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As the South Central region of Việt Nam endures a historic round of floods , the relentless news of damage has prompted a surge of calls to support affected communities. Notably, almost all appeals for donations have been directed towards a single destination: Mặt trận Tổ quốc Việt Nam (Vietnam Fatherland Front - VFF).

As of 5:00 p.m. on Nov. 25, the VFF had received more than 2 trillion đồng from millions of citizens. This is not the first time this has occurred; the same pattern appeared when Typhoon Yagi devastated northern Việt Nam, with the VFF receiving more than 5.3 trillion đồng in contributions (as of Feb. 16, 2025).

This centralization of aid has repeated itself during other natural disasters and epidemics. However, when such a large amount of charitable money flows to a single place, it inevitably raises questions: Is transparency ensured, and how exactly will the money be used?

The Roots of the Monopoly To clarify how the VFF uses charitable funds, its near-monopoly on donations must first be addressed. Legally, the VFF is not the sole actor in disaster relief. Clause 1, Article 2 of Decree No. 93/2021/NĐ-CP (Decree 93/2021) grants the right to mobilize, receive, and distribute donations to the Red Cross Society, ministries, People’s Committees (UBND), and even individuals.

Furthermore, Clause 1, Article 4 of Decree 93/2021 states:

“The State encourages, honors, and creates favorable conditions for organizations and individuals to participate in voluntary contributions and organize campaigns to mobilize voluntary contributions […]”.

Despite this legal framework, reality paints a different picture. With each natural disaster, public donations overwhelmingly converge on the VFF. This is rooted in a systemic "imbalance": while state-affiliated bodies are enabled, private individuals and independent organizations face several obstacles and difficulties.

This dominance is also historical. Before the current regulatory "favor," the VFF held a formally sanctioned monopoly. Prior to Decree 93/2021, Decree No. 64/2008/NĐ-CP stipulated that only the Central Committee of the VFF, the Việt Nam Red Cross Society, and authorized units could receive relief money and goods. All others were barred from engaging in such activities, firmly establishing the VFF’s long-standing dominance.

Although Decree 93/2021 acknowledged the right of individuals to mobilize and recieve relief funds, the position of the VFF remained unchanged: it continues to occupy the top position for receiving and distributing voluntary contributions.

Even more significant is the fact that the preferential treatment afforded to the VFF is clearly reflected in the constitution. Since 1980 , the VFF has held a unique status . While technically a voluntary organization, it operates under a dedicated law and receives state budget funding, making it resemble a state institution more than a civil society group. Its reach is nationwide, and the Law on Organization of Local Government explicitly requires local authorities to “coordinate with and promote the role” of the Front.

Notably, the most recent constitutional amendment reinforced this role. The resolution amending the 2013 Constitution explicitly affirmed that the VFF is a component of the political system under the leadership of the Communist Party of Việt Nam (ĐCSVN). It also acts as a “parent body” to major organizations like the Trade Union and Youth Union, further expanding its capacity to mobilize resources.

Beyond these legal advantages, the state actively directs donors to the Front. State media consistently presents the VFF as the “ go-to address ” for relief. Recently, the Ministry of Public Security even coordinated with the VFF to solicit donations for flood victims through the VNeID application . Clearly, the authorities have made every effort to position the VFF as the sole “official” channel for charitable funds.

Bureaucratic Barriers to Private Charity While Decree 93/2021 technically allows individuals to mobilize relief funds, the provision seems designed less to facilitate private charity and more to control it. The decree imposes a stringent set of conditions that differ significantly from the freedom enjoyed by the VFF. Specifically, individuals must:

Publicly announce through media outlets all details of the fundraising campaign, including specific bank accounts and distribution timelines; Submit written notifications to the Commune-level People’s Committee of their residence for monitoring, inspection, and supervision; Coordinate directly with local authorities in affected areas to determine recipient lists, distribution timelines, assistance levels, and so forth. These requirements place private actors in a position of dependency on local officials, effectively limiting their charitable initiatives. For those without administrative expertise or political connections, these are significant hurdles, particularly during the chaos of a natural disaster.

Consequently, the role of private charity has diminished. Following various controversies , both the public and the organizers have become hesitant. Recently, public figures like singer Đan Trường faced backlash for using personal bank accounts to solicit donations. In response, many celebrities who previously led fundraising campaigns are now donating directly to the VFF to avoid legal and reputational risks. They are also urging the public to do the same.

This creates a paradox: the law ostensibly opens the door for multiple charitable actors, yet in practice, only the Việt Nam Fatherland Front can operate effectively. Through administrative friction and public pressure, the VFF has secured a de facto monopoly on charity.

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 1, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

The Vietnam Fatherland Front’s Monopoly on Disaster Relief–Part 1: When All Charitable Funds Flow to a Single Channel

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