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Author’s Note: The author wishes to thank Professor Arijit Mazumdar , PhD in Political Science, for his insightful discussions and scholarly suggestions that helped shape the arguments of this article. Any remaining views, interpretations, or errors are solely the author’s responsibility.

In historical Chinese dramas, the “kim bài miễn tử” serves as a golden immunity token bestowed by the emperor to protect high-ranking officials from execution, regardless of their crimes. In modern Việt Nam, the Communist Party possesses a similar “golden token,” granted not by a monarch, but by the Constitution itself: Article 4.

During the constitutional revision process in 2013 , society engaged in a vibrant debate regarding the political order. [1] While suggestions varied, a closer look reveals that most proposals converged on a single objective: the removal of Article 4.

Article 4 does more than simply codify the Party’s political monopoly; it acts as a constitutional locking mechanism. It renders any argument regarding the Party’s “unconstitutionality” moot.

Consequently, while critics increasingly describe Party actions as unconstitutional, these accusations rarely carry legal weight. Article 4 serves as the ultimate shield, effectively immunizing the Party against legal challenges.

Ambiguous Definitions in Article 4

Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution establishes three primary tenets: the Communist Party of Việt Nam is the leading force of the State and society; it is subject to the People’s supervision; and it operates within the framework of the Constitution and the law.

The final point nominally binds the Party to the law. However, for a constitution to have substantive meaning rather than acting as a mere moral exhortation, it must define the mechanisms of enforcement. It must specify who has the authority to supervise, what instruments they may use, and what legal consequences follow a violation.

This is where Article 4 reveals a striking ambiguity.

While Article 4 affirms that the Party is “subject to the supervision of the People,” the Constitution fails to clarify how this is enforced. It does not grant citizens the right to sue the Party before a judicial body, nor does it provide a mechanism to annul unlawful Party decisions. There is no designated authority empowered to halt party actions by declaring them unconstitutional.

Hence, “the People’s supervision” is understood merely in a political or social sense—manifesting through petitions, public opinion, or channels controlled by the Party itself. It is supervision based on moral legitimacy, not judicial authority capable of producing binding judgments.

Viewing these elements together reveals a clear imbalance. The first point—the Party’s status as the leading force—is unequivocal. The latter points—supervision and adherence to the law—are declaratory principles that lack concrete sanctions. Article 4 clearly defines the Party’s power, yet remains conspicuously vague on a crucial question: if the Party acts wrongly, who adjudicates, and how?

The Party at the Center

A constitution performs a clear and specific function: it draws boundaries around the power of the government. It creates a framework that power holders must operate within, serving as a check against overreach.

The Constitution in Vietnam serves a fundamentally different purpose. Instead of erecting a framework to constrain power, it positions the Party at the center of the entire political system. From this position, the Party is able to both lead the State and define its organization, operation, and control mechanisms.

Institutions such as the National Assembly, the government, and the judiciary are not designed to provide checks and balances. Instead, they are set up to revolve around the Party's main power. The Vietnamese Constitution, therefore, does not function as a “fence” to contain the Party; it serves as a map, legitimizing the Party’s leadership across every facet of political life.

The Constitution Legitimizes the Party

In a constitutional order where the Party occupies the center of power, the concept of “unconstitutionality” is structurally inapplicable to the Party itself. We must closely examine the Constitution's function to understand this impossibility.

In multi-party systems, the Constitution serves as an external arbiter designed to limit the ruling party. It ensures that those in power are merely players in a game regulated by law. An independent institution has the authority to intervene if a ruling party crosses a line.

In Việt Nam, however, the Constitution functions to legitimize the Communist Party, rather than restrain it. Article 4 explicitly establishes the Communist Party as the leading force of the state and society, and any inquiry into the Party’s constitutionality encounters a vacuum of authority. There is no independent constitutional court to review party actions, nor is there a system of checks and balances capable of invalidating party decisions.

Hence, accusing the party of unconstitutionality is akin to suing a homeowner within a house where they hold all the keys. While such a condemnation may carry moral weight, it cannot translate into a concrete legal process. There is simply no venue to file the case, no judge to hear it, and no authority to enforce a ruling.

Article 4 is Not Unique to Việt Nam

The design of Article 4 is not unique to Việt Nam; the constitutions of China, Laos, and Cuba all contain similar provisions that affirm the absolute leadership of the ruling party.

These provisions function as “locking clauses” within the constitutional framework. By design, they preemptively foreclose any attempt to challenge the one-party system through legal channels.

Any debate regarding “unconstitutionality” that fails to address these clauses is destined to remain mere political criticism, with no path to becoming a viable legal case.

***

Debates regarding the party’s unconstitutionality are destined to be circular because no authority possesses sufficient power to issue a binding judgment.

For this reason, the pertinent question is not whether specific party actions violate the law, but rather what purpose the Constitution serves. Is it designed to control power or to legitimize a power structure that has already been predetermined?

The answer is not difficult to find. As long as Article 4 remains, it is already written explicitly into the Constitution itself.

Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Jan. 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

Trịnh Hữu Long. (2025, July 21). Phong trào Lập hiến 2013 – một lịch sử ngắn . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2022/11/phong-trao-lap-hien-2013-mot-lich-su-ngan/