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Reflecting on the tenure of General Secretary Tô Lâm, Professor Carl Thayer remarked to the BBC: “I think that surprised many people because he comes from the police sector; people used to think everything would remain the same when he came to power. But what has unfolded has been an extraordinary change that I have to acknowledge and admire.” [1]

Thayer made this observation at the one-year mark of Tô Lâm’s leadership. Now, after 18 months in power, Tô Lâm has secured his position at the apex of the political system for another five years.

This invites a fundamental question: have the “extraordinary changes” overseen by this leader truly amounted to reform, or have they brought disruption and disorder? Furthermore, what should the public expect—or be wary of—in the term ahead?

A Figure Worth Debating

Few figures in contemporary Vietnamese politics have generated as many surprises as Tô Lâm. With a background in the public security sector, he rose rapidly from Minister of Public Security to State President, and finally to General Secretary—the most powerful office in the political system.

His re-election comes as Việt Nam pushes through forceful reforms targeting organizational structures and social discipline. During his previous term, domestic and international media often portrayed Tô Lâm as a “ reformer ” bringing efficiency to a state apparatus widely seen as bloated and sluggish. [2]

However, as reforms deepen, public consensus has not kept pace. This sentiment has not formed through organized political movements, but through the cumulative experience of ordinary people confronting changes in their daily lives. These range from administrative mergers, tax policies, and penalties, to the expanding role of the police and tighter management of cyberspace.

While each policy has a logical governance goal, collectively they raise questions about the balance between state effectiveness and the tangible impact on citizens.

As General Secretary Tô Lâm enters a new term, he faces a new challenge: how to adjust these reforms to maintain a connection with citizens’ lived realities? This alignment is essential to uphold the Communist Party of Việt Nam’s principle : “the people know, the people discuss, the people act, the people inspect, the people supervise, and the people benefit.” [3]

Administrative Mergers and Streamlining the State

A hallmark of Tô Lâm’s tenure has been the aggressive reorganization of administrative units, including the merger of provinces and cities and the shift toward a two-tier local government model. Viewed as one of the most rapid overhauls in modern Vietnamese history, the goal is clear: streamline the organization, cut costs, and boost efficiency. [4]

Theoretically, a leaner apparatus should reduce overlap and speed up decision-making. However, the implementation challenges the principle of “the people discuss.” The recent mergers were executed in a blisteringly short window —barely four months from announcement to implementation. [5]

This speed casts doubt on the validity of social consultation. When reforms are rushed, the line between asking for public opinion and merely notifying the public of a decision blurs. As administrative units grow larger in both geography and population, there is a real risk that citizens will feel increasingly distant from local authorities. Moreover, it is questionable if sufficient flexible mechanisms will be created to absorb public feedback and if policies can adjust accordingly.

Looking ahead to 2026, the government intends to accelerate this streamlining under Resolution No. 244/2025/QH15 . [6] [7] Authorities have more preparation time now, and the newly issued Decree No. 321/2025/NĐ-CP (Dec. 16, 2025) mandates that at least 50 percent of households must approve any boundary changes or renaming efforts. [8]

While the legal framework for consent is in place, the practical reality—the depth of public participation and the willingness of the state to actually listen to feedback—remains to be seen.

Taxes and Administrative Penalties

Stricter enforcement in taxation and administrative sanctions is often justified as necessary for social order and legal awareness. A prime example is Decree 168/2024 on traffic violations, which introduced sharply increased fines to enhance deterrence. [9]

However, when penalties for common infractions consume a large portion of a worker’s income, the balance between discipline and fairness is lost. Rapid and heavy penalties narrow the space for appeal, disproportionately affecting those with limited economic means.

The economic toll is visible. Official statistics from the end of 2025 reveal that more than 227,000 businesses exited the market that year—nearly 19,000 per month. [10] Additionally, millions of small household businesses are struggling to adapt to new tax policies, particularly adjustments to presumptive taxation and data-driven oversight.

The problem is not just the severity of the fines, but the lack of checks and balances. As authorities gain greater power to inspect and sanction, the mechanisms for transparency and accountability lag behind. If enforcement power expands without corresponding oversight, the law risks being unequally applied.

This also applies to tax reform. While technology- and data-driven tax management is essential for modernizing public finance [11], it cannot succeed in an economy dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises through coercion alone. To gain broad acceptance, authorities must prioritize communication and feedback over penalties and other coercive measures.

Managing Cyberspace

Leading up to the Party Congress, authorities intensified the crackdown on online speech, using administrative penalties to target dissent. [12] In the post-Congress period, this pressure has not abated. Citizens continue to face penalties for " damaging reputations " or " distorting " the image of leaders. [13] [14] [15]

This signals a sharp contraction of online freedom. The mechanism of control is twofold: vague legal definitions and heavy economic sanctions. The standard fine of 7.5 million đồng is a significant financial blow for the average citizen, creating a pervasive chilling effect. Consequently, silence becomes the default choice—driven not by consensus, but by the fear of legal jeopardy.

Crucially, the rights of the accused remain nebulous. There is little evidence that citizens can effectively appeal these sanctions before an independent court. Instead, guilt is often determined by the subjective assessment of the police.

This dynamic inverts the Party’s own principle. While the slogan promises that “the people supervise,” the reality suggests the opposite: it is the people who are being subjected to ever-tighter surveillance by the state.

A New Term

General Secretary Tô Lâm begins his new term as Việt Nam faces multiple, overlapping challenges: sustaining economic growth, maintaining social stability, and adapting to a volatile international environment. With his position secure, he is poised to accelerate the agenda set in motion over the last 18 months.

Retrospectively, his leadership has been defined by a clear prioritization of managerial efficiency and strict social discipline. However, the success of the next five years will not be measured by the speed of these reforms, but by the depth of social participation, oversight, and consensus they generate. The administration must ensure that the drive for efficiency does not sever the link between the state and the people.

Ultimately, a fundamental choice remains: will governance continue to rely on top-down administrative logic, or will it evolve to allow genuine social feedback? The answer will determine not only the level of public trust but the very stability of Việt Nam in the years to come.

Minh Viễn wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Jan. 30, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2025, August 1). Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm: Từ Bộ trưởng Công an tới “nhà cải cách.” https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cz6gv048l1zo

2. The Economist. (2025, May 22). The man with a plan for Vietnam. The Economist . https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/05/22/the-man-with-a-plan-for-vietnam

3. Tiến sĩ Nguyễn Thị Dơn. (2024, June 14). Thực hiện tốt phương châm “Dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra, dân giám sát, dân thụ hưởng.” Báo Nhân Dân Điện Tử . https://nhandan.vn/thuc-hien-tot-phuong-cham-dan-biet-dan-ban-dan-lam-dan-kiem-tra-dan-giam-sat-dan-thu-huong-post814424.html

4. Nhân Dân. (n.d.). Sắp xếp tổ chức bộ máy tinh-gọn-mạnh-hiệu năng-hiệu lực-hiệu quả . https://nhandan.vn/special/sap-xep-to-chuc-bo-may-tinh-gon-manh-hieu-nang-hieu-luc-hieu-qua/index.html

5. Trường An. (2026, January 6). Việt Nam 2025: Redrawing the administrative map at breakneck speed . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/viet-nam-2025-redrawing-the-administrative-map-at-breakneck-speed/

6. Xaydungchinhsach.Chinhphu.Vn. (2026, January 18). Tiếp tục sắp xếp, tinh gọn tổ chức bộ máy, đẩy mạnh thực hiện 3 đột phá chiến lược. xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn . https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/tiep-tuc-sap-xep-tinh-gon-to-chuc-bo-may-day-manh-thuc-hien-3-dot-pha-chien-luoc-119260111132156085.htm

7. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, January 2). Nghị quyết 244/2025/QH15 về Kế hoạch phát triển kinh tế – xã hội năm 2026 do Quốc hội ban hành. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Thuong-mai/Nghi-quyet-244-2025-QH15-Ke-hoach-phat-trien-kinh-te-xa-hoi-nam-2026-682478.aspx

8. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2025, December 17). Hướng dẫn việc lấy ý kiến Nhân dân về thành lập, giải thể, điều chỉnh địa giới và đổi tên đơn vị hành chính. baochinhphu.vn . https://baochinhphu.vn/huong-dan-viec-lay-y-kien-nhan-dan-ve-thanh-lap-giai-the-dieu-chinh-dia-gioi-va-doi-ten-don-vi-hanh-chinh-102251217165536767.htm

9. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, December 29). Nghị định 168/2024/NĐ-CP quy định xử phạt vi phạm hành chính về trật tự, an toàn giao thông trong lĩnh vực giao thông đường bộ; trừ điểm, phục hồi điểm Giấy phép lái xe. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Giao-thong-Van-tai/Nghi-dinh-168-2024-ND-CP-xu-phat-vi-pham-hanh-chinh-an-toan-giao-thong-duong-bo-619502.aspx

10. Thạch Hãn. (2026, January 28). Bloomberg: Cam kết trả nợ thay doanh nghiệp, các ngân hàng Việt Nam đang đối diện nguy cơ lớn . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/01/bloomberg-cam-ket-tra-no-thay-doanh-nghiep-cac-ngan-hang-viet-nam-dang-doi-dien-nguy-co-lon/

11. Nai, T. B. Đ. (2025, November 9). Chuyển đổi số để nâng cao chất lượng quản lý thuế. Copyright (C) by Copyright (C) by Bộ Khoa Học Và Công Nghệ . https://mst.gov.vn/chuyen-doi-so-de-nang-cao-chat-luong-quan-ly-thue-197251108165824876.htm

12. Lê Giang. (2026, January 21). Bắt bớ người dân trước Đại hội 14, Tô Lâm vẫn khẳng định “dân là gốc.” Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/01/bat-bo-nguoi-dan-truoc-dai-hoi-14-to-lam-van-khang-dinh-dan-la-goc/

13. Khôi, H. (2026, January 28). Xử phạt 7,5 triệu đồng người đàn ông ở Hải Phòng đăng tin xuyên tạc trên mạng. Báo Lao Động . https://laodong.vn/phap-luat/xu-phat-75-trieu-dong-nguoi-dan-ong-o-hai-phong-dang-tin-xuyen-tac-tren-mang-1647823.ldo

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15. Hưởng, N. (2026, January 20). Xử phạt 2 nam thanh niên xuyên tạc về lãnh đạo Đảng, Nhà nước trên mạng xã hội. Báo Người Lao Động Online . https://nld.com.vn/xu-phat-2-nam-thanh-nien-xuyen-tac-ve-lanh-dao-dang-nha-nuoc-tren-mang-xa-hoi-196260120204244256.htm