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When the 2026 Lunar New Year approached, businesses and farming households across Việt Nam were thrown into turmoil by a surprise legal issuance, fearing they would “lose the Lunar New Year.” [1] The cause was Decree No. 46/2026 , a document designed to “[detail] the implementation of certain provisions and measures for organizing and guiding the enforcement of the Law on Food Safety.” [2]

Despite its intention to clarify existing laws, Decree 46 proved so unclear that it caused immediate congestion and disruption in Việt Nam’s supply chains. Just 10 days after taking effect , the decree was temporarily suspended on Feb. 4. [3] [4]

Brief as its lifespan was, Decree 46 managed to distress traders, provoke public frustration, and anger experts. Yet the National Assembly—the constitutionally mandated body empowered to make and amend laws—made only one move: asking the Government to learn from the experience . [5] [6] This response raises serious questions about the role of the legislative body, defined as the highest organ of state power, in overseeing the Government’s rule-making activities.

The Rule-making Authority of the Executive Branch

To understand the current crisis, it is necessary to examine the Government’s authority to issue legal normative documents.

Laws passed by the National Assembly typically establish only a policy framework. A familiar phrase in these laws is: “The Government shall provide detailed regulations on […].” This provision delegates the creation of operational rules—procedures, conditions, and technical standards—to the executive branch. The Government fills these legislative gaps through decrees and resolutions.

Decree 46/2026 exemplifies this process. It relies on Article 72 of the 2010 Law on Food Safety , which states: “The Government shall provide detailed regulations and guidance for implementing the articles and clauses assigned in this Law.” [7] Additionally, Articles 6 and 12 authorize the Government to specify prohibited acts, administrative penalties, and procedures for conformity declarations.

This principle applies across sectors, from journalism to construction and security. The National Assembly sets the core principles, while the Government “fills in the remaining parts.” Essentially, the Government’s rule-making power is the authority to issue sub-law documents that concretize and organize the implementation of acts passed by the legislature.

This executive power is enshrined in Clause 1, Article 96 of the 2013 Constitution which states:

“The Government has the following duties and powers:

To organize the implementation of the Constitution, laws, resolutions of the National Assembly, ordinances and resolutions of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and orders and decisions of the President.”

Here, a distinction must be made between legislative authority (the National Assembly’s power to pass laws) and rule-making authority (the Government’s power to issue sub-law normative documents).

Significantly, the scope of this rule-making authority expanded after the 2025 Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative Document took effect. [8] This law classified Government resolutions as legal normative documents. Under Clause 2, Article 14, the Government may now issue resolutions to address urgent issues, decentralize powers and responsibilties, or adjust the validity of decrees.

This provision was the legal basis for Resolution No. 09/2026, which suspended Decree No. 46/2026. [9] However, this mechanism also allows for more sweeping measures, such as the draft Resolution on digital citizen development, which contains controversial provisions on citizen scoring . [10]

As these examples illustrate, the Government possesses broad authority. Its rule-making power goes beyond merely “writing the remaining parts” of laws; in practice, it enables the executive branch to shape how legal rights and obligations are applied in everyday life.

The National Assembly’s Influence on Government Regulations

The Government’s rule-making authority is necessary for the legal system to remain flexible and responsive to reality. However, this authority is extensive; without effective oversight, the Government risks acting as both player and referee within the legislative framework.

What power, then, does the National Assembly have to control this process?

While the Assembly does not draft decrees, it possesses several legal mechanisms to supervise them. Primarily, the Assembly sets the “framework” and “ceiling” for the Government’s authority within the laws themselves. By using phrases like “The Government shall detail procedures […]” or “The Government shall prescribe conditions […],” the Assembly explicitly defines which matters are delegated for detailed regulation and to what extent.

This limitation prevents the Government from independently expanding into new areas. Under Article 5 of the 2025 Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents, all documents must “ensure constitutionality, legality, and consistency within the legal system […].” Furthermore, Point a, Clause 1, Article 14 of the same law restricts the Government to issuing decrees only for provisions specifically “assigned” by the National Assembly.

Ultimately, laws enacted by the National Assembly hold higher legal validity. Government decrees and resolutions must follow them and must always align with them.

In addition to its legislative role, the National Assembly is constitutionally vested with supreme supervisory authority over state activities. This includes monitoring compliance with the Constitution and laws, a power operationalized by requiring the Government to report on its implementation efforts.

Critically, Clause 2, Article 21 of the 2015 Law on Supervisory Activities of the National Assembly and People’s Councils empowers the National Assembly to annul any legal normative document from the Government or Prime Minister that contradicts the Constitution or legislative resolutions. [11] Theoretically, this serves as an “emergency brake,” allowing the legislature to halt unconstitutional decrees.

In practice, however, this oversight is compromised. While the National Assembly formally passes laws, it is the Government ministries that draft them. Since the Assembly typically adopts these Government-proposed bills with little alteration, the executive branch effectively writes its own framework, paving the way for the detailed regulations that follow.

Consequently, while legal texts portray the National Assembly as a supreme authority capable of annulling decrees, its actual oversight is often limited to questioning sessions and requests for impact assessments. This passivity was evident during the Decree 46/2026 crisis. Despite possessing the mechanism to intervene, the National Assembly took no strong action, choosing instead to watch silently from the legislative gallery.

Who Decides Legislative and Rule-making Power?

Việt Nam’s National Assembly is frequently dismissed by analysts as a “ puppet ” institution. [12] This critique is rooted in the reality that legislative projects do not originate in the chamber, but are issued under the strict direction of the Communist Party.

Article 5 of the Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents establishes “the comprehensive and direct leadership of the Communist Party of Việt Nam” as a guiding principle. Legislative ideas are thus born in Central Committee meetings , not parliamentary debates. [13] The Assembly’s role is largely reduced to collective endorsement, evidenced by near-unanimous votes and the rarity of rejected bills.

The 10th Session of the 15th National Assembly illustrates this dynamic. In a single session, the body passed 51 laws and 39 resolutions. [14] The workload was so intense that National Assembly Chairman Trần Thanh Mẫn complained of being pressured by the Government to pass laws at breakneck speed. [15]

Real power lies with the Communist Party, which sets the trajectory for all rule-making. The Government and National Assembly merely translate these directives into legal text, following the formula: “The Party leads, the National Assembly endorses, and the Government operates.” This structure erodes checks and balances, rendering the Assembly unable to protect citizens from flawed regulations like Decree 46/2026. Without a voice in the process, the public is forced to simply “live with” the consequences.

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Hoàng Nam. (2026, February 2). Nghị định 46 “đánh úp” người dân: Doanh nghiệp khốn đốn, chuyên gia bất bình . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/02/nghi-dinh-46-danh-up-nguoi-dan-doanh-nghiep-khon-don-chuyen-gia-bat-binh/

2. See: https://datafiles.chinhphu.vn/cpp/files/vbpq/2026/01/46-ndcp.signed.pdf

3. See [1]

4. Lê Sáng. (2026, February 5). Nghị định 46: Sau gần 10 ngày “bàn làm” đã phải “bàn lùi” đến ngày 15/4 . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/02/nghi-dinh-46-sau-gan-10-ngay-ban-lam-da-phai-ban-lui-den-ngay-15-4/

5. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, August 14). Văn bản hợp nhất 52/VBHN-VPQH năm 2025 hợp nhất Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam do Văn phòng Quốc hội ban hành. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Van-ban-hop-nhat-52-VBHN-VPQH-2025-Hien-phap-nuoc-Cong-hoa-xa-hoi-chu-nghia-Viet-Nam-665872.aspx

6. Hoàng Nam. (2026, February 3). Nghị định 46 gây bức xúc, Quốc hội đề nghị Chính phủ “rút kinh nghiệm.” Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/02/nghi-dinh-46-gay-buc-xuc-quoc-hoi-de-nghi-chinh-phu-rut-kinh-nghiem/

7. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, February 3). Luật an toàn thực phẩm 2010. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Thuong-mai/Luat-an-toan-thuc-pham-2010-108074.aspx

8. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, August 23). Văn bản hợp nhất 54/VBHN-VPQH năm 2025 hợp nhất Luật Ban hành văn bản quy phạm pháp luật do Văn phòng Quốc hội ban hành. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Van-ban-hop-nhat-54-VBHN-VPQH-2025-Luat-Ban-hanh-van-ban-quy-pham-phap-luat-669858.aspx

9. See [4]

10. Trường Tộ. (2025, December 20). Dự thảo mới: Bộ Công an muốn chấm điểm và xếp hạng công dân qua VNeID . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/du-thao-moi-bo-cong-an-muon-cham-diem-va-xep-hang-cong-dan-qua-vneid/

11. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, January 27). Luật hoạt động giám sát của Quốc hội và Hội đồng nhân dân 2015. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-hoat-dong-giam-sat-cua-Quoc-hoi-va-Hoi-dong-nhan-dan-2015-298366.aspx

12. Bui, T. (2025, March 6). The declining influence of the National Assembly in Vietnam’s ‘New Era.’ The Diplomat . https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/the-declining-influence-of-the-national-assembly-in-vietnams-new-era/

13. Trường An. (2025, December 25). Hội nghị trung ương đảng quan trọng hơn họp Quốc hội? Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/hoi-nghi-trung-uong-dang-quan-trong-hon-hop-quoc-hoi/

14. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2025, December). National Assembly pushes through record number of laws, expands police powers over the media . The Vietnamese. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/12/national-assembly-pushes-through-record-number-of-laws-expands-police-powers-over-the-media/

15. Bối Thủy. (2025, October). Lawmaking at lightning speed: Vietnam’s citizens pay the price . The Vietnamese. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/10/lawmaking-at-lightning-speed-viet-nams-citizens-pay-the-price/