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Phạm Văn Luật wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luat Khoa Magazine on October 17, 2024.

A review of the Vietnamese government’s actions in the South China Sea (Biển Đông in Vietnamese) over the past two years reveals a carefully calibrated strategy. On the ground and at sea, Hà Nội has taken increasingly assertive actions to bolster its physical presence and claims. In the political arena, however, it has remained tactful.

China’s Fortress in the Spratlys This new Vietnamese strategy is a direct response to China's aggressive expansion in the region. From 2013 to 2018, Beijing carried out a massive land reclamation campaign in the Spratly Islands (Trường Sa), building large-scale military bases on artificial islands, with the three largest being Mischief Reef (đá Vành Khăn), Subi Reef (đá Xu Bi), and Fiery Cross Reef (đá Chữ Thập).

According to a 2020 assessment by Greg Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), these island fortresses pose a major threat to U.S. military power in the region, potentially neutralizing its ability to win an initial engagement in a conflict. [1] This overwhelming strength has fueled an increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign policy.

A prime example is the ongoing blockade of the Second Thomas Shoal (bãi Cỏ Mây), which the Philippines administers. Since early 2021, China has worked to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the small garrison of troops stationed on an old, grounded World War II-era ship, creating a tense and unbroken standoff. [2][3] It is in response to such moves that the Vietnamese government has begun to employ its own combination of strong measures on the ground and flexible diplomacy.

Việt Nam Reclaims Islands at Record Speed Since 2022, a year after China began its blockade of bãi Cỏ Mây, the Vietnamese government has undertaken an unprecedented effort to expand the features it controls in the Spratly Islands. According to a June 2024 report by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), the speed of this reclamation has accelerated dramatically. In just seven months, from November 2023 to June 2024, Việt Nam created as much new land in the archipelago as it had in the previous two years combined. [4]

The report details this rapid expansion: Việt Nam reclaimed 342 acres (about 1.4 km²) in 2022, added another 404 acres (1.63 km²) through most of 2023, and then surged forward by adding a further 692 acres (2.8 km²) in the period leading up to the report's release.

This recent effort brings Việt Nam’s total reclaimed and dredged area in the Biển Đông to approximately 2,360 acres (over 9.5 km²). While this is still about half of China’s total of 4,650 acres, it represents a significant narrowing of the gap and a major shift in the physical landscape of the disputed waters. [5]

While China built the three largest artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago, Việt Nam now controls the next three largest: bãi Thuyền Chài (Barque Canada Reef), bãi Nam Yết (Namyit Island), and đá Phan Vinh (Pearson Reef). [6] The expansion of bãi Thuyền Chài is particularly significant; as of June 2024, it had been reclaimed to a length of 4,318 meters, giving it the potential to host a 3,000-meter runway similar to those on China’s main bases.

Currently, Việt Nam has only one 1,300-meter runway in the Spratly Islands, which is sufficient for its current military aircraft. However, a future 3,000-meter runway on bãi Thuyền Chài would be a game-changer, capable of accommodating larger military transport planes, surveillance aircraft, and bombers. [7]

This assertive strategy stands in stark contrast to that of the Philippines, which, after grounding a ship on bãi Cỏ Mây (the Second Thomas Shoal) in 1999, did little to upgrade the outpost in the two decades before China’s blockade began in 2021.

By upgrading, reclaiming, and building multiple artificial islands, Việt Nam has given itself enough strength to make a Chinese blockade of its features far more difficult than what the Philippines now faces. This should be recognized as a strategic success of the Vietnamese government—a point that outside observers, including opposition groups, ought to acknowledge fairly.

Việt Nam Is Now More Seasoned Than in the Gạc Ma Era Compared to its naivety in 1988, Việt Nam now appears to be a far more seasoned player in the South China Sea chess game. The 1988 Gạc Ma massacre was a profound failure for Việt Nam, both in strategic forecasting and force preparedness. Hà Nội suspected China might act but deployed no protective forces for the engineering unit sent to hold đá Gạc Ma, resulting in the deaths of 64 combat engineers. [8]

Today, however, the government has learned to take coordinated, multi-pronged steps that may appear to go in opposing directions but are designed to work in concert. This strategy involves aggressively intensifying land reclamation and building military bases in the Spratly Islands, while simultaneously maintaining friendly bilateral relations with China to minimize backlash.

At the same time, Hà Nội is opening the door to deeper security ties with China’s rivals—the United States, Japan, and their allies—as if to signal the price Beijing might pay for exerting pressure. All the while, Việt Nam continues to tighten its deep economic interdependence with China, benefiting from investment, trade, and crucial imports.

This multi-layered approach suggests a more pragmatic and seasoned government, one making smarter moves to safeguard national interests.

Different Strategies Between Việt Nam and the Philippines Việt Nam’s campaign of land reclamation and artificial island construction in the Spratly Islands has been accelerating since 2022 and continues to this day, with research centers like CSIS expected to provide updates on its progress by the end of 2024. [9]

This assertive strategy stands in sharp contrast to the slower, less decisive approach of the Philippines. While most of the Spratly Islands lie geographically closer to the Philippines, it is Việt Nam that has been more proactive. The case of bãi Cỏ Mây (the Second Thomas Shoal) highlights this difference. The shoal is of critical strategic importance to the Philippines, lying only 80 nautical miles from its coast. To understand the gravity of the situation, a Vietnamese person might imagine China imposing a similar blockade on Côn Đảo island.

Yet, despite this strategic importance, the Philippines' approach has been a holding action at best. After grounding an old World War II-era ship on the shoal in 1999 to serve as a garrison, it went 22 years without carrying out any significant reclamation or reinforcement of this critical military outpost before China began its blockade in 2021.

Việt Nam, by contrast, learned a painful lesson from the 1988 Gạc Ma massacre. Ever since that event, it has been continuously reclaiming and upgrading its own outposts throughout the Spratly Islands, demonstrating a consistent, long-term strategy to solidify its physical presence. [10]

The Acts in the Regional Political Theater The immense strategic value of the Spratly Islands is underscored by features like bãi Tư Chính (Vanguard Bank), which is estimated to hold oil reserves worth roughly $3 trillion. [11][12] This is the prize that China is willing to encircle and Việt Nam is determined to defend. Việt Nam's strategy for this defense is now clear: the newly expanded base at bãi Thuyền Chài is only 80 nautical miles from bãi Tư Chính, making it a powerful forward outpost.

China is surely aware of Việt Nam's record-speed island building since 2022. What is most notable, however, is the sophisticated diplomatic dance Hà Nội has performed simultaneously, right under China’s nose.

On one hand, it maintained warm ties with Beijing: General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng visited China in November 2022, and Chinese President Tập Cận Bình received a 21-gun salute in Hà Nội in December 2023. On the other hand, it pushed back against Chinese aggression, lodging diplomatic protests against the Hướng Dương Hồng 10 survey ship in its EEZ, while also elevating relations with the United States to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” [13][14][15]

This is the essence of Việt Nam's new, more seasoned approach. The handshakes, embraces, and ceremonial gun salutes serve to strengthen ties and manage tensions between the two ruling communist parties. At the same time, they provide diplomatic cover for the assertive, on-the-ground construction that is permanently changing the strategic reality in the South China Sea.

References: Poling G, ‘The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong – War on the Rocks’ ( War on the Rocks, 10 January 2020) accessed 12 October 2024 Himmelman J, ‘A Game of Shark and Minnow’ ( Nytimes.com, 24 October 2013) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Shifting Tactics at Second Thomas Shoal | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 22 August 2024) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Hanoi in High Gear: Vietnam’s Spratly Expansion Accelerates | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 June 2024) accessed 12 October 2024 ‘Hanoi in High Gear: Vietnam’s Spratly Expansion Accelerates | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 7 June 2024) accessed 12 October 2024 ‘Hanoi in High Gear: Vietnam’s Spratly Expansion Accelerates | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 June 2024) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Hanoi in High Gear: Vietnam’s Spratly Expansion Accelerates | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 June 2024) accessed 13 October 2024 BBCnews, ‘Nhắc Lại 35 Năm Trận Gạc Ma và Di Sản Nhức Nhối Của “Cuộc Thảm Sát” – BBC News Tiếng Việt’ ( BBC News Tiếng Việt, 14 March 2023) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Hanoi in High Gear: Vietnam’s Spratly Expansion Accelerates | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 June 2024) accessed 12 October 2024 thanhnien.vn, ‘Trường Sa 1988 – Hồ Sơ Một Sự Kiện Lịch Sử: Mở Màn Cuộc Thảm Sát Gạc Ma’ ( thanhnien.vn, 13 March 2022) accessed 13 October 2024 LỤC MINH TUẤN, ‘Trung Quốc Âm Mưu Gì ở Biển Đông?’ ( TUOI TRE ONLINE, 27 May 2023) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Crude Oil Price Today | WTI OIL PRICE CHART | OIL PRICE per BARREL | Markets Insider’ ( markets.businessinsider.com, 10 October 2024) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Toàn Cảnh Chuyến Thăm Chính Thức Trung Quốc Của Tổng Bí Thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng’ ( VOV.VN, November 2022) accessed 13 October 2024 ‘Tàu Hướng Dương Hồng 10 Của Trung Quốc vi Phạm Vùng Biển Việt Nam: Ý đồ và Hậu Quả Quốc Tế’ ( Nghiencuubiendong.vn, 2024) accessed 13 October 2024 baochinhphu.vn, ‘Chuyến Thăm Việt Nam Của Tổng Bí Thư, Chủ Tịch Nước Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình Thành Công Tốt Đẹp, để Lại Dấu Ấn Lịch Sử Cho Quan Hệ Hai Đảng, Hai Nước’ ( baochinhphu.vn, 14 December 2023) accessed 13 October 2024