Power Without Oversight: The Question of Accountability in Việt Nam’s One-Party System

This article’s headline poses a perennial question that arises after every Communist Party congress, especially when the congress convenes in secret to elect the country’s top leadership.

While the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) claims to be the supreme entity leading the state and society in the country, the Constitution and the current legal system have never clearly addressed who, or what institution, has the authority to oversee the party’s power and the transparency of its internal affairs.

As the new National Assembly prepares to convene in April, what should the public expect? It remains to be seen if there will be any provisions establishing clearer mechanisms for independently monitoring, checking, and limiting the power of the CPV.

Authority and Oversight

Since Sept. 2, 1945, no law has ever been enacted to regulate the activities of the CPV. This stands in contrast to most other actors within the political system—including the government, the National Assembly, the courts, the procuracy, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, businesses, social organizations, and all Vietnamese citizens—which operate under specific legal frameworks.

Senior officials of the Communist Party repeatedly state that all policies and decisions serve the interests of the people. However, if citizens truly possessed the authority to oversee the party, they would likely better protect these interests.

This oversight requires the ability to express views within the framework of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and the law.

Furthermore, Clause 2, Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution clearly states: “The Communist Party of Việt Nam maintains close ties with the people, serves the people, is subject to the people’s supervision, and is accountable to the people for its decisions.” [1] 

Despite this, it remains extremely difficult for citizens to exercise this supervisory right in reality. Public voices that criticize or challenge Party policies frequently face accusations of “abusing freedom of expression,” a charge imposed by the Party itself.

Supervisory Power in Theory

The National Assembly, as the legislature representing the people, is central to any discussion on mechanisms for supervising power. The 2013 Constitution gives the National Assembly the highest level of oversight over all state activities, but it doesn’t say anything about its power over the Communist Party.

In practice, the National Assembly functions largely to formalize the party’s decisions. This dynamic stems from the party’s complete control over the nomination and election processes for National Assembly delegates at all government levels. 

Because all senior state positions are held by party members, the National Assembly often just approves decisions that the Party Central Committee and the Politburo have already made. This makes the National Assembly less independent.

The Fatherland Front and the Limits of Social Criticism

While Article 9 of the Constitution grants the Vietnam Fatherland Front the authority to “conduct supervision and social criticism” and to “participate in building the party and the state,” its theoretical role as a channel for overseeing party power is limited.

The party strictly directs the top-down management of this umbrella organization, which encompasses various social groups. Consequently, the Front functions largely as an extension of the Party rather than as an independent supervisory body.

This distinction is even acknowledged in the Political Report of the 14th Party Congress, which noted that the Front’s supervisory activities remain largely formalistic and have not been highly effective. [2]

The Party Supervises Itself

The Central Inspection Commission is another institution relevant to the issue of “supervising party power.” While it plays a key role in anti-corruption efforts by conducting inspections, investigations, and handling violations committed by party members, the commission remains an internal part of the party itself.

Because its top leaders are party members elected by the Party Central Committee following each congress, the existence of this organization demonstrates that the Party is essentially “supervising itself.” [3]

From here, it becomes clear that Việt Nam currently lacks any institution or legal framework capable of enabling independent oversight of the CPV’s power.

Expectations for the Upcoming Comprehensive Constitutional Review

One of the primary tasks identified for 2026 by the 14th Party Congress is a comprehensive review of the Constitution. However, the push for further constitutional amendments predates the 14th Congress; Tô Lâm had already mentioned the idea in official remarks months earlier, following the mid-2025 constitutional revisions.

The rapid pace of these legislative changes has raised valid concerns. Under Tô Lâm’s leadership, the drafting and revising of laws has accelerated dramatically, adhering to the well-known principle of “running while lining up.” [4] 

This unprecedented speed has applied directly to the Constitution itself. Over the past year, the National Assembly managed to amend 5 out of 120 articles of the 2013 Constitution in a mere 43 days—spanning from the start of parliamentary discussions to the enactment of the amendment resolution. [5] These specific revisions primarily formalized administrative reforms to reorganize the government apparatus.

In May 2025, Tô Lâm indicated that further fundamental constitutional amendments would be pursued to shape a long-term vision for the country, potentially linking them to a national development platform slated for the 14th Party Congress. [6]

Seven months later, immediately following the 14th Congress, state media reported ongoing research into a comprehensive revision of the 2013 Constitution, though specific details remain undisclosed. [7] 

This “comprehensive” revision might include changes about the party’s leadership role and how power is monitored, with the documents from the 14th Congress likely helping the National Assembly decide what parts will be changed.

Congress Documents and the Limits of Reform

The 14th Congress documents, much like those of previous Party congresses, re-emphasize the principle of taking “the people as the root.” They prominently feature the motto “the people know, the people discuss, the people implement, the people inspect, the people supervise, the people benefit” as a means to “promote the people’s mastery in all aspects of social life.” [8] 

Consequently, the party affirms its commitment to maintaining close ties with the public and remaining subject to their supervision, while citizens are encouraged to exercise their participation rights across society.

Despite these affirmations, the documents completely omit any mechanism for independent oversight outside the party. They opt instead to reaffirm the party’s exclusive leadership role and its reliance on internal control mechanisms.

Historically, proposals to introduce constitutional provisions that limit or supervise the Communist Party’s power have been raised, but they are consistently set aside. Embedding such limits into law creates binding constraints that those in power often avoid imposing upon themselves. 

As Dr. Bùi Hải Thiêm notes in his research paper, “Constitutionalizing Single Party Leadership in Vietnam: Dilemmas of Reform,” numerous proposals to place the Party within a legal framework have ultimately “disappeared into thin air.” [9]

It remains uncertain whether this established precedent will shift under Tô Lâm’s leadership. Lâm has frequently expressed a desire to lead Việt Nam into “a new era of national rise” and to formalize a socialist rule-of-law state that champions “respect for the Constitution and the law, control of power, transparency, openness, and accountability to the people.” [10]

Still, an optimistic outlook is difficult to maintain. While the Constitution formally states that the CPV is subject to the supervision of the people, this assertion operates as a largely symbolic political principle rather than an actionable legal mechanism.

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Hạo Nam wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 12, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.