 2026, though only after he served his full five-year sentence.

However, Hà Nội’s apparent goodwill ended upon their release. As the report states, the advocates’ organizations remain shuttered, Decrees 126 and 147 have tightened censorship and state control over civil groups, and the JETP Secretariat was relocated to the growth-obsessed Ministry of Industry and Trade amid Tô Lâm’s 2026 consolidation of power.

If Việt Nam aligns with China, it will never have to fake sympathy with grandiose, surface-level gestures for outside observers. As International Rivers observes, China’s GBRI is largely a rebrand of the Belt and Road Initiative with the exact same underlying institutional habits: imposing zero expectations for open civic space, transparency, or keeping activists out of jail.

ESG Risks

According to the International Rivers report, China committed approximately $28.2 billion between 2000 and 2022 in development finance to Việt Nam, pouring roughly three-quarters of this capital into the energy sector. This included $3.6 billion in emergency coal loans for plants such as Vĩnh Tân 1, Vĩnh Tân 2, and Quảng Ninh 2 after Western and Japanese lenders withdrew their support.

Against this massive financial weight, the JETP’s $15.5 billion package appears positively modest. International Rivers states that it barely covers 11% of the $136.3 billion required for power plans through 2030, with an additional $699.1 billion needed through 2050, and grants making up a mere 2% of the overall total. 

Furthermore, individual donor pledges form a fragmented ledger of debt and export credits. The EU and its member states committed EUR 2.8 billion (with only 5% in grants), the Asian Development Bank pledged $2.1 billion for JETP goals, and Britain offered up to $6.5 billion in export credit ceilings. Meanwhile, South Korea’s K-SURE provided targeted industrial financing, and Japan supplied bilateral loans alongside over $20 billion under its Asia Zero Emission Community.

Western financiers are not blameless. Their fixation on “bankability” for private investors often leaves social programs underfunded. At flagship projects such as the Bác Ái pumped-storage hydropower plant, preparatory construction began before environmental and social approvals were finalized. Still, European and multilateral lenders tie loan disbursements to formal benchmarks: the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework.

In contrast, AidData research cited in the International Rivers report indicates that a major share of China’s Vietnamese portfolio carried severe ESG risks. These hazards include ecological harm, worker safety lapses, and forced community displacement, which are further compounded by Chinese and Laotian dams starving the Mekong Delta of sediment. Historically, Chinese banks only accepted stricter ESG clauses when co-financing alongside Western and multilateral lenders, as demonstrated by the 2022 Lotus Wind Power deal.

An Accountability Trap

Supporters of Beijing’s pivot often emphasize that China pledged to end overseas coal finance in 2021. Since then, the country has shifted toward wind projects—such as PowerChina’s 30-megawatt Hương Linh 4 plant—alongside solar manufacturing and electric-vehicle supply chains. However, according to the report, construction and equipment contracts drive much of China’s clean-energy push, rather than transparent loan disclosures. Furthermore, legacy Chinese coal debt, which is built on 16-year loans averaging 3.1 to 4% interest, leaves the state utility Vietnam Electricity (EVN) financially exposed if plants are retired early without creditor refinancing.

More concerning is that Beijing’s no-strings financing provides Hà Nội with a convenient escape hatch whenever JETP partners attempt to enforce social or environmental regulations. Even Việt Nam’s March 2026 Decision 458, which grandly vows to “leave no one behind,” remains hollow. Between 50,000 and 70,000 coal workers still lack dedicated transition funding, even as Vietnam’s surging power demand drove coal imports to a record 65.43 million metric tons in 2025.

Because Việt Nam’s Western partners are already tempted to compromise on human rights in their scramble for manufacturing alternatives to China, the influx of uncoordinated Chinese capital only accelerates a race to the bottom. If JETP nations want their climate pact to represent more than debt-laden infrastructure bearing a green label, they cannot attempt to out-lend Beijing by gutting their own rules. 

Instead, they must unite behind binding ESG and grievance standards, align European and Chinese funding streams under shared safeguards, and fund coal-worker protections with upfront grants. They must prove that the transition to green energy cannot be justified by silencing the people and communities forced to live with its consequences.

Aerolyne Reed. “Not a ‘Just’ Transition: Việt Nam’s Green Energy Push and the Silencing of Đặng Đình Bách,” The Vietnamese Magazine, Nov. 28, 2025, https://thevietnamese.org/2025/11/not-a-just-transition-viet-nams-green-energy-push-and-the-silencing-of-dang-dinh-bach

Asian Development Bank: Response to Joint Communication AL OTH 65/2025], Sept. 2, 2025, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39200

China Briefing, The Green Belt and Road Initiative,” Nov. 12, 2021, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-green-belt-and-road-initiative/

Council of the European Union, “Joint Statement on upgrading relations between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the European Union to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” (5819/26), Jan. 29, 2026, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5819-2026-INIT/en/pdf

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). [Response to Joint Communication AL OTH 70/2025], July 24, 2025, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39112

International Rivers, “Coalition Welcomes Release of Environmental Lawyer Dang Dinh Bach,” June 25, 2026, https://www.internationalrivers.org/news/coalition-welcomes-release-of-environmental-lawyer-dang-dinh-bach/

International Rivers, “Energy Transition at Whose Expense? Justice, Finance, and Public Participation in Vietnam’s JETP Three Years On,” Oct. 2026, https://www.internationalrivers.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2026/10/JETP-2026-ReportFinal_digitalcompressedsinglepage.pdf

Japhet Quitzon, “The Latest on Southeast Asia: U.S. Withdrawal from JETP,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 13, 2025. https://www.csis.org/blogs/latest-southeast-asia/latest-southeast-asia-us-withdrawal-jetp

Phạm Thu Trang, “Việt Nam’s Coal Workers in the Shadow of Energy Transition,” The Vietnamese Magazine, Nov. 5, 2025, https://thevietnamese.org/2025/11/viet-nams-coal-workers-in-the-shadow-of-energy-transition/

Aerolyne Reed

Aerolyne Reed is a writer and she does not consider herself as anyone special. She thinks she is just another sound, lost in a multitude of voices, just another soul adrift in the aetherial sea.

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