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“Under the sacred red flag with a yellow star of the Fatherland, before the National Assembly, compatriots, and voters nationwide, I, the State President of the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam, solemnly swear to be absolutely loyal to the Fatherland, to the people, and to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam and to strive to fulfill all duties entrusted to me by the Party, the State, and the people.”

Tô Lâm, the incumbent General Secretary of the Communist Party of Việt Nam, delivered these above words on the morning of April 7 after being elected President with 100 percent approval from the 16th National Assembly. [1]

This election comes just over two months after the 14th Party Congress, where he secured unanimous backing from the Party Central Committee for re-election as general secretary. [2]

While this election marks the second time he has simultaneously held the top leadership posts of both the party and the state, this dual role is expected to last for a full five-year term, unlike his brief previous stint.

Tô Lâm’s authority now surpasses that of any leader in the communist state apparatus of Việt Nam since the era of Hồ Chí Minh, granting him both the formal role of head of state and the power to control the Communist Party’s political trajectory.

The Supreme Authority of the General Secretary

In Việt Nam’s political system, the highest authority is the head of the Communist Party: the General Secretary.

According to the 2013 Constitution ( amended and supplemented in 2025), the supreme legal document in Việt Nam’s legal system, the authority of the Communist Party is placed above that of the state. [3] [4]

Under this framework, all administrative decisions of the state must first pass through the will of the party via its three central power organs: the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat.

Since the general secretary heads all three bodies, this individual occupies the highest leadership position of the "state and society,” as stipulated in Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution.

In this capacity, Tô Lâm will direct the formulation of all major policies concerning institutional reform, socio-economic development, and foreign affairs. The party then submits these directions to state organs for approval and concrete implementation.

His authority also extends to controlling the process of nominating key personnel across the entire political system. [5] Under party rules , the Politburo, under the direction of the general secretary, introduces senior state personnel for election by the National Assembly. [6] Simultaneously, his office dictates appointments to Party leadership roles at every level, from the central government down to local administrations.

By assuming the role of General Secretary, Tô Lâm also becomes the Secretary of the Central Military Commission. This grants him the authority to intervene in and direct military affairs through Party channels.

In theory, the general secretary's immense leadership power remains formally confined to the party apparatus, making any influence over state organs indirect and based on political authority rather than legal legitimacy.

This structural limitation shows how significant Tô Lâm’s current term is. By also being elected President, he has successfully consolidated two of the highest leadership posts in Việt Nam—a dual mandate that his predecessor, the late General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng, failed to institutionalize permanently.

An Even More Powerful President

By securing the presidency, Tô Lâm ensures that his directives to state institutions now carry full constitutional legitimacy.

Party theorists argue that this consolidation is “appropriate for the new era” and will “improve governing efficiency” by accelerating the implementation of party directives within the National Assembly and the government. [7] The move is expected to expedite reform programs, specifically the ambitious goal of achieving annual GDP growth above 10 percent starting in 2026, a target initiated by Tô Lâm himself.

However, scholar Lê Hồng Hiệp of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has warned that combining these two posts could weaken internal checks within the Communist Party and complicate future succession. [8] While this model of concentrated power has long existed in other communist states—most notably in Việt Nam’s closest “comrades,” China and Laos—it represents a significant shift domestically.

Equipped with the powers of head of state, Tô Lâm now wields formal legal authority to intervene directly in state institutions. He no longer has to rely solely on the intermediary mechanisms of the National Assembly or government for personnel appointments, as he did when holding only the general secretaryship.

Under the Constitution, he possesses the authority to directly propose the appointment, dismissal, or removal of senior leaders, including the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, the chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court, and the procurator general of the Supreme People’s Procuracy.

Having already served as a leader in the public security apparatus, Tô Lâm now chairs the National Defense and Security Council, commanding the entire military and holding the specific authority to promote or demote officers and generals. His constitutional mandate also grants him the power to award state honors, grant amnesties, and issue special pardons to prisoners.

In the realm of foreign affairs, he now officially represents the nation in diplomatic relations, signs international treaties, receives foreign ambassadors plenipotentiary to Việt Nam, and dictates the appointment of Vietnamese ambassadors abroad.

If he held only the presidency, Tô Lâm would remain subject to oversight and accountability before the National Assembly. By simultaneously serving as General Secretary, however, his power has become almost absolute, challenging the principle of collective leadership that Việt Nam has maintained since the era of Lê Duẩn. [9]

Looking Back at History

Throughout the history of socialist Việt Nam, there have been previous periods when the head of the Communist Party simultaneously served as head of state.

The most emblematic figure to wield both scepters of power was Hồ Chí Minh, revered by the Party as the “father of the nation.” His “revolutionary morality” and philosophies on “governing the nation and securing the people” remain guiding models today.

At the 2nd Party Congress in 1951, the position of Party Chairman was created specifically for him. [10] Between 1951 and 1969, he concurrently held the roles of Party Chairman, General Secretary, and President.

Following his death in September 1969, the title of Party Chairman was permanently abolished.

According to Cù Huy Hà Vũ, in an article published in The Diplomat, the Politburo members who inherited Hồ Chí Minh’s revolutionary path reached an unspoken agreement to prevent any single individual from simultaneously serving as general secretary and president. [11]

For nearly half a century, Việt Nam adhered to this unwritten rule, maintaining the “four pillars” model of power—General Secretary, President, Prime Minister, and National Assembly Chairman—to ensure collective leadership.

However, even without the presidency, Lê Duẩn was widely regarded as having dominated the political system. [12] Some studies suggest that the “Lê Duẩn era” served as a cautionary lesson, prompting Vietnamese leadership to strengthen collective principles to prevent excessive power concentration. [13]

Decades later, the dual-office model briefly resurfaced when Nguyễn Phú Trọng assumed the presidency following the sudden death of Trần Đại Quang in 2018. [14] This consolidation ended in April 2021 when the presidency was handed to Nguyễn Xuân Phúc. [15]

A similar temporary consolidation occurred under Tô Lâm. In May 2024, he replaced Võ Văn Thưởng, who was removed pending disciplinary action. [16] [17] This lasted only five months before the role of head of state was transferred to Lương Cường in October 2024. [18]

Today, the dual-leadership model has fully materialized under the leader from Hưng Yên Province, more than half a century after Hồ Chí Minh and following a turbulent history of merging party and state roles.

While Việt Nam may still be far from “standing shoulder to shoulder with the great powers of the world,” as Hồ Chí Minh once envisioned, it can now firmly “stand shoulder to shoulder” with the remaining communist states in the global trend of consolidated power.

Hạo Nam wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 24, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

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VOV. (2026, January 23). Central Committee unanimously elects Tô Lâm as general secretary of the 14th Party Central Committee . VOV.vn. https://vov.vn/chinh-tri/trung-uong-thong-nhat-tuyet-doi-bau-dong-chi-to-lam-giu-chuc-tong-bi-thu-ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang-khoa-xiv-post1263552.vov

Thu Vien Phap Luat. (2025, June 16). 2013 Constitution . THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hien-phap-nam-2013-215627.aspx

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