Become a Member for $9.99/month

Each congress of the Communist Party of Việt Nam draws significant public attention. Among its many proceedings, the selection of the General Secretary always stands at the center of focus. As the event approaches, the political atmosphere in the country becomes animated with rumors, analyses, and speculations about the balance of power within the party. [1]

Likewise, debates and forecasts about the next supreme leader proliferate, especially on independent media outlets and social networks. Below are three key points about the selection of the General Secretary that offer a broader perspective on one of Việt Nam’s most significant political events.

1. The General Secretary Is Elected Through a Closed Process In principle, the General Secretary is elected by the Party’s Central Committee—the highest authority between National Congresses—during the first plenary session of a new term. While the process officially involves nominations, the compilation of a shortlist, and a secret ballot, international scholars observe that it is not a genuine competitive vote. Instead, it reflects complex negotiations and power interactions among the Party’s top leaders. [2]

This dynamic was described by Jonathan D. London in his 2016 Diplomat article , “Vietnam’s Leadership Succession Struggle.” He characterized the 12th National Congress as “a tense power struggle” between three centers of authority: the General Secretary, the 16-member Politburo, and the 175-member Central Committee. [3]

According to London, while the General Secretary and Politburo “retain control over the key procedural levers of power,” the Central Committee has at times challenged this authority. It has pushed its own slate of nominees and vehemently declared General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s ban on nominations “illegal and invalid.” The Committee also reportedly “rejected the General Secretary’s proposed leadership list through an open vote.”

Professor Carlyle A. Thayer, in his 2021 analysis —“Vietnam’s 13th National Congress: Leadership Transition and Political Consolidation”—called the leadership transition “a grand compromise.” According to Thayer, the Politburo is where final personnel negotiations are settled, while the Central Committee’s role is to formally approve and legitimize those decisions, including “special cases” involving age or term limits. [4]

Thus, the election is both procedurally closed and shaped by power dynamics: the Politburo defines the political agreement before the Central Committee casts the deciding ballots.

2. The Criteria for General Secretary and the Mantra of “Special Cases” According to Regulation No. 214-QĐ/TW , issued in 2020, a General Secretary candidate must meet all qualifications for a Politburo member, plus possess high prestige, exemplary morality, and comprehensive leadership capability. Candidates are also expected to have served as a provincial party secretary, a minister, or a head of a central committee, and to have completed at least one full term in the Politburo. [5]

However, all these standards can be overridden by a single clause: the “special case” exception, as determined by the Central Committee. In practice, this mechanism is often invoked to legitimize appointments that breach formal requirements.

For instance, in 2021, Nguyễn Phú Trọng was re-elected for a third term, despite exceeding both age and term limits. Similarly, a figure such as Phan Văn Giang could be considered eligible—even if he has not completed a full Politburo term—if the Central Committee deems his appointment a necessary special case.

According to Thayer, this mechanism is more than an administrative exception; it is a “shortcut to preserve political stability.” It serves to legitimize high-level personnel decisions, ensuring that internal agreements are ratified by the Central Committee, even when they bypass formal rules, thereby maintaining continuity within the leadership. [6]

3. How Should Rumors About the Top Leadership Election Results Be Understood? The process of selecting top leaders within the Communist Party of Việt Nam takes place entirely behind closed doors, with key decisions made only during Central Committee meetings.

According to Reuters , during the 13th National Congress in 2021, the Party “formally selected its top leadership for the next five years through an extremely secretive process.” [7]

Around 1,600 delegates cast secret ballots to elect the Central Committee, which in turn elected the Politburo and the General Secretary. The shortlist of leading candidates is typically classified as “top secret,” meaning that even when journalists obtain information, official media are rarely permitted to report on it. [8]

Yet as each Congress approaches, rumors about high-level personnel circulate widely. These “leaks” reflect the public’s deep interest, but they can also be seen as part of the Party’s political machinery; such information could hardly escape by accident from such a tightly sealed system. This phenomenon can be interpreted through three different lenses:

Testing Public Sentiment Although citizens do not directly elect their leaders, legitimacy still depends on public acceptance. For example, General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s “furnace-burning” anti-corruption drive was viewed as a way to gauge public trust , as many experts noted Trọng was aware that corruption “threatens the Party’s legitimacy.” Allowing personnel information to leak may serve as a way to gauge public reaction: the Party learns who is “popular with the people” and which propaganda campaigns are trusted. If responses are too negative, adjustments can be made to personnel or messaging. [9]

Controlling Public Opinion Polling sentiment is the first step; controlling it is the next. Reuters reported that ahead of the 13th National Congress, the government banned all speculation, declared the candidate list “top secret,” kept “a tight grip on the press,” while “showing little tolerance for critical opinions.” [10] Official agencies warned that anyone sharing leaked information deemed “false” or “causing public confusion” would be punished. [11]

This is how the Party preserves its image, maintains stability, and protects the credibility of its leadership.

Constructing the Image of “Internal Democracy” within the Party The Party also seeks to project that its internal environment allows for genuine democratic choice. By regulation, Central Committee meetings present multiple personnel options, hold debates, and conduct secret ballots. Leaks about “potential candidates” may be a strategy to create the impression of deliberation and real competition. [12] [13]

According to RFA (Radio Free Asia), however, delegates at the 2021 Congress cast secret ballots, but the full candidate list was already predetermined. The chosen person is often part of the Party’s “succession planning” and has secured majority support in advance. [14]

Reuters described the 2016 “internal power struggle” between Nguyễn Phú Trọng and Nguyễn Tấn Dũng as existing mostly at the level of speculation. [15] Thus, the rumors about the current situation—such as Phan Văn Giang surpassing Tô Lâm for General Secretary—are likely another round of “intentional leaks” designed to create the appearance of debate within the Party’s inner circle.

Minh Viễn wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Oct. 29, 2025. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyright for the English version of this article.

References: 1. Văn, T. (2024, May 21). Việt Nam: Độc diễn chính trị và thảm họa (P1). Voice of America . https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/viet-nam-doc-dien-chinh-tri-va-tham-hoa-p1-/7620787.html

2. Xaydungchinhsach.Chinhphu.Vn. (2025, April 3). TOÀN VĂN: Quyết định 190-QĐ/TW về QUY CHẾ BẦU CỬ trong Đảng. xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn . https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/toan-van-quyet-dinh-190-qd-tw-ban-hanh-quy-che-bau-cu-trong-dang-119241025090411335.htm

3. London, J. D. (2016, January 14). Vietnam’s leadership succession struggle. The Diplomat . https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/vietnams-leadership-succession-struggle/

4. Thayer, P. C. (2021, February 4). Vietnam’s 13th National Party Congress: exceptional and unprecedented – Australian Institute of International Affairs . Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/vietnams-thirteenth-national-party-congress-exceptional-and-unprecedented/

5. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, September 20). Quy định 214-QĐ/TW năm 2020 về khung tiêu chuẩn chức danh, tiêu chí đánh giá cán bộ thuộc diện Ban Chấp hành Trung ương, Bộ Chính trị, Ban Bí thư quản lý do Ban Chấp hành Trung ương ban hành. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Quy-dinh-214-QD-TW-2020-tieu-chuan-chuc-danh-can-bo-thuoc-dien-Ban-Chap-hanh-Trung-uong-433545.aspx

6. See [4]

7. Pearson, J. (2021, January 12). “Hot news from the Super League!”: How Vietnam skirts Party speculation ban on social media. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hot-news-super-league-how-vietnam-skirts-party-speculation-ban-social-media-2021-01-12/

8. Vietnam tightens info controls for party Congress as 2020 violations cited in HRW report. (2025, June 4). Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/fakenews-01132021185445.html

9. Hunt, L. (2023, January 18). Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption drive claims president. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-s-anti-corruption-drive-claims-president/6923255.html

10. See [7]

11. See [8]

12. Tăng cường thu hút, trọng dụng nhân tài, góp phần xây dựng đội ngũ cán bộ các cấp ngang tầm nhiệm vụ trong tình hình mới . (n.d.). Tạp Chí Cộng Sản. https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/media-story/-/asset_publisher/V8hhp4dK31Gf/content/tang-cuong-thu-hut-trong-dung-nhan-tai-gop-phan-xay-dung-doi-ngu-can-bo-cac-cap-ngang-tam-nhiem-vu-trong-tinh-hinh-moi

13. See [7]

14. See [8]

15. Pearson, J. (2021, January 31). Nguyen Phu Trong, Vietnam’s anti-corruption czar, crowned party chief again. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/article/world/nguyen-phu-trong-vietnams-anti-corruption-czar-crowned-party-chief-again-idUSKBN2A006T/

Three Key Takeaways About Việt Nam’s Communist Party Election on Its General Secretary

RELATED POSTS

Woman Arrested Under Article 331 After Accusing Sơn La’s Party Leaders of Corruption and Land Mismanagement

Major Danish Broadcaster Calls Việt Nam President Tô Lâm Leader of a Regime That ‘Can Do Some Pretty Nasty Things’

Hà Nội Residents Lose Homes as President Tô Lâm Pushes for Further Road Widening Projects

Minh Viễn

Related Posts

Sacrificing the Individual: The Ethics of Land Seizures in Việt Nam

Content Creation in Việt Nam: Navigating Censorship and Post-Takedowns

Phil Robertson: “Việt Nam has the capacity and the political will to abduct people abroad.”

BPSOS Director Nguyễn Đình Thắng: Việt Nam’s Terrorism Charges Are an ‘Absurd Fabrication’

Reddit’s Growing Popularity in Việt Nam Amid Internet Censorship

Partners in Profit and Crime: Việt Nam’s Lucrative Alliance With Min Aung Hlaing

Sexual Harassment Scandals and a Grotesque Masculine Society

The Price of Preserving the Hồ Chí Minh Mausoleum

OPINIONS

Southern Vietnamese Changed After 1975. Loving the Old Words Doesn’t Mean Fighting the New Ones.

Four Journalists Are in Prison in Việt Nam. Their Mother, Sister, and Wives Demand Their Release

Canada and the West Cannot Ignore Việt Nam’s Human Rights Record

POPULAR STORIES

Hà Nội ‘Justice Tree’: Social Media Users Demand Investigation into Former Lawmaker Nguyễn Sỹ Cương

Việt Nam Culture Ministry Blocks Threads Posts Accusing Nguyễn Sỹ Cương

Religion Bulletin – April 2026 – Việt Nam Passes Amended Religion Law As Authorities Prosecute Four Independent Protestants

Post-1975 Tragedy: The Grim Reality of Life in Vietnam’s Re-education Camps

Former Deputy Nguyễn Sỹ Cương Trends on Vietnamese Social Media Following Rap Album Censorship