Key Events
- Citizens Asked to Keep Their Homes. Hà Nội Sent Police and Cut Them From the News;
- Việt Nam Wants to Quit Coal. It Could End Up Depending on China Instead;
- Europe Needs Minerals for Its Weapons. Enter Việt Nam;
- After 30 Years of Talks, the South China Sea Code May Arrive Too Weak to Stop the Clashes;
- Việt Nam and the Philippines Share Clean Energy Reliance on China Despite Sea Tensions.
Vĩnh Hưng Residents Say Police, State TV, and Sun Group Are Shutting Them Out of a $7 Billion Land Deal
Residents of Hà Nội’s Vĩnh Hưng Ward say they are being shut out at every turn as they fight a Sun Group redevelopment that would take their homes. The police warned them against protesting, and the developer has not attended a single neighborhood meeting. Meanwhile, the city’s state broadcaster, they say, has edited their objections out of the evening news.
The 447-hectare urban renovation and redevelopment project carries a total investment of nearly 186 trillion đồng ($7.18 billion). Many residents did not learn that their land fell inside the project zone until Aug. 28, when state media reported the groundbreaking.
Before then, the only public trace of the plan was a proposal on the Hà Nội Department of Finance website, and its size and investment figures do not match the current project. One young resident said she had checked the zoning before buying her home. A petition from residents of Lane 467 Lĩnh Nam Street described them as “perplexed and worried” and unable to get “official information.”
Residents say the ward held several meetings from late August to early October, but Sun Group never sent anyone to attend. The officials who attended those meetings only took notes. Petitions sent to the authorities at every level went unanswered.
A Luật Khoa survey found that residents still do not know the project timeline, the compensation terms, the resettlement arrangements, or when their land will be taken. Some say they have lost sleep and 4 to 5 kilograms since August.
In early October, a draft 1:500 detailed plan showed their land zoned for commercial apartment buildings. Protest banners went up at almost every home. The message was consistent: they will give up their land for roads, schools, or hospitals, but not for apartments that a developer will sell.
“Don’t take people’s land and hand it to businesses,” marchers chanted. Many also reject the offer of an apartment as compensation. A 50- to 60-square-meter unit, worth about 3 billion to 3.5 billion đồng cannot house the extended families who now share their homes.
The law gives them little protection. The Land Law allows the state to take land for “socioeconomic development in the national and public interest,” but it never defines those terms. A National Assembly resolution passed Dec. 11, 2025, widens the state’s power to take land for major projects.
From Oct. 8 to 10, hundreds of residents gathered outside government offices and marched through the streets. On Oct. 10, the Vĩnh Hưng Ward police warned on their Facebook page that they would “resolutely and strictly punish” anyone joining “illegal gatherings and marches.”
The police also told residents to get information only from state agencies and to “stand with local authorities.” The day before, the police had summoned a resident to discuss the project regarding the protest.
Then, on Oct. 13, Hà Nội Television aired a report that residents say cut every objection. The broadcast showed only residents who agreed to infrastructure work, while ward Vice Chairman Ngô Mạnh Cường said locals “mostly” support the project. A video recorded a woman telling the reporter that losing her home would mean “a life worse than death.” Her words never aired.
Public comment on the plan runs until Nov. 1. The comment form offers only “agree,” “disagree,” or “other opinion,” and officials have not said how the votes will be counted. Residents point to the Red River Scenic Boulevard Project, whose consultation closed Sept. 26: three weeks later, no detailed results have been released.
Clean Energy Push Could Trade Fuel Imports for Dependence on China’s Minerals
Việt Nam’s ambitious move toward renewable power could free it from imported coal but tie it more tightly to China, which dominates the minerals that clean energy needs. That is the argument of a new analysis in The SAIS Review of International Affairs.
In the Oct. 13 article, Chiara C. Sutton, a policy research fellow at the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, writes that the transition will strengthen Việt Nam’s energy security in some ways while at the same time creating a new weakness the government has yet to acknowledge.
Việt Nam’s need for electricity is growing fast. Demand rose about 8% a year from 2013 to 2023, while domestic production of coal, gas, and oil has declined since 2010. In 2023, power shortages caused rolling blackouts that cost the economy an estimated $1.4 billion.
The government’s answer is Power Development Plan VIII (PDP8), revised in April 2025. It aims for solar and wind to supply 28% to 36% of electricity by 2030 and 74% to 75% by 2050. Coal would fall to 20% of generation by 2030 and to zero by 2050. Total generation capacity, 80 gigawatts in 2023, would nearly triple by 2030.
Fossil fuels still dominated in 2024, producing 55.85% of electricity generation for the year, most of it from coal. Việt Nam’s domestic coal is primarily anthracite, a high-rank coal that is technically challenging to use in conventional power plants, so the country now relies on imports. Việt Nam went from a small net coal exporter in 2000 to a major net importer by 2023.
Renewables solve part of that problem: once solar panels and wind turbines are built, they need no fuel shipments. But Sutton argues that Việt Nam lacks enough domestic supply of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, and rare earths to build that infrastructure, so it must import these minerals.
Unlike coal, which Việt Nam buys from Indonesia, Australia, Russia, and Laos, critical minerals are particularly difficult to source from more than one supplier. According to the International Energy Agency, China controls an average of 70% of refining for 19 of 20 strategic minerals.
That is relevant for Hà Nội’s “bamboo diplomacy,” its strategy of balancing among the major powers. China was Việt Nam’s largest source of imports in 2025, at about $186 billion. Sutton writes that Beijing has already used mineral export controls as leverage against the United States and that a Việt Nam without other suppliers could face similar pressure.
The analysis concludes that the transition is a net gain on timing, because a shortage of minerals is easier to manage than a sudden fuel shock. It is less clearly a gain for long-term resilience.
EU Turns to Việt Nam for Critical Minerals as It Seeks to Cut Reliance on China
The European Union wants to buy more critical minerals from Việt Nam to reduce its dependence on China, according to internal EU documents reported by Reuters. The news comes as Việt Nam’s leader prepares to visit Brussels next week.
The documents, dated June 2026 and prepared by the EU delegation in Hà Nội, say Europe’s push to rearm, combined with fears that its current supplies may be at risk, makes Việt Nam too important to overlook.
“Considering Europe’s need to rearm and de-risk as fast as possible, the EU cannot afford ignoring Vietnam as a potential supplier of critical raw materials,” the delegation wrote. It pointed in particular to Việt Nam’s “abundant reserves” of rare earths and tungsten.
Việt Nam sits on large deposits of several minerals that Western governments consider strategic. They include tungsten, rare earths, antimony, and bismuth, as well as bauxite, from which gallium can be extracted as a byproduct.
So far, Việt Nam’s exports to the EU have been mostly limited to tungsten and antimony. Both are used in the defense industry, including in ammunition and explosives.
According to Reuters, the documents also cite growing competition for Việt Nam’s supplies. They recommend that the EU provide financial support and pursue mineral processing projects in the country, a step that would move Việt Nam beyond simply exporting raw ore. EU leaders are also discussing broader plans to cut their reliance on Chinese supply chains.
The push reflects how much control Beijing has over the industry. According to the International Energy Agency, China refines an average of 70% of 19 of 20 strategic minerals, and it has shown it will use export controls as leverage in trade disputes. That has sent the EU, the United States, and others looking for alternative suppliers, and Việt Nam’s reserves have made it an increasingly attractive partner.
For Hà Nội, the EU’s interest offers both opportunity and risk. Closer mineral ties with Brussels could bring investment and technology and help Việt Nam develop a domestic processing industry.
But they would also put Việt Nam at the center of the rivalry over the materials that power modern weapons, electronics, and clean energy. Việt Nam relies heavily on China, its largest source of imports, so it will have to balance carefully as it courts new partners.
The upcoming visit to Brussels is expected to give both sides a chance to discuss deeper cooperation.
South China Sea Code of Conduct Risks Becoming ‘Toothless’ as 2026 Deadline Nears, Analysts Warn
China and Southeast Asian nations are racing to finish a code of conduct (COC) for the South China Sea by the end of 2026. But analysts warn the agreement could end up toothless unless it focuses on preventing clashes at sea rather than settling who owns what.
The pact has been under discussion for more than three decades. It remains stuck on how to balance China’s sweeping claims against those of four Southeast Asian claimants: Việt Nam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Speaking at a conference in Kuala Lumpur this week, maritime experts agreed that the code was never meant to resolve sovereignty disputes, the South China Morning Post reported. They were divided on whether it could keep the peace.
Ding Duo, a researcher at China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said a binding agreement that tried to define maritime rights would face resistance on all sides. “If anything involves clarifying maritime rights, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam will reject a binding COC,” Ding told the Post’s This Week in Asia.
Ding’s comment points to the central dilemma. Each claimant wants a code strong enough to restrain its rivals, but none wants one that could weaken its own claims. A code that only sets rules of behavior, such as how coast guards and fishing fleets should act when they meet, may be easier to agree on. But it would leave untouched the disputes that drive the confrontations in the first place.
The situation is particularly serious for Việt Nam. It claims both the Paracel and Spratly islands and has repeatedly called for a “substantive, effective, and legally binding” code consistent with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Vietnamese fishermen have long faced harassment, ramming, and seizures by Chinese vessels near the Paracels, which China has controlled since 1974. Việt Nam has also expanded its own presence in the Spratlys in recent years through large-scale land reclamation, drawing scrutiny from Beijing.
The Philippines has experienced its most serious standoffs with Chinese coast guard ships near Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, following a 2016 international arbitration ruling that rejected most of China’s claims. China rejects the ruling.
ASEAN and China first committed to working toward a code in their 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. In 2023, they agreed to aim to conclude negotiations within three years, which set the current deadline.
As that deadline approaches, analysts say the question is no longer whether they will sign a code, but whether it will matter. A weak agreement could allow Beijing to claim diplomatic progress while doing little to stop the incidents at sea that keep the region tense.
Quiet or Loud, Việt Nam and the Philippines Share One Weak Spot Against China: Clean Energy
Việt Nam and the Philippines take very different public approaches to China in the South China Sea, but they may share the same long-term vulnerability: a growing dependence on Chinese clean energy, according to an analysis published by Australia’s Lowy Institute.
In an Oct. 15 commentary for The Interpreter, the institute’s analysis site, Southeast Asia security scholar Hanh Nguyen argues that the two countries’ strategies look more alike than they seem. “Vietnam’s quiet diplomacy and loud protests from the Philippines mask the same reliance on Chinese clean energy,” she writes.
Việt Nam, which has no military allies or close political and economic ties to Beijing, keeps its messaging restrained. In March, it protested China’s land reclamation at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands without naming China directly.
On the 10th anniversary of the 2016 arbitration ruling against Beijing’s sweeping claims, Hà Nội reaffirmed that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is the only legal basis for maritime entitlements.
Quietly, it has also sped up construction on 18 reefs in the Spratly Islands, adding ports, runways, military facilities, and communications arrays. And it has upgraded its partnerships with the Philippines and India and signed a vision statement for defense cooperation with Australia.
Manila has taken the opposite approach in public. It has filed 39 diplomatic protests against China this year through September. A recent standoff near the Second Thomas Shoal led each country to summon the other’s ambassador.
Joined by 13 other countries, the Philippines called the 2016 ruling “final, legally binding, and definitive.” It has extended the runway on Thitu Island, expanded a port on Nanshan Island, opened four new sites to U.S. forces, and hosted U.S. missile systems during exercises.
Yet both countries are moving quickly toward renewable energy built largely on Chinese supply chains. The Philippines has become China’s second-largest market for solar panels, and Chinese companies have won construction contracts and bought manufacturing capacity there.
In Việt Nam, Chinese firms dominate many renewable energy contracts and supply chains, from wind turbine parts to electric vehicle inputs.
That dependence, she argues, could create business interests in both countries that favor closer economic ties with Beijing and push back against confrontation at sea. “These developments can gradually constrain Hanoi’s and Manila’s strategic autonomy,” Hanh Nguyen writes.
Hanh’s recommendation is industrial policy. That means requiring local content, demanding technology transfer, and building domestic manufacturing further up the supply chain.
The warning echoes other recent analyses of Việt Nam’s energy transition. Experts say renewables could free the country from imported coal, but they could also tie it to China’s dominance over the minerals and equipment that clean energy requires.
Quick Takes:
Freedom House Takes Up Cases of Jailed Former VOA Journalists Lê Anh Hùng and Phạm Chí Dũng
Freedom House has adopted the cases of two imprisoned Vietnamese journalists, Lê Anh Hùng and Phạm Chí Dũng, under its Fred Hiatt Program to Free Political Prisoners. Both men reported for Voice of America. The Washington-based group announced the decision Oct. 15.
Lê Anh Hùng, who covered politics and corruption, was arrested March 9 and charged with “propaganda against the state,” which carries up to 20 years in prison. He was previously jailed from 2018 to 2023.
Phạm Chí Dũng is the founding chairman of the Independent Journalists Association of Vietnam. He was sentenced to 15 years in January 2021 after a one-day trial.
Jamie Fly, the CEO of Freedom House, called for their immediate and unconditional release.
Rights Advocates Urge Australia to ‘Push Hard’ for Release of Melbourne Activist Held in Việt Nam
Human rights advocates are pressing Canberra to do more to free Trần Hiệp, a Melbourne-based member of the overseas pro-democracy group Việt Tân. Vietnamese police say they are holding him on terrorism charges. Rights advocate Phil Robertson called the arrest “outrageous and unacceptable.” He urged Australia to “push hard, both privately and publicly,” for Trần Hiệp’s release.
Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she had personally made representations to Hà Nội. As of last week, Australian officials had not been granted consular access, ABC News reported.
Việt Nam’s embassy in Canberra called the abduction allegations “unfounded and misleading.”
Resettled Once, Hà Nội’s Đầm Ấu Residents Face Losing Their Homes Again to Sun Group
Residents of Đầm Ấu, a resettlement area in Hà Nội’s Vĩnh Hưng Ward, say Sun Group’s 447-hectare redevelopment project could force them to move a second time. Families were first moved to what residents describe as “desolate marshland,” then filled in the land and rebuilt their lives “from nothingness.” A draft plan released in early October still places their homes inside the project zone.
The Hà Nội Department of Construction reportedly said Đầm Ấu would not be resettled again. Residents’ petition got a one-word reply: “noted.” Banners now read: “Đầm Ấu resettlement area does not want to be resettled again.”
Việt Nam Signs Free Trade Deal With Four European Nations After 14 Years of Talks
Việt Nam signed a free trade agreement Sunday with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Communist Party General Secretary and President Tô Lâm attended the signing at the party’s headquarters in Hà Nội, Tuổi Trẻ reported. Swiss President Guy Parmelin and Liechtenstein Prime Minister Brigitte Haas were also there.
The deal will eliminate or reduce tariffs, and it covers services, investment, intellectual property, and government procurement. Việt Nam exports mainly seafood, footwear, textiles, and electronics to the bloc. It must be ratified by each country’s parliament before taking effect.
