Hưng Yên, the home province of General Secretary Tô Lâm, has emerged as a focal point for numerous large-scale projects carrying both security and symbolic significance. This “unusual” level of priority has prompted public questions regarding the fair allocation of resources across different localities.
Public attention has increasingly focused on this puzzling convergence of economic projects in Hưng Yên Province, particularly as Tô Lâm has just been re-elected to serve as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Việt Nam for its 14th term (2026–2031), cementing his position at the highest seat of power within the political system.
A Dense Convergence of “Specialized” Projects
Leaders of Hưng Yên province have reported that several projects carried out in coordination with the Ministry of Public Security are progressing on schedule.
Among the most notable is the multipurpose PVF stadium with a capacity of 60,000 seats, invested in by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), with the main contractor being Vinhomes Joint Stock Company (part of Vingroup), along with cybersecurity industrial parks and centers for training and developing peacekeeping capabilities. [1]
Public attention has further intensified because Hưng Yên is also the location of the first Trump-branded golf project in Việt Nam, a development that carries symbolic importance at a time when Việt Nam–United States relations have seen significant progress. [3]
The Department of Construction of Hưng Yên Province announced that the official name of the Khoái Châu urban complex, eco-tourism, and golf project is “Trump International Hung Yen.” [4]
What has truly drawn public attention is the density and nature of these developments. Few provinces—especially those outside the country’s leading economic centers such as Hà Nội, Hồ Chí Minh City, or Bình Dương—simultaneously host such a combination of security, training, sports, and politically symbolic projects on such a massive scale.
Technical and strategic criteria partially explain the selection of these projects and investment locations. Hưng Yên lies adjacent to Hà Nội, possesses available land resources, has increasingly improved transportation infrastructure, and offers relatively convenient administrative coordination.
Furthermore, according to the Adjusted Hưng Yên Provincial Plan for the 2021–2030 period, with a vision to 2050, “by 2050, Hưng Yên will become a centrally governed city, a modern, smart, green, and sustainable industrial and service center of the Red River Delta region, serving as a strategic connector for both the Red River Delta and the entire country.” [2]
The Leader’s Hometown
Political leaders often give special attention to their hometowns. In heavily centralized countries, localities associated with a leader’s origins frequently see higher levels of public investment and project allocation than other areas.
While this dynamic does not necessarily violate the law, it often operates within a policymaking “gray zone.” Decisions may follow proper procedures, but the actual hierarchy of priorities remains opaque to the public.
This coexistence of central power and local interests is particularly sensitive within the Vietnamese political system, where internal mechanisms dictate most large-scale projects.
As a result, questions have inevitably arisen after General Secretary Tô Lâm directly “praised” projects implemented by the MPS in Hưng Yên and expressed hope for the locality’s continued attention and guidance. [6]
Those public encouragements fuel ongoing concerns that he is concentrating power in Hưng Yên to fortify his own political position. [7]
Where Do Other Localities Stand?
If Hưng Yên receives such high priority, where does that leave other provinces in the broader picture of resource allocation?
According to a report by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, public investment disbursement during 2024–2025 revealed significant regional disparities.
Despite substantial needs for infrastructure, social welfare, and economic development, many provinces in Central Việt Nam and the Central Highlands consistently ranked among those with the lowest disbursement rates. [8] This sluggish pace reflects what has been described as an “alarming capacity to absorb public investment capital.” [9]
Residents in numerous localities have voiced concerns regarding transparency and fairness in resource allocation, particularly for state-funded or central government projects. Many are calling for equitable treatment “in a reasonable manner based on actual capacity and needs” across all provinces. [10]
Against this backdrop, the rapid rise and special preference granted to Hưng Yên inevitably invite stark comparisons. Projects like the PVF stadium and the Trump-branded golf course vividly demonstrate how a leader’s hometown can be placed at the center of national development strategies.
While there is no evidence that projects in Hưng Yên violate the law or circumvent proper procedures, the timing raises questions. With political power increasingly concentrated in Tô Lâm, any alignment between his personal origins and policy priorities attracts heavy scrutiny.
This leads to an important question: Are current development priorities based on the common needs of the nation, or do they reflect the interests of specific individuals or groups?
The current political landscape further amplifies this skepticism. Among the 19 members of the 14th Politburo, three hail from Hưng Yên: Tô Lâm, Lương Tam Quang, and Nguyễn Duy Ngọc. [11] Furthermore, an astounding 20 of the 200 members of the 14th Party Central Committee are from Hưng Yên. [12]
The remarkable ascent of Hưng Yên politicians during Tô Lâm’s era has surprised observers, making the influx of massive projects into the province a source of understandable concern. Ultimately, these developments suggest a growing and evident trend of prioritizing state investment in the hometowns of political leaders.
***
The investment flowing into Hưng Yên, coupled with repeated praise from General Secretary Tô Lâm himself, illustrates how the province reflects the relationship between personal power and the rapid allocation of resources.
Public skepticism is a natural response when major decisions occur within a closed political space that lacks transparent criteria for comparing localities.
In the long term, unexplained preferential treatment for one specific locality does more than just shape perceptions of Hưng Yên. It directly erodes social trust in the fairness, transparency, and integrity of the entire resource allocation system.
Consequently, the ultimate question extends to the broader policy-making mechanism: Are current development priorities determined by the shared needs of the nation, or do they merely reflect shifts in political power over time?
Nguyễn Hưng Yên wrote this op-ed article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 11, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. Lương, H. (2025, October 19). Khởi công sân vận động lớn nhất Việt Nam. VnExpress.https://vnexpress.net/khoi-cong-san-van-dong-lon-nhat-viet-nam-4953162.html
2. Hoàng, T. (2026, January 18). Hưng Yên phát triển hạ tầng, đô thị theo 2 cực: Gần Hà Nội và hướng biển. Tiền Phong. https://tienphong.vn/hung-yen-phat-trien-ha-tang-do-thi-theo-2-cuc-gan-ha-noi-va-huong-bien-post1813928.tpo
3. Diễm, N. (2026, February 5). Dự án thương hiệu Trump ở Hưng Yên được phép bán cho người nước ngoài. VnExpress. https://vnexpress.net/du-an-thuong-hieu-trump-o-hung-yen-duoc-phep-ban-cho-nguoi-nuoc-ngoai-5014324.html
4. See [3].
5. Kenny, P. D. (2015). The Origins of Patronage Politics: State Building, Centrifugalism, and Decolonization. British Journal of Political Science. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43821689?seq=3
6. Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm dự buổi làm việc của Đảng ủy Công an Trung ương với Ban Thường vụ Tỉnh ủy Hưng Yên. (2025, February 8). Dân Việt. https://danviet.vn/tong-bi-thu-to-lam-du-buoi-lam-viec-cua-dang-uy-cong-an-trung-uong-voi-ban-thuong-vu-tinh-uy-hung-yen-d1401621.html
7. Từ bộ trưởng Công an đến tổng bí thư: Ông Tô Lâm xây dựng và củng cố quyền lực như thế nào? (2026, January 23). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c3edd5p2we7o
8. Tuấn, N. (2026, January 9). Giải ngân đầu tư công các địa phương: Nơi vượt đích, chốn lo âu. Đấu thầu.https://baodauthau.vn/giai-ngan-dau-tu-cong-cac-dia-phuong-noi-vuot-dich-chon-lo-au-post192037.html
9. See [8].
10. Dũng, N. S. (2025, November 12). Một tầm nhìn mới cho tài chính công Việt Nam. Bộ Tài chính.https://nief.mof.gov.vn/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/mot-tam-nhin-moi-cho-tai-chinh-cong-viet-nam-11685.html
11. 19 đồng chí ủy viên Bộ Chính trị khóa XIV. (2026, January 23). Sài Gòn Giải phóng. https://www.sggp.org.vn/19-dong-chi-uy-vien-bo-chinh-tri-khoa-xiv-post834865.html
12. Thanh, H. (2026, January 24). Bức tranh toàn cảnh về quê quán của 200 ủy viên Trung ương khóa 14. VietnamNet. https://vietnamnet.vn/buc-tranh-toan-canh-ve-que-quan-cua-200-uy-vien-trung-uong-khoa-14-2484514.html







