Become a Member for $9.99/month

2025 has entered history as a year of broken records, disrupted orders, and new precedents. Amid these shifts various individuals—whether by accident or design— have left their footprints in the country’s historical flow.

The Vietnamese Magazine invites readers to review the figures who shaped this surprise-filled year.

A common citizen in central Việt Nam in 2025 may have had to flee floods several times, may have waited for rescue while sitting on the roof of their home, and may have returned only to find that their parents had starved or frozen to death after being cut off by floodwaters for days.

In the collective memory of Vietnamese born since 1961, floods have never been as devastating. A record-shattering total of 15 storms and six tropical depressions operated over the Biển Đông, [1] bringing catastrophic consequences to Huế, Phú Yên, and many other localities. As of Dec. 4, at least 419 people were reported dead or missing. [2] Yet, official figures are questionable; on Dec. 19, provincial leaders in Đắk Lắk revised their local death toll from 63 to 113. [3]

While natural disasters are acts of heaven, the ratio of deaths caused by nature versus human action remains unknown. In a year when the nation twice entered a frenzy of “pride and swagger” for A50 and A80 celebrations, ordinary people were frantically climbing onto rooftops and rowing boats through city streets, victims of sudden hydropower discharges and sluggish rescues.

Officials consistently hid behind procedures governing hydropower releases until police began investigating the record-level discharge by the Sông Ba Hạ Hydropower Plant in Đắk Lắk. [4] This, however, is only the visible part of the problem. As soon as ordinary citizens questioned the government’s poor response, they were silenced with fines of 7.5 million đồng. Meanwhile, senior leaders remained conspicuously absent, failing to show the same presence they displayed during the year's celebrations.

General Secretary Tô Lâm is the inevitable choice for any list of the year's most influential figures. When selected last year , the prediction was that if he succeeded in streamlining the state apparatus, he would be the first to "move mountains and fill seas." With 2025 at a close, he has done far more than that; he has moved towering peaks and filled the deepest waters.

In a mere twelve months, Tô Lâm oversaw a radical restructuring of the state. [5] National Assembly committees were reduced from 14 to eight, while ministries dropped from 30 to 22, resulting in job losses for hundreds of thousands of public servants. He abolished district-level administrative units, established special courts, and oversaw the "carving and merging" of 63 provinces into just 34.

Regardless of his future tenure, Tô Lâm has created an unprecedented historical turning point. His successor will inherit both this immense administrative legacy and the long shadow of a powerful police general.

Unlike his conservative predecessor Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Tô Lâm is viewed as a pragmatist. Breaking from the Communist Party's history of state-centered economics, he declared the private economy to be "the most important driving force." He set an unprecedented annual growth target of over 10 percent [6] and facilitated the establishment of International Financial Centers in Hồ Chí Minh City and Đà Nẵng to attract foreign investment. [7]

However, this reformist energy does not obscure his core identity as a regime-protecting police officer. Under his leadership, the Ministry of Public Security has expanded its power significantly, tightening internet controls and continuing the arrest of activists. The state has assumed the unmistakable shape of a police regime—one bearing the distinct imprint of Hưng Yên.

With prospects for political democratization entirely bleak, Tô Lâm enters 2026 as the nominee for both General Secretary and State President. This move toward institutional consolidation reflects a rare concentration of power. [8] He has moved mountains, yet the highest peaks remain untouched. It remains to be seen how he will ultimately wield this power.

Senior Lieutenant General Lương Tam Quang, Minister of Public Security, was undoubtedly the busiest lawmaker of 2025. The volume of legislation drafted by his ministry was unmatched, while the National Assembly’s own initiative became negligible.

In a political system dominated by the police sector , it is unsurprising that the Minister of Public Security was involved in virtually all legislative work. [9] With General Secretary Tô Lâm pushing sweeping reforms , the Ministry naturally sat at the center of the process. [10] This resulted in record-breaking figures: 85 laws and 73 resolutions from the Assembly, and 322 government decrees as of Dec. 16.

The Ministry of Public Security spearheaded the drafting of major legislation, including the Penal Code, the Law on Personal Data Protection, the Extradition Law, the Cybersecurity Law, and laws regarding state secrets, criminal judgment, and detention enforcement.

Additionally, the ministry contributed to the Law on Civil Judgment Enforcement, the Press Law, and the Anti-Corruption Law. This is not to mention the ministry’s role in hosting the Hà Nội Convention in November. [11]

By year’s end, Minister Quang solicited public feedback on a draft resolution introducing a citizen scoring and ranking system , [12] raising serious concerns about state intrusion into private life.

Most politicians wait for favorable winds to fly their kites. General Lương Tam Quang, however, is the kind of kite that is already positioned high in the sky long before the wind begins to blow.

The cracking of the Đoàn Văn Sáng case by anonymous online sleuths stood in stark contrast to the reality of the state security apparatus. Despite being swollen to its limits and equipped with cutting-edge technology, [13] the police force failed to rein in rampant social fraud. Instead, it focused its proactivity on “protecting the Party’s ideological foundation”—identifying and imprisoning government critics.

Consequently, the sensational Sáng case was uncovered by nameless individuals, with the police appearing only in late November to formally initiate proceedings.

These online sleuths are not a new phenomenon. For years, amateur and professional investigators have utilized open-source intelligence (OSINT) to trace criminal clues using publicly available data. They work quietly and without accolades, but their contributions are real. Precisely because they remain uncelebrated, they have been selected as one of the figures of the year.

Military generals occupy a domain so insulated that even the police rarely gain access. This immunity is absolute—unless the general travels abroad.

While Vietnamese leaders staining the national image is nothing new, few cases match the severity of Hoàng Xuân Chiến’s scandal . He was accused by the South Korean government of sexually harassing a civil servant during a diplomatic event in Seoul. [14]

Although the scandal dominated South Korean media throughout October, the Vietnamese side maintained complete silence. There was no statement, not a single word. Chiến retained his titles as Deputy Minister of National Defense and Central Committee member, continuing to issue directives and travel as if nothing had happened.

Sexual harassment may be an individual offense, but this profoundly uncivilized response represents a systemic failure, demonstrating utter disrespect for both the military and the people.

While it is not unusual for the country’s richest man to appear on a list of influential figures, we chose Phạm Nhật Vượng this year not for his wealth or political connections, but for a specific action: the unprecedented legal campaign launched by Vingroup against 68 individuals and organizations accused of spreading “false information.” [15]

Big business inevitably attracts controversy, and a leader's caliber is defined by how they respond to it. Vingroup’s previous strategy was simply to “ report it to the police ,” [16] a tactic that exemplified a culture of extinguishing fire with gasoline—using state power rather than dialogue, even against their own customers.

In September, however, Vượng surprised observers by shifting tactics. He filed civil lawsuits abroad against critics such as Lê Trung Khoa (Germany), Hoàng Dũng (U.S.), and Phương Ngô (Canada), while announcing plans for domestic litigation. While no domestic cases have been disclosed yet, the overseas cases have already yielded results.

Regardless of the verdicts, the significance lies in the method. A major corporation is pioneering a shift away from “calling the police” in favor of civil legal avenues to resolve disputes.

This move must be viewed within the context of Việt Nam’s unequal legal environment, where corporations hold overwhelming advantages. It remains unclear how Vượng is dealing with domestic critics in the absence of public lawsuits. Nevertheless, one can cautiously hope that this marks the beginning of a space for civil discourse in debates over speech in Việt Nam.

For Lê Trung Khoa , editor-in-chief of the Germany-based Thoibao.de, 2025 was defined by a dual assault from two of Việt Nam’s most powerful forces. [17] Vingroup sought to silence him through a civil lawsuit in Germany, while the Ministry of Public Security issued an arrest warrant for “propaganda against the state.” [18]

In the German court, Khoa prevailed on four out of five claims regarding his alleged false reporting. In the Vietnamese criminal case, however, he faced a trial in absentia on Dec. 31 [19]—a proceeding with a far more predictable conclusion.

Khoa’s outlet is known for publishing “inside information” allegedly leaked from within the government—content that is inherently unverifiable, as Thoibao.de openly acknowledges.

These simultaneous legal battles make Khoa a living witness to the evolving threats against overseas dissidents. The Vingroup case marks the first cross-border civil lawsuit of its kind, while the criminal charge represents a rare instance of Việt Nam prosecuting a dissident abroad. While Vingroup’s choice of civil litigation suggests a relatively civilized approach, the Ministry of Public Security shows no signs of learning such restraint.

For students, few political lessons are more instructive than the twin mega-celebrations of A50 and A80. The students of Hanoi College of Tourism, however, learned these lessons the hard way.

After training for weeks to participate in the “national concert” of A50 (the 50th anniversary of Reunification) and A80 (the 80th National Day), these students faced a harsh reality . Despite the Party’s mobilization of patriotism and technology, the students discovered they had received only about half the training compensation paid to their peers at other institutions. [20]

This sparked a rare public challenge. The students dared to speak out, leading to the arrest of their principal, Phạm Văn Long, for allegedly directing the embezzlement of their stipends. [21]

While corruption is not new in Việt Nam, and similar abuses may well exist elsewhere, the actions of these students were exceptional. They defied the cynical Vietnamese proverb of “an ant suing a potato,” proving that even the smallest voices can sometimes hold power accountable.

By the end of 2025, Minister of National Defense Phan Văn Giang had become an unlikely internet sensation. A Facebook page in his name amassed 87,000 followers, while a TikTok channel reached 127,500. [22] Though the manager of these accounts remains unknown, Giang has become one of the most searched politicians online, a stark contrast to previous years when few members of the public even knew his name.

This surge in visibility accompanied six months of speculation regarding his potential candidacy for General Secretary. Had he succeeded, he would have been only the second military general to lead the Party, following Lê Khả Phiêu (1997–2001). However, that prospect faded after the Central Committee nominated Tô Lâm for both General Secretary and State President. [23]

That the public relies on such rumors and signals is a symptom of an unhealthy political environment. Only in non-democratic systems is leadership selection treated as palace intrigue, leaving citizens with nothing but rumors to analyze court politics. This discourse points to a future where national leadership is dominated by either the police or the military—armed forces that should, in principle, remain separate from governance.

The year’s final figure is a man of few words, no interviews, and no signature on public documents. He appears only rarely to wave and smile, yet leaves a wake of intense curiosity.

Following the death of General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng in July 2024, former Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng has re-emerged. Moving beyond funeral appearances, he now stands alongside General Secretary Tô Lâm at major events. Most significantly, Tô Lâm personally awarded him the Gold Star Order —the state’s highest honor and a de facto talisman of immunity for as long as Tô Lâm remains in power. [24]

Known as “ Ba Dũng, ” he remains one of the most intriguing figures in modern history. [25] A war veteran who traversed the military, police, and central banking systems, he became the most powerful Prime Minister of the Đổi Mới era before his defeat in 2016. Even in retreat, his influence persisted as his children advanced: Nguyễn Thanh Nghị and Nguyễn Minh Triết climbed the political ladder, while his daughter, Nguyễn Thanh Phượng , thrived in business.[26][27][28].

Now, a decade later, Dũng has returned with undiminished energy. His eldest son, Nguyễn Thanh Nghị, now heads the Central Policy and Strategy Commission and is a Politburo contender. His younger son, Nguyễn Minh Triết, serves as Standing Secretary of the Central Youth Union. While Tô Lâm is only beginning to position his son, Tô Long, the Nguyễn Tấn Dũng dynasty has long had its forces deployed.

Trịnh Hữu Long wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 24, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2025, December 4). Thiên tai cực kỳ dị thường, nguy cơ vẫn còn 1-2 cơn bão trên Biển Đông. baochinhphu.vn . https://baochinhphu.vn/thien-tai-cuc-ky-di-thuong-kha-nang-con-1-2-con-bao-tren-bien-dong-102251204135145093.htm

2. Hoàng, Đ. (n.d.). Thiên tai 2025 phá vỡ hàng loạt kỷ lục, gây thiệt hại 97.000 tỷ đồng. VietNamNet News . https://vietnamnet.vn/thien-tai-2025-pha-vo-hang-loat-ky-luc-gay-thiet-hai-97-000-ty-dong-2469263.html

3. Số người chết vì lũ lụt tăng thành 113 người, lãnh đạo Đắk Lắk xin lỗi. (2025, December 19). Znews.vn . https://znews.vn/so-nguoi-chet-vi-lu-lut-tang-thanh-113-nguoi-lanh-dao-dak-lak-xin-loi-post1612847.html

4. Thủy, H. (2025, December 19). Bộ Công an vào cuộc xác minh việc Thủy điện Sông Ba Hạ xả lũ kỷ lục ở Đắk Lắk. Báo Điện Tử Tiền Phong . https://tienphong.vn/bo-cong-an-vao-cuoc-xac-minh-viec-thuy-dien-song-ba-ha-xa-lu-ky-luc-o-dak-lak-post1806232.tpo

5. Nguyễn, H. T. (2025, December 3). Bộ máy tinh gọn: Công chức giảm 5%, biên chế sự nghiệp giảm 15%. Báo Điện Tử Dân Trí . https://dantri.com.vn/thoi-su/bo-may-tinh-gon-cong-chuc-giam-5-bien-che-su-nghiep-giam-15-20251203085413226.htm

6. Trần, V. (2025, October 6). Tổng Bí thư: Tăng trưởng kinh tế năm 2026 phải đạt trên 10%. Báo Lao Động . https://laodong.vn/thoi-su/tong-bi-thu-tang-truong-kinh-te-nam-2026-phai-dat-tren-10-1586776.ldo

7. VnExpress. (2025, December 21). Thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính công bố Trung tâm tài chính quốc tế mới. vnexpress.net . https://vnexpress.net/chinh-phu-cong-bo-thanh-lap-trung-tam-tai-chinh-quoc-te-tai-viet-nam-4996407.html

8. Trịnh Hữu Long. (2025, December 23). Bloomberg: Tô Lâm được đề cử làm tổng bí thư kiêm chủ tịch nước . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/bloomberg-to-lam-duoc-de-cu-lam-tong-bi-thu-kiem-chu-tich-nuoc/

9. Trường An. (2026, January 5). Việt Nam 2025: The power expansion of the Ministry of Public Security. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2026/01/viet-nam-2025-the-power-expansion-of-the-ministry-of-public-security/

10. Thúc Kháng. (2025, December 26). A 2025 recap: Four defining moments in the “second year of Tô Lâm.” The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/12/a-2025-recap-four-defining-moments-in-the-second-year-of-to-lam/

11. Thái Hà & Hải Linh. (2025, November 3). Hà Nội Convention: The thin line between cybersecurity and cyber surveillance. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/11/ha-noi-convention-the-thin-line-between-cybersecurity-and-cyber-surveillance/

12. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2025, December 22). Ministry of Public Security pushes social credit system without waiting for lawmakers. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/12/ministry-of-public-security-pushes-social-credit-system-without-waiting-for-lawmakers/

13. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2025, December 8). As extradition law advances, police seek Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài — Both say they will continue their work. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/12/as-extradition-law-advances-police-seek-le-trung-khoa-and-nguyen-van-dai-both-say-they-will-continue-their-work/

14. Nguyễn Hưng Bình. (2025, October 30). Hoàng Xuân Chiến harassment scandal and the challenge for Việt Nam’s “bamboo diplomacy.” The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/10/hoang-xuan-chien-harassment-scandal-and-the-challenge-for-viet-nams-bamboo-diplomacy/

15. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2025, September 15). From prison cell to courtroom: Việt Nam pursues second case against Trịnh Bá Phương; Vingroup sues 68 entities in massive crackdown on “fake news.” The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/09/from-prison-cell-to-courtroom-viet-nam-pursues-second-case-against-trinh-ba-phuong-vingroup-sues-68-entities-in-massive-crackdown-on-fake-news/

16. (2025, October 3). VinFast, the police, and the roots of a chilling legal culture. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/10/vinfast-the-police-and-the-roots-of-a-chilling-legal-culture/

17. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2025, December 8). As extradition law advances, police seek Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài — Both say they will continue their work. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/12/as-extradition-law-advances-police-seek-le-trung-khoa-and-nguyen-van-dai-both-say-they-will-continue-their-work/

18. Đan Thanh. (2025, December _). Analyzing the Vingroup vs Lê Trung Khoa dispute: Implications of the final judgment. The Vietnamese Magazine. (Exact date not available in search summary; adjust when you have it) https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/11/analyzing-the-vingroup-vs-le-trung-khoa-dispute-implications-of-the-final-judgment/

19. Trường Tộ. (2025, December 17). Tòa Hà Nội sẽ xét xử hai vụ án Lê Trung Khoa, Nguyễn Văn Đài vào ngày 31/12 . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/toa-ha-noi-se-xet-xu-hai-vu-an-le-trung-khoa-nguyen-van-dai-vao-ngay-31-12/

20. VnExpress. (2025, November 30). Cao đẳng Du lịch Hà Nội nói gì vụ sinh viên bức xúc 940.000 đồng hỗ trợ A80. vnexpress.net . https://vnexpress.net/cao-dang-du-lich-ha-noi-noi-gi-vu-sinh-vien-buc-xuc-940-000-dong-ho-tro-a80-4987970.html

21. Dự, P. (2025, December 15). Hiệu trưởng Cao đẳng du lịch Hà Nội “ăn chặn tiền A80” bị bắt. vnexpress.net . https://vnexpress.net/hieu-truong-cao-dang-du-lich-ha-noi-an-chan-tien-a80-bi-bat-4994244.html

22. Trịnh Hữu Long. (2025, December 19). Thăm CLB Thể Công – Viettel, tướng Phan Văn Giang diễn “sức.” Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/tham-clb-the-cong-viettel-tuong-phan-van-giang-dien-suc/

23. See [8]

24. Bình An. (2025, July 26). Shiny gold star, shady past: Comrade “X” collects both. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/07/shiny-gold-star-shady-past-comrade-x-collects-both/

25. Tư liệu – Văn kiện Đảng. (2025, October 19). Đồng chí Nguyễn Tấn Dũng . tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn. https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/lanh-dao-dang-nha-nuoc/thu-tuong-chinh-phu/dong-chi-nguyen-tan-dung-53

26. (n.d.). Chuyên trang thông tin Đại hội Đảng XIV – Thông tấn xã Việt Nam . Chuyên Trang Thông Tin Đại Hội Đảng XIV – Thông Tấn Xã Việt Nam. https://daihoidang.vn/nhan-su/nguyen-thanh-nghi-281.html

27. Thơ, V. (2022, December 16). Tiểu sử anh Nguyễn Minh Triết, Bí thư T.Ư Đoàn. Báo Thanh Niên . https://thanhnien.vn/tieu-su-anh-nguyen-minh-triet-bi-thu-tu-doan-1851531224.htm

28. CafeF. (2025, December 24). Nguyễn Thanh Phượng – Chủ tịch HĐQT Công ty Cổ phần Chứng khoán VIETCAP . https://cafef.vn/du-lieu/ceo/ceo_99999/nguyen-thanh-phuong.chn