Key Events
- Việt Nam Dismisses HRW as Book Crackdown Deepens;
- New Digital ID Bill Could Track Facebook ‘Likes’;
- 119 Christians Are Penalized Over Alleged Separatism;
- ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’ Elevates Việt Nam’s Global Role;
- China Pressure Tests Việt Nam’s Balancing Act.
Việt Nam Calls HRW Claims ‘Not Worth Commenting On’
Việt Nam has made its position on Human Rights Watch (HRW) unmistakable: It does not treat the organization as a watchdog worth engaging but as an outside accuser whose legitimacy can be dismissed. That message came on July 23, when Foreign Ministry spokesperson Phạm Thu Hằng said HRW’s “so-called allegations” were “not worth commenting on.”
Her response followed HRW’s call for Việt Nam to immediately and unconditionally free five people arrested in connection with the book “Chuyện với Thanh – Lời kể mới về ánh sáng” (“Story with Thanh—A New Account of Light”), which offers a different account of Hồ Chí Minh, especially during the time when he was a youth named Nguyễn Tất Thành.
Author Nguyễn Thành Nam, Trần Việt Anh (the director of Spiderum, a platform for sharing knowledge, viewpoints, and discussion, especially for youth); and publishing officials Nguyễn Thúy Hằng, Đào Bá Đoàn, and Nguyễn Văn Yên all face charges under Article 117 of the Penal Code for allegedly producing or disseminating materials against the state.
HRW called Article 117 a “notorious” national security provision and said the arrests sent a disturbing warning to Việt Nam’s writers, journalists, and publishers. The organization also criticized the authorities for publishing the defendants’ home addresses.
Rather than address those concerns individually, the Foreign Ministry rejected the premise of HRW’s intervention. Pro-government voices went further: The Facebook page Tifosi labeled HRW a “subversive organization,” while writer Nguyễn Mai Dung praised the government’s refusal to recognize the group’s standing.
That hostility reflects a longstanding official position. Việt Nam routinely describes HRW’s reporting as false, fabricated, and biased, even as European institutions regard the New York-based organization as credible and the United Kingdom’s Home Office uses its findings in asylum assessments. HRW, founded in 1978, says it accepts no government funding and investigates abuses in more than 100 countries.
The dispute is unfolding amid a wider campaign against books and contested historical narratives. The Writers’ Association Publishing House recalled “Chuyện với Thanh,” was suspended for two months, and was fined 100 million đồng ($3,799). The authorities arrested five people connected to the book, while the Press Authority penalized 23 media outlets and disciplined more than 30 people for publishing articles that “praised” it.
Online denunciations have also expanded. Facebook user and former soldier Phan Trung Can has targeted additional books, writers, and public officials while claiming that provincial police and the Cybersecurity and High-Tech Crime Prevention Division support his activities.
Those claims remain unverified; Can did not immediately respond to Luật Khoa’s request for a comment. His campaign continued despite state media warnings against allowing online opinion to become a substitute for legal judgment.
The pressure has now moved directly into newsrooms. A July 21 Press Authority directive requires media organizations to seek official guidance before publishing sensitive or potentially influential material about history and national leaders. The order appears to conflict with Việt Nam’s Press Law, which states that the press “shall not be censored before being printed, transmitted, and broadcast.”
The arrests, denunciations, and tighter editorial controls explain why HRW’s intervention faced rejection rather than debate: In Việt Nam’s official framing, scrutiny from an organization like HRW is not a legitimate human rights challenge but unwelcome interference.
Newly Proposed Draft Digital ID Law Could Track Every Transaction—and Even Facebook ‘Like’
Việt Nam’s Ministry of Public Security has proposed a sweeping electronic identification law that could link citizens’ assets, financial transactions, and online behavior—potentially including every social media “like”—to state-managed digital identities.
The draft Law on Electronic Identification and Authentication, open for public comment from July 13 through Aug. 2, would expand electronic identification far beyond people and organizations.
It creates five categories of entities subject to identification: people and institutions; physical objects; nonphysical entities such as data, applications, and digital assets; events, transactions, and conduct; and locations and spaces.
Once identified, information about each entity would be incorporated into the national identification system to form a unique “electronic identity.” Physical objects and locations would be linked to the identity of their owner or lawful manager when involved in a transaction or legal proceeding.
The proposal goes further with digital activity. Under Articles 9 and 20, identified “events, transactions, and behaviors” must link to the electronic identities of every participating individual or organization. Records could also include when and where an activity occurred and its surrounding context.
The bill does not expressly mention Facebook activities. Its broad references to behavior and interactions, however, could encompass actions such as liking, sharing, or commenting on social media. The same provisions could cover financial transfers, online purchases, and other digital interactions.
An unnamed legal expert told Luật Khoa Magazine that the proposal reflects Việt Nam’s ambition to create a comprehensive digital governance system. But linking millions or billions of daily transactions to all participants—along with their time, location, and context—would require immense technological capacity, staffing, and financial resources.
The expert warned that such a system could, in principle, allow the state to reconstruct nearly an individual’s entire digital footprint. Centralizing such large amounts of information could improve administrative efficiency and help prevent crime and fraud, but it would also increase the damage caused by data breaches or official misuse.
Key questions remain unanswered, including who could access the data, how long it would be retained, when authorities could use it and whether independent oversight would exist.
The bill was not part of the National Assembly’s original legislative agenda. The government sought to add it after a proposal from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), issuing Resolution No. 125 on May 11.
The MPS argues that the existing Decree No. 69 does not provide enough legal authority to expand the scope and models of electronic identification. It is therefore seeking legislation with greater legal force.
If adopted without strong safeguards, the law could transform Việt Nam’s identification system from a tool for verifying identity into infrastructure capable of mapping what people own, where they transact, and how they behave online.
Việt Nam Says 119 Christians Penalized Over Alleged Separatist Links
Vietnamese authorities said 119 Christians in Gia Lai Province were subjected to “enforcement measures” during the first half of 2026 over alleged links to separatist movements, according to a July 21 report by The Christian Post.
Police also opened two criminal cases involving four defendants, but officials did not specify what measures were imposed on the remaining individuals. Reports did not disclose any names, charges, or supporting evidence concerning most of the 119 people.
The figures were announced by Maj. Gen. Lê Quang Nhân, director of the Gia Lai Provincial Police, during a July 19 meeting with Minister of Public Security Lương Tam Quang.
State newspaper Tuổi Trẻ said police had identified, investigated, and “handled” people suspected of attempting to revive the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, or FULRO, and promote “Tin Lành Đề Ga,” or De Ga Protestantism.
FULRO emerged in the 1960s as an armed movement seeking greater autonomy for ethnic minorities, particularly Montagnard communities in the Central Highlands. Its military campaign largely ended decades ago in the 1990s, but Vietnamese authorities continue to invoke FULRO and alleged successor networks when addressing separatism and national-security concerns.
The government uses “Tin Lành Đề Ga” to describe what it says is a movement combining Protestant practice with FULRO-linked political objectives and demands for minority self-determination. Hà Nội does not recognize it as a lawful religious organization and portrays it as a threat to national unity.
Christian Solidarity Worldwide, the religious-freedom organization cited by The Christian Post, disputes that characterization. It says the label is pejorative and is used to politicize and delegitimize lawful worship among ethnic and religious minorities.
CSW President Mervyn Thomas accused Việt Nam of intensifying religious repression and called for accountability over restrictions on freedom of religion or belief.
Most Montagnards are Protestant Christians and have long reported surveillance, harassment, and pressure from authorities. Tensions intensified after armed attacks on government offices in Đắk Lắk Province in June 2023 killed nine people, including police officers and local officials. Authorities subsequently increased security operations across the region.
Gia Lai police also said in April that they had dismantled six alleged FULRO-linked cells involving more than 200 members of the Ba Na, an ethnic minority community. Four people were recommended for prosecution.
Rights advocates warn that broadly equating unregistered Protestant activity with separatism risks criminalizing peaceful worship, while officials maintain that their operations are necessary to prevent extremism and preserve national unity.
Việt Nam Positions Itself for a Middle-Power Role in a Fractured World
Việt Nam is increasingly positioned to act as a middle power capable of shaping regional diplomacy rather than merely navigating competition among larger states, according to an analysis by Nicholas Chapman published by East Asia Forum.
The argument comes as geopolitical rivalry, protectionism, and weakening confidence in the rules-based international order create greater space for mid-sized countries to influence global affairs.
Việt Nam’s expanding diplomatic reach, economic importance, and commitment to multilateral engagement could allow Hà Nội to help build coalitions and defend rules that smaller states depend on.
For many years, Việt Nam’s foreign policy has been based on diversification, multilateralism, and integration into the world. Often described as “bamboo diplomacy,” the approach combines firm principles—particularly sovereignty and strategic independence—with flexibility in managing relations with competing powers.
This strategy has enabled Việt Nam to maintain deep political and economic ties with China while expanding cooperation with the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and European partners. Hà Nội has also continued engaging Russia despite Western pressure over the war in Ukraine.
This dense network of partnerships aims to prevent overreliance on any single country. Within one year, Việt Nam hosted the leaders of the United States, China, and Russia, demonstrating its ability to maintain access to governments with sharply conflicting interests.
Chapman argues that this diplomatic record gives Việt Nam the foundations to respond proactively to global fragmentation. A successful middle-power role, however, would require more than balancing major powers. Hà Nội would need to help set the agenda for the world, make multilateral institutions stronger, and encourage people to work together to solve problems.
ASEAN remains central to that effort. By using the regional bloc and other multilateral forums, Việt Nam can amplify its influence on issues including maritime security, trade, supply chains, climate change, and emerging technologies. Support for international law is particularly important because of Việt Nam’s disputes with China in the South China Sea.
The country’s goals of becoming a middle power are also closely linked to its economic goals. Việt Nam aims to become a developed, high-income country by 2045, requiring secure supply chains, reliable energy, upgraded infrastructure, and more competitive domestic industries.
Strategic autonomy does not mean eliminating foreign dependence. Instead, it involves managing unavoidable dependencies, cultivating alternative partners, and building domestic capacity to withstand outside pressure.
Significant obstacles remain. Việt Nam must navigate worsening U.S.-China competition, trade protectionism, regional conflict, and its continuing reliance on foreign investment and technology. Its diplomatic ambitions will also require greater institutional expertise and resources.
Still, the emerging global order may offer Hà Nội an unusual opening. If Việt Nam can convert its diplomatic flexibility into sustained leadership and practical coalition-building, it could move from adapting to international change to helping shape it.
China’s Maritime Pressure Tests Việt Nam’s ‘Cooperate and Struggle’ Strategy
Việt Nam’s decades-old strategy of simultaneously cooperating with and resisting China is coming under growing strain as deeper economic and security ties collide with escalating pressure in the South China Sea, according to an analysis by Bich Tran for the Lowy Institute.
The latest test came when three vessels linked to China’s maritime militia reportedly patrolled within 60 to 65 nautical miles of Lý Sơn Island off central Việt Nam. The incident followed Communist Party General Secretary and President Tô Lâm’s April state visit to China, which both governments portrayed as strengthening bilateral ties and regional stability.
The apparent contradiction reflects Hà Nội’s “cooperation and struggle” approach. Formally adopted in 2003, the strategy recognizes that another country can be a partner in some areas and a competitor or threat in others.
A 2011 agreement between Hà Nội and Beijing placed the overall relationship above individual maritime disputes, allowing both sides to deepen cooperation while moving sovereignty disputes onto a slower diplomatic track.
That cooperative framework is extensive. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s April 2025 visit to Hà Nội produced 45 agreements covering railways, supply chains, and the digital economy. Tô Lâm’s 2026 visit generated another 32 agreements and a ministerial hotline between the two public security ministries.
Two-way trade reached a record $256 billion in 2025. By the end of 2024, China had 5,111 registered investment projects in Việt Nam worth $31 billion, making it the country’s sixth-largest source of foreign direct investment.
Military engagement has also grown. The two countries marked the 10th anniversary of their Border Defense Friendship Exchange in March and conducted their 40th joint patrol and training mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Their armies held a joint exercise for the first time in July 2025.
But maritime tensions are intensifying. China began dredging and construction at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands (Hoàng Sa archipelago) in October 2025. Satellite images indicate that the site could become China’s largest artificial island in the Paracels, possibly the largest in the South China Sea.
Việt Nam formally protested in March 2026, declaring that activities conducted without its permission in the Paracel Islands were illegal. The months-long delay reflected Hà Nội’s reluctance to let one dispute damage the broader relationship.
Việt Nam has, meanwhile, accelerated its reclamation work on all 21 features it occupies in the Spratly Islands (Trường Sa archipelago), adding about 216 hectares since early 2025.
Economic interdependence and dense diplomatic channels give both governments strong reasons to contain disputes. But wider public access to information makes restraint politically harder for Hà Nội. As Chinese assertiveness becomes more visible, Việt Nam may face growing pressure to respond more forcefully without provoking a broader breakdown in relations.
Quick Takes:
Đinh Thị Thu Thuỷ Reportedly Freed Nine Months Early
Political prisoner Đinh Thị Thu Thuỷ was released July 20, 2026, nine months before completing her seven-year sentence, according to a Facebook post by activist Phạm Thanh Nghiên. Police arrested the aquaculture engineer and environmental advocate on April 18, 2020. A Hậu Giang court convicted her in January 2021 under Article 117 for allegedly spreading anti-state propaganda through Facebook posts criticizing government policies and Communist Party leaders. Project88 listed her scheduled release as April 18, 2027. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found her imprisonment violated multiple rights and was arbitrary. Authorities have not publicly confirmed her release.
HRW Urges Việt Nam to Free Five Arrested Over Hồ Chí Minh Book
Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Việt Nam to release author Nguyễn Thành Nam and four others arrested over publishing “Chuyện với Thanh,” a book about Hồ Chí Minh. All face Article 117 charges for anti-state propaganda and could receive up to 20 years in prison. The authorities say the book distorted history and insulted Hồ Chí Minh, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and other Communist leaders. The publisher recalled the book in June after criticism, and 23 newspapers were fined for favorable coverage. HRW said the arrests sent a chilling message to writers, journalists, and publishers. Reuters could not reach the detainees’ representatives. The government investigation continues.
Rep. Derek Tran Presses Việt Nam on Human Rights Abuses
U.S. Rep. Derek Tran urged Việt Nam to honor its international human rights commitments in a letter to Ambassador Nguyễn Quốc Dũng. Tran cited evidence of arbitrary killings, torture, arrests, restrictions on expression and religious freedom, and limits on workers’ freedom of association. He said stronger respect for citizens’ rights would make U.S.-Việt Nam relations more reliable and productive. Tran, the son of Vietnamese refugees, previously requested access to prisoners of conscience and co-led the bipartisan Việt Nam Human Rights Act. He also sponsors imprisoned journalist Lê Hữu Minh Tuấn through the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s Defending Freedoms Project.
Government Proposes Social Media Posting Ban for Children Under 16
Việt Nam is considering rules that would bar children under 16 from posting, commenting, or reacting on social media while still allowing them to view content. Accounts would require registration through a parent or guardian, who would supervise content and usage time. Platforms would have to identify child users, provide maximum privacy protections, and block material involving violence, pornography, gambling, drugs, and suicide. Deputy Culture Minister Phan Tâm said the goal was age-appropriate access, not excessive restriction. The proposal would also limit children under 16 to 60 minutes of daily play on games offered by one company. The draft could be revised before adoption.
