“Warmly welcome the Election Day for deputies to the 16th National Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels for the 2026–2031 term!”
“The election of deputies to the 16th National Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels for the 2026–2031 term is a festival of the entire people!”
“Election Day—A festival of trust, unity, and Việt Nam’s aspirations!”
“Each ballot contributes to building a strong and prosperous nation!”
Since February, these slogans have appeared densely on banners, billboards, and posters lining streets and displayed throughout the premises of state offices. [1]
Every morning and evening, loudspeakers in communes and wards broadcast propaganda messages about the upcoming election. The familiar voice seems intended to remind the people to pay attention to the information and prepare to carry out their “rights and duties” as citizens, although these citizens, and perhaps even the lawmakers themselves, may not really know why voting is considered their “duty.” [2]
Occasionally, local officials or commune police knock on doors to verify residency and household numbers for voter lists. In many ways, these are the clearest—and perhaps the only—signs distinguishing the once-every-five-years “festival of the entire people” from ordinary days. [3]
Despite this state-sponsored enthusiasm, few people discuss the candidates running for the National Assembly (ĐBQH) or the People’s Councils (HĐND) at their dinner tables, markets, or cafés. In fact, many citizens do not even know the date of the election, the candidates on the ballot, or the location of their polling stations.
In recent days, what has attracted their attention instead includes the gasoline prices, gold prices, the war in Iran, the financial and romantic dispute between a woman named Tym and a monk named Thích Nhuận Đạt, or singer Hòa Minzy publicly revealing her boyfriend. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
These issues either impact their daily lives directly or offer the kind of tension and drama that people actually want to follow.
The public has gradually come to view elections as a tedious procedure and a dull performance, designed solely to legitimize the government’s authority, due to the long-held belief that they are inevitable.
How People Choose Candidates
People’s Committees and polling stations prominently display official candidate profiles and voter lists in the days leading up to an election. Despite this public posting, citizen engagement is virtually nonexistent. The rare individuals who actually view the lists usually do so in passing while attending to unrelated errands.
Because voters do not actively seek information regarding the “red” or “non-red” political backgrounds of their prospective representatives, they are left to base their ballot decisions on entirely subjective criteria.
Personal familiarity heavily influences these choices. Local communities naturally elevate candidates who they recognize as relatives or former teachers as worthy choices. When personal connections are absent, voters pivot to superficial metrics.
Many do not evaluate the candidates until they physically arrive at the polling station. There, selections are hastily made based on résumé length, academic titles, professional seniority, or simply possessing a benevolent facial appearance.
A subset of voters adopts more arbitrary methods, intentionally crossing out older or higher-ranking officials to artificially create opportunities for younger or lower-tier candidates. At the end of the day, however, the specific methods voters use to select candidates matter very little.
The election outcomes are almost entirely predetermined, a fundamental reality that continually reinforces the public’s widespread apathy toward the entire voting process.
Why Does This Happen in Việt Nam’s Election?
Although the nationwide election will not occur until March 15, 2026, the “number, structure, and composition” of representatives were already finalized by the National Assembly on Nov. 10, 2025, following directives issued by the Communist Party on May 16, 2025, via Directive No. 46. [9] [10]
This predefined framework does not name individual candidates, but it establishes strict demographic quotas dictating the exact number of men, women, party members, non-party members, religious dignitaries, and ethnic minority representatives required.
Using this rigid structure, the Communist Party maintains comprehensive control over the election through multiple rounds of consultation. [11]
Each consultation round functions as a rigorous screening stage, systematically eliminating candidates who fail to fit the quotas before the official list is finalized. [12]
The authorities have even outlined the “agenda and program” for the first session of the 16th National Assembly well before a single ballot is cast. [13]
As a result, the electoral process devolves into a solo performance orchestrated by the state. Citizens are entirely excluded from determining the representative structure prior to the election, and they remain uninformed about how official results are calculated afterward.
According to Clause 1, Article 86 of the current Law on the Election of National Assembly Deputies and People’s Council Deputies, official results may take up to 10 days to be released, a slight improvement from the previous 20-day waiting period but still a significant delay. [14] [15]
During this window, citizens have no way of verifying whether their ballots are counted accurately. They are eventually presented with a document, stamped with the election committee’s red seal, containing results that perfectly mirror the quotas the authorities outlined months prior.
The previously discussed examples of subjective voting generally involve citizens who have experienced multiple election cycles. These individuals, along with the broader public, intimately understand the mechanics of a one-party electoral system.
They are no longer surprised when top Communist Party leaders share electoral units with low-level female commune specialists. [16]
They do not bat an eye when national election organizers simultaneously run as candidates. [17] It is completely normalized for central leaders to reside in one location while standing for election in another. [18] The public even accepts situations where bosses run directly against their own subordinates. [19]
Because these glaring contradictions are openly displayed every election season, many citizens are convinced that elections have lost their original meaning. They no longer provide fair competition, nor do they accurately reflect the true will and aspirations of the people.
Finding a Representative Becomes a Distant Hope
Another reason citizens find elections dull may lie in their familiarity with the images of representatives in the legislative chamber—some making shocking proposals, others dozing off, and others quietly pressing voting buttons. [20]
Because these above-mentioned scenes have repeated frequently over the years, they have created a difficult-to-bridge distance between the electorate and their supposed representatives.
In a one-party system, legislative decisions strictly adhere to the party’s direction. Each session of the National Assembly passes numerous legal documents under party guidance, with approval rates that are almost unanimous. [21]
Consequently, citizens do not expect their ballots to enact meaningful change over the next five years, knowing full well that all decisions are made in advance, entirely beyond their knowledge and participation.
Rather than a democratic exercise, the election has devolved into an administrative ritual repeated every five years.
Voters simply go to the polling station, receive a ballot, cross out a few names, place it in the box, and return home. Approximately 10 days later, the official results are published without any suspense, surprise, or controversy.
Just days ago, voters across the country elected deputies to the National Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels for the 2026–2031 term. On the morning of election day, assembly halls were adorned with bright flags, flowers, and numerous banners.
Among the many slogans covering the entranceways, one was predictably placed in the center, hanging higher than the rest: “Long live the glorious Communist Party of Việt Nam!”
This single phrase perfectly encapsulates what most voters have long realized. The result of this so-called “national festival” has, in fact, already been shaped by the Communist Party even before the first ballot is cast—year after year, and perhaps for eternity. [22]
Bảo Khánh wrote this op-ed article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. Tổng hợp 23 Khẩu hiệu tuyên truyền bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội khóa XVI và đại biểu HĐND các cấp 2026 – 2031 ra sao? (n.d.). Thư Viện Pháp Luật. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/phap-luat/ho-tro-phap-luat/tong-hop-23-khau-hieu-tuyen-truyen-bau-cu-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-khoa-xvi-va-dai-bieu-hdnd-cac-cap-2026–755282-251860.html
2. Trịnh Hữu Long. (2026, March 12). Đi bầu là quyền hay là nghĩa vụ? Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/di-bau-la-quyen-hay-la-nghia-vu/
3. Vinh, Q. (2026, March 11). Sẵn sàng cho ngày hội của toàn dân. Báo Nhân Dân Điện Tử. https://nhandan.vn/san-sang-cho-ngay-hoi-cua-toan-dan-post947713.html
4. An, T. (n.d.). Giá xăng lại tăng, RON 95 vượt 29.000 đồng/lít. VietNamNet News. https://vietnamnet.vn/gia-xang-lai-tang-ron-95-vuot-29-000-dong-lit-2496127.html
5. Duy, K. (2026, March 11). Giá vàng sẽ tăng hay giảm nếu xung đột kéo dài? Báo Lao Động. https://laodong.vn/tien-te-dau-tu/gia-vang-se-tang-hay-giam-neu-xung-dot-keo-dai-1666649.ldo
6. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2026, March 10). Chiến sự Iran: Việt Nam đối phó cú sốc xăng dầu ra sao? https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c3wlyz07y0zo
7. Lê, T. (n.d.). Giáo hội Phật giáo Việt Nam lên tiếng vụ ông Thích Nhuận Đạt. VietNamNet News. https://vietnamnet.vn/giao-hoi-phat-giao-viet-nam-len-tieng-vu-ong-thich-nhuan-dat-2495079.html
8. VnExpress. (2026, March 7). Hòa Minzy công khai người yêu là quân nhân. vnexpress.net. https://vnexpress.net/hoa-minzy-cong-khai-nguoi-yeu-la-quan-nhan-5047732.html
9. Nghị quyết Dự kiến số lượng, cơ cấu, thành phần đại biểu Quốc hội khóa XVI. (n.d.). Ủy Ban Thường Vụ Quốc Hội. https://os-north-1.viettelcloud.vn/ctt-baucu-data/Files/Others/fc470d47-85b0-497e-9cea-33bc900092fd/NQ_1891._Nghi_quyet_du_kien_so_luong_co_cau_DBQH_khoa_XVI_1762773010165.pdf
10. Công. (n.d.). Toàn văn Chỉ thị số 46-CT/TW ngày 16/5/2025 của Bộ Chính trị về lãnh đạo cuộc bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội khóa XVI và bầu cử đại biểu Hội đồng nhân dân các cấp nhiệm kỳ 2026 – 2031. https://hcma.vn/toan-van-chi-thi-so-46cttw-ngay-1652025-cua-bo-chinh-tri-ve-lanh-dao-cuoc-bau-cu-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-khoa-xvi-va-bau-cu-dai-bieu-hoi-dong-nhan-dan-cac-cap-nhiem-ky-2026–2031-20777.htm
11. Hoàng Mai. (2026, February 12) Communist Party Control in Việt Nam’s National Assembly Elections. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/02/communist-party-control-in-viet-nams-national-assembly-elections/
12. Danh sách chính thức những người ứng cử đại biểu Quốc hội khóa XVI. (n.d.). https://bcp.cdnchinhphu.vn/334894974524682240/2026/2/15/ds-17711232861151343593189.pdf
13. Hoàng Nam. (2026, March 11). Chưa bầu cử, Chính phủ và Quốc hội đã chuẩn bị “nội dung, chương trình” cho Quốc hội khóa sau. Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/chua-bau-cu-chinh-phu-va-quoc-hoi-da-chuan-bi-noi-dung-chuong-trinh-cho-quoc-hoi-khoa-sau/
14. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, September 10). Văn bản hợp nhất 85/VBHN-VPQH năm 2025 hợp nhất Luật Bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội và đại biểu Hội đồng nhân dân do Văn phòng Quốc hội ban hành. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Van-ban-hop-nhat-85-VBHN-VPQH-2025-Luat-Bau-cu-dai-bieu-Quoc-hoi-672010.aspx#_ftn82
15. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, February 23). Luật Bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội và đại biểu Hội đồng nhân dân 2015. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-Bau-cu-dai-bieu-Quoc-hoi-va-dai-bieu-Hoi-dong-nhan-dan-2015-282376.aspx
16. Trịnh Hữu Long. (2026, March 3). Hà Nội: Hai nữ chuyên viên phường “tranh cử” với Tô Lâm và tướng quân đội. Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/ha-noi-hai-nu-chuyen-vien-phuong-tranh-cu-voi-to-lam-va-tuong-quan-doi/
17. Trường An. (2026, March 10). Uniquely Việt Nam: How National Election Council Members Organize and Campaign. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/03/uniquely-viet-nam-how-national-election-council-members-organize-and-campaign/
18. Lê Sáng. (2026, March 7). Nguyễn Thanh Nghị: Quê ở Cà Mau, sống ở Hà Nội, tranh cử ở Đắk Lắk. Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/nguyen-thanh-nghi-que-o-ca-mau-song-o-ha-noi-tranh-cu-o-dak-lak/
19. Lê Sáng. (2026, March 9). Nhiều đơn vị bầu cử: Sếp “tranh cử” với nhân viên. Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/nhieu-don-vi-bau-cu-sep-tranh-cu-voi-nhan-vien/
20. Tiến Long. (2025, May 16). Đại biểu đề xuất tăng mức phạt vi phạm giao thông lên 200 triệu đồng. TUOI TRE ONLINE. https://tuoitre.vn/dai-bieu-de-xuat-tang-muc-phat-vi-pham-giao-thong-len-200-trieu-dong-20250516170825064.htm
21. Trường An. (2025, December 15). Do Party Central Committee Meetings Outweigh National Assembly Sessions? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/12/do-party-central-committee-meetings-outweigh-national-assembly-sessions/
22. Lê, V. (2026, March 1). Hướng tới “Ngày hội của non sông.” Báo Nhân Dân Điện Tử. https://nhandan.vn/huong-toi-ngay-hoi-cua-non-song-post945531.html
