The Ministry of Public Security has quietly released a draft decree on combating fake news during the early days of the new year, a timing perhaps inspired by the surprise Lunar New Year offensive King Nguyễn Huệ of the Tây Sơn launched against Qing forces at the Battle of Ngọc Hồi in 1789 [1].
Nevertheless, unlike that historical conflict, this new draft decree targets no external enemy. Instead, it places ordinary Vietnamese citizens squarely within its regulatory scope, necessitating immense caution.
A brief look at the draft reveals four major problems: unclear definitions, a long list of banned actions, too much power given to one agency, and a verification process that is completely unclear and never-ending.
Vague Definitions
The use of difficult-to-quantify concepts is nothing new within Việt Nam’s legal system.
For years, phrases such as “abusing democratic freedoms” or “affecting security and public order” have been familiar yet notoriously difficult to pin down.
Instead of establishing clear boundaries to target specific criminal conduct, authorities frequently utilize definitions broad enough to permit flexible interpretation. Unfortunately, the draft decree on combating fake news follows this exact path.
The draft defines fake news simply as information that is “not true” and misleading information as “partly untrue.” While seemingly straightforward, these definitions omit fundamental legal elements, such as whether the dissemination was intentional, whether actual harm occurred, and how that harm is demonstrated.
By combining these new, broad definitions with already vague, familiar legal concepts, the draft perpetuates a boundaryless style of lawmaking. The more elastic the legal concepts, the wider the interpretive space for administrative power.
Consequently, a single interpretive step could turn a harmless statement into a violation or categorize a debatable opinion as “posing risks.”
The Risks of Engagement
Article 3 of the draft expands its scope beyond creating, distributing, or posting fake information; it also penalizes sharing and commenting on fake or misleading content.
In effect, anyone from the fabricator of a story to a user who merely leaves a comment could fall within the zone of legal risk.
This represents a major inconsistency from a legal standpoint, as modern written law clearly distinguishes between different levels of responsibility. [2]
Specifically, the law typically differentiates between the creator of false information, the intentional disseminator, and the ordinary user who receives and engages with the content through questions, comments, or debate.
However, the draft places all three categories in the same basket. It completely omits crucial elements of fault, such as the degree of intent, subjective awareness, or the actual capacity to cause harm.
Ultimately, a law combating fake news should target deliberate manipulation, deception, and serious harm, rather than prohibiting the ordinary communication and information exchange that characterize an information society.
The Police’s Centralized Power
An important yet under-discussed question is who holds the authority to classify information as fake.
According to Article 8 of this draft, while victims can submit evidence and various ministries, agencies, and People’s Committees can make determinations within their jurisdictions, the ultimate authority falls to the police if sufficient grounds are lacking. In other words, the Vietnamese police heavily concentrates its power to determine the truth.
The draft also grants the police extensive additional powers. These include:
- Verifying fake news (Article 17);
- Organizing its removal, investigation, and handling (Articles 19, 20, and 23);
- Managing the National Database Center on Fake News (Articles 21 and 23.12); and
- Issuing public warnings across platforms like the VNeID application (Article 23.8).
Ultimately, this makes the police responsible for the entire lifecycle of fake news enforcement: detection, verification, conclusion, public announcement, removal, and data management.
This framework also establishes a closed loop of power. The police consolidate investigation, conclusion, enforcement, and data storage without any visible mechanism for independent oversight.
Furthermore, the draft completely omits the rights of the accused during the verification process, such as the right to offer explanations, access case files, or appeal decisions. By placing the authority to determine truth within the same agency that wields investigative and coercive powers, the draft creates a very real risk of abuse.
An Opaque Verification Process
According to Article 9, the “process for handling fake or misleading information” involves detection and identification, verification, public announcement, warning, prevention, removal, investigation, and sanctioning. While this procedure seems comprehensive, it suffers from three major gaps.
Primarily, the absence of binding deadlines means the draft does not specify a timeframe for authorities to complete their verification. Consequently, a statement could remain indefinitely labeled as “under review,” creating an atmosphere of uncertainty that alone can paralyze freedom of expression without any formal ruling.
Furthermore, the process offers no procedural protections for the individuals involved. This draft fails to outline whether the accused is entitled to review allegations, provide evidence, or offer rebuttals. Instead, all actions occur exclusively between state agencies, leaving the affected individual entirely excluded from the proceedings.
Finally, verification results are entered directly into a centralized database managed by the police. Once information is labeled “fake,” it enters this national system—which connects to various ministries, agencies, and local authorities—and may remain there long after the issue is resolved. Because the draft omits mechanisms for removing labels, issuing corrections, or limiting data retention, a single record could follow an individual indefinitely.
Ultimately, this framework suspends citizens’ rights, permitting investigations without clear criteria, recording without removal recourse, and judicial proceedings without a defense.
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Because the definitions are broad, the prohibited acts extensive, the enforcement authority concentrated in the police, and the verification process stripped of safeguards and time limits, it is difficult to conclude that this draft is solely concerned with combating fake news.
Instead, it reflects a broader tendency to expand the police’s authority to intervene in the everyday information space of citizens. This is a domain that should fundamentally be governed by principles of transparency, strict limits on state power, and a profound respect for freedom of expression.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 09, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. The Vietnamese. (2026, March 02). New Draft Reveals the Ministry of Public Security’s Expanding Cybersecurity Firewall. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/03/new-draft-reveals-the-ministry-of-public-securitys-expanding-cybersecurity-firewall/
2. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights requires that liability for information be applied in proportion to the conduct and the degree of fault.
