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A clear pattern emerges when observing Google’s search platform in Việt Nam: there is a clear difference in visibility between celebrations of the U23 national football team and news regarding land protests in locations like Hà Nội, Nghệ An, and Hồ Chí Minh City. While U23 search results consistently dominate “hot search” lists, information concerning land petitions is largely absent from the mainstream information space.

One might ask if football simply occurs more frequently than land disputes. Quantitatively, a football tournament lasts only one to three months and happens once every few years. In contrast, administrative complaints and collective disputes over hundreds of hectares of land can drag on for several years.

Socially, football celebrations draw massive crowds that frequently cause traffic congestion, safety violations , and noise pollution. [1] [2] Protest gatherings, meanwhile, are typically smaller and rarely cause such public disruptions.

However, the authorities manage these two activities in vastly different ways, suggesting a system that encourages specific values while discriminating against others based entirely on the content of the expression, such as prioritizing the celebration of football over the expression of dissenting political views.

Furthermore, the state maintains strict sanctions for citizens who even show curiosity toward opposing viewpoints. For instance, in the lead-up to the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party, police penalized numerous citizens for sharing content from platforms like thoibao.de or the Facebook accounts of Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài, which the government officially labels as “opposing” the Party and the state. [3]

This suppression of free expression has increasingly expanded beyond national borders, evidenced by extraterritorial judicial decisions and sentences handed down to figures like Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài. [4]

The harsh crackdown on dissenting voices, along with the widespread promotion of state-approved media like the song "Thưa Đảng" (Dear Party) by singer Anh Tú, shows that the government wants to limit speech based on its political content.

The Retreat of State Responsibility

Historically, philosophers have defined the state by its obligations to the public. In The Social Contract ( Du Contrat Social, 1762), Jean-Jacques Rousseau described the state as an entity existing to protect the common good. Similarly, in Two Treatises of Government (1689), John Locke emphasized the state's duty to govern, administer, and protect natural rights. [5] [6] Locke explicitly argued this point:

“§131. […] The power of society, or of the legislature constituted by it, can never be supposed to extend beyond the common good.

§142. […] the laws must likewise be designed for no other ultimate end but the good of the people.”

Modern international human rights standards, collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights , build upon this foundation by identifying three core categories of state obligations: [7]

Respect: States must refrain from directly interfering with or restricting the enjoyment of human rights.

Protect: States must take measures to prevent individuals or groups from violating human rights.

Fulfil: States must take positive steps to facilitate the realization of fundamental human rights.

The retreat, or deregulation, of state responsibility occurs when a state reduces its role in governance, administration, protection, and public service provision. By doing so, it loosens or transfers obligations that naturally fall within its purview.

Under such circumstances, the slow development of clear legal frameworks for fundamental liberties—such as the right to protest, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly—creates severe legal vacuums.

These gaps hinder the exercise of citizens’ rights and heighten the risk of arbitrary law enforcement. In the end, the consequences go far beyond fines or prison time; they create long, systemic chains of social injustice.

Ensuring Human Rights Through a Content-neutral Approach to Speech

In a rule-of-law state, recognizing and effectively fulfilling state responsibilities creates greater possibilities for protecting human rights. Regarding freedom of expression, the state must design a content-neutral legal framework to gradually replace any laws based on the suppression of specific speech content.

International examples illustrate this principle clearly. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 8 of the Constitution ( Grundgesetz ) guarantees all citizens the right to assemble peacefully without prior permission. [8] For demonstrations or marches, organizers simply notify local authorities in advance to arrange security measures, such as traffic management and violence prevention.

Similarly, in the French Republic, freedom of expression was foundational to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen ( Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen ). The French legal system further protects freedom of association via the Decree-Law of Oct. 23, 1935, and the Internal Security Code (CSI). [9] [10] [11] Organizing a protest merely requires notifying authorities of the organizers' details, the event's purpose, and the planned route. This cooperative process ensures the exercise of expressive rights while minimizing public order risks.

These examples demonstrate that the exercise of fundamental freedoms—speech, association, and protest—should never be subject to content-based censorship. The role of authorities in a notification system is to facilitate and protect these rights, not to judge or filter the underlying message.

In Việt Nam, however, the state has retreated from its legislative responsibilities concerning basic freedoms. This retreat, combined with a strong tendency toward content-based censorship, forms a significant barrier to implementing the civil rights recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR , 1966) and the 2013 Constitution. [12] Moving forward, Việt Nam must develop a content-neutral legal framework that eliminates censorship and effectively fulfills the state's obligation to protect human rights.

Consider the double standard: if street celebrations for sporting victories are protected under the right to participate in cultural life via Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR , 1966), then public protests exercising freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR (1966) must receive the exact same state protection. [13] [14]

Instead of censoring messages, authorities should focus entirely on the technical and logistical management of public spaces. This includes regulating:

Specifying acceptable hours or days for events

Managing access to residential areas, public squares, or major traffic routes

Establishing acceptable noise levels, crowd sizes, and safety measures

In sum, a content-neutral approach does not weaken state authority. Instead, it strengthens the legitimacy of the government, builds public trust, and expands the necessary space for free expression. Ensuring these rights through transparent, consistent legal mechanisms allows society to develop along democratic, progressive, and rule-of-law lines.

Ngọc Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 10, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Hùng, T., & Huy, N. (n.d.). CĐV TPHCM, Hà Nội “đi bão” trong đêm khuya mừng thành tích của U23 Việt Nam. VietNamNet News . https://vietnamnet.vn/cdv-tphcm-di-bao-trong-dem-khuya-mung-u23-viet-nam-doat-huy-chuong-dong-2484703.html

2. Banduong.Vn. (n.d.). Hưng Yên: Xử lý nhiều trường hợp “đi bão” sau trận chung kết bóng đá nam . banduong.vn. https://banduong.vn/Hung-Yen-Xu-ly-nhieu-truong-hop-di-bao-sau-tran-chung-ket-bong-da-nam-d21415.html

3. Lê Giang. (2026, January 21). Bắt bớ người dân trước Đại hội 14, Tô Lâm vẫn khẳng định “dân là gốc.” Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/01/bat-bo-nguoi-dan-truoc-dai-hoi-14-to-lam-van-khang-dinh-dan-la-goc/

4. The Vietnamese. (2026, January 5). Trial in Absentia Ends With 17-Year Prison Sentences for Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/trial-in-absentia-ends-with-17-year-prison-sentences-for-le-trung-khoa-and-nguyen-van-dai/

5. Rousseau, J.-J. (1780). DU CONTRAT SOCIAL, OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE. In Collection complète des oeuvres (Vol. 1, pp. 187–360). Genève. https://www.rousseauonline.ch/pdf/rousseauonline-0004.pdf

6. Khảo luận thứ hai về chính quyền: Chính quyền dân sự : John Locke : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive . (2007). Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/khaoluanthuhaivechinhquyen_chinhquyendansu

7. OHCHR. (n.d.). International Human Rights Law . https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-and-mechanisms/international-human-rights-law

8. Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany . (n.d.). https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html

9. La Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme . (2020, June 1). https://www.un.org/fr/universal-declaration-human-rights/

10. The right of peaceful assembly in France . (n.d.). Peaceful Assembly Worldwide. https://www.rightofassembly.info/country/france

11. Ameringer, M. (2023, April 27). Freedom of assembly in France . International Law and Policy Brief. https://studentbriefs.law.gwu.edu/ilpb/2023/04/27/freedom-of-assembly-in-france/

12. Đại hội đồng Liên Hợp Quốc. (1976). CÔNG ƯỚC QUỐC TẾ VỀ CÁC QUYỀN DÂN SỰ VÀ CHÍNH TRỊ . https://moj.gov.vn/tttp/tintuc/Lists/CongUocQuocTe/Attachments/10/1.%20Cong%20uoc%20ICCPR%20-%20VN.pdf

13. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2020, November 23). Công ước quốc tế các quyền kinh tế, xã hội và văn hoá, 1966. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Thuong-mai/Cong-uoc-quoc-te-cac-quyen-kinh-te-xa-hoi-va-van-hoa-1966-269761.aspx

14. OHCHR. (n.d.). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights