Key Events
- Hà Nội’s Arch Proposal and Grab Drivers’ Pay Dispute Raise Questions About Priorities;
- When Followers Criticize Politics, Việt Nam’s Influencers Are Told to Hit Delete;
- Việt Nam Signs Russia Oil Reserve Deal Amid Push for Maritime Support;
- Hà Nội Bans Forced-Labor Imports Amid U.S. Trade Pressure;
- Export Boom Complicates Hà Nội’s Trade Talks With Washington.
Who Gets Heard in Việt Nam: Monument Planners or Struggling Workers?
Hà Nội’s proposed triumphal arch and Grab drivers’ calls for a boycott expose a troubling contrast in Việt Nam’s public priorities: ambitious plans to reshape the capital receive official attention, while workers demanding clearer pay arrangements appear to lack a public advocate.
The capital city is considering a 36-meter landmark near Hồ Hoàn Kiếm (Hoàn Kiếm Lake) as part of a broader redevelopment study covering approximately 66 hectares. Proposals include demolishing government offices, the Children’s Palace, and a theater. Public consultation runs from Sept. 7 through Sept. 26, the minimum 20 days required by law.
Historians and architects have challenged the monument’s suitability. History professor Phạm Hồng Tung called it “completely misguided,” while residents urged more trees and public space. Officials emphasize that the proposal remains preliminary and that no final architectural design has been approved yet.
Meanwhile, Grab drivers have described a different urban reality: long shifts, shrinking earnings, and uncertainty about how much of each fare they can keep.
Drivers called for logging off on Sept. 12 and 13 to protest deductions they described as unreasonable and opaque. One reported taking home 230,000 đồng ($8.87) after fuel expenses for eight hours of work. Another said that a passenger paid 25,000 đồng, while the driver received only 13,000 đồng.
Some drivers said debt and family obligations prevented them from participating in the protest. Their dependence on daily earnings illustrates how financial insecurity can weaken a worker’s ability to bargain collectively.
As of Sept. 9, Luật Khoa reported that no government agency had publicly intervened on behalf of the drivers, and Grab has not responded to Luật Khoa’s request for a comment. A circulating notice allegedly from Grab that threatened account deletion remained unverified and should not be treated as an established company policy.
The news report on Grab drivers from Luật Khoa does not establish that the monument spending caused any hardship for the drivers. It does, however, reveal a disparity in visible institutional engagement.
Officials are explaining a proposed landmark’s location, symbolism, and possible name. Grab bikers in the capital are asking who will explain wage deductions and defend their interests when their salaries fall short, and yet no state agency has intervened.
A development agenda earns public legitimacy through its response to those everyday concerns. Transparent fares, meaningful worker representation, and accessible channels for resolving disputes for the Grab bikers deserve sustained official attention alongside construction plans.
For drivers struggling to cover fuel, debt, and household expenses, national progress becomes credible when it improves the security of their working lives.
New Influencer Code Calls for Removing “Negative” Political Comments
Việt Nam has expanded state control over online speech by requiring influencers to moderate user comments on their social media pages, according to the new Operating Standards for Influencers and Content Creators issued by the Digital Trust Alliance (DTA) on September 7, Luật Khoa reported.
The Ministry of Public Security’s Department of Cybersecurity and High-Tech Crime Prevention backed the unveiling of the standards, which comprise five chapters and 19 articles.
The requirements appear in Section 8.4 of Article 8, which establishes two comment-moderation obligations. The first addresses legitimate concerns: influencers must moderate hate speech, harassment, and incitement to violence—though qualified by language noting influencers can only act “within the scope of their control and reasonable capabilities.”
The second requirement, however, contains no such qualifications. It mandates that influencers “proactively report” and delete comments that contain “negative” content about politics, religion, ethnicity, or issues “potentially affecting security and public order,” and “cooperate with competent authorities when requested.”
The vagueness is deliberate and troubling. The standards define neither “negative” nor distinguish between legitimate criticism and incitement. None of the 19 articles explain what constitutes a negative political comment, provide exceptions for public debate, or clarify where policy criticism ends and prohibited speech begins. This ambiguity effectively gives authorities and influencers discretion to suppress any political discussion deemed inconvenient.
This move extends a growing pattern of state censorship. On August 28—just ten days before the standards were introduced—Hà Nội police fined a Facebook group moderator 15 million đồng for failing to prevent false information posted by others in the group. The new standards simply expand this obligation from group moderators to all influencers with significant followings.
The DTA’s institutional structure reveals state control. Launched August 18, 2025, by the Ministry of Public Security’s cybersecurity department, the alliance now has approximately 138 formal members, including high-profile personalities like performer Xuân Bắc, rapper Đen Vâu, and singer Tùng Dương.
Membership spans four groups: influencers, businesses and digital platforms, news and media organizations, and government regulators. This creates a state-directed apparatus for policing online discourse.
The effort aligns with broader government strategy. In February 2026, Communist Party Secretariat permanent member Trần Cẩm Tú issued Plan No. 04 on cybersecurity, which called for strengthening oversight of online influencers through identity verification and “trustworthiness assessment.” The plan framed surveillance as promoting “public trust and responsibility online”—language masking state censorship as community benefit.
With over 1,132 influencers commanding audiences exceeding 1 million followers, plus thousands more with smaller but significant reach, the government has effectively conscripted digital opinion leaders into its propaganda apparatus.
By requiring influencers to censor political comments without clear definitions or protections, authorities have created a system where self-censorship becomes mandatory, and free political discourse becomes impossible.
Việt Nam Deepens Russian Energy Ties Amid South China Sea Tensions
Việt Nam and Russia signed a framework agreement Sept. 9 to cooperate on establishing a strategic oil reserve in Việt Nam, expanding energy ties during President Tô Lâm’s visit to Moscow, The Moscow Times reported.
The agreement followed talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Deputy Foreign Minister Lê Thị Thu Hằng said Hà Nội hoped for a breakthrough in cooperation on oil, gas, and nuclear power.
The report did not specify the reserve’s capacity, cost, or construction schedule. A framework agreement establishes a basis for cooperation; it does not mean the reserve is already operating.
Strategic oil reserves generally provide emergency supplies when disruptions threaten the continued availability of fuel.
Putin also said Russia was preparing to allow Vietnamese citizens to enter without visas but offered no timetable.
Tô Lâm’s three-day Moscow visit began Sept. 7 and included meetings with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and other senior officials. He previously visited in May 2025, when the countries signed a strategic partnership agreement.
Russia remains Việt Nam’s leading arms supplier and participates in nuclear power and offshore gas projects, including in South China Sea waters also claimed by China. Hà Nội has nevertheless been diversifying its weapons suppliers.
The Moscow agreement comes amid a diplomatic push linking economic ambitions with maritime security. The South China Morning Post reported that analysts viewed Tô Lâm’s visits to Russia and France as an effort to attract support for Việt Nam’s South China Sea claims and its goal of becoming a high-income economy by 2045.
Tô Lâm’s itinerary included meetings with Putin, followed by talks with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris and attendance at an international space summit.
Observers described the successive visits as an example of Việt Nam’s “bamboo “diplomacy”—maintaining relationships with competing powers while avoiding a firm alignment with any single nation.
Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Honolulu, told the Post that Tô Lâm would likely try to persuade Moscow and Paris to support Việt Nam’s position in maritime territorial disputes. Both governments officially remain neutral in the territorial disputes.
The outreach follows Vietnamese protests in late August over Chinese construction and land reclamation on Antelope Reef and Yagong Island, which Hà Nội calls Ba Ba. Those tensions provide the backdrop to the diplomatic effort; the reports do not establish that either partner has changed its position.
Forced-Labor Import Ban Raises Stakes for Global Supply Chains
Việt Nam has banned imports of goods produced wholly or partly through forced labor, introducing scrutiny of supply chains as Washington increases trade pressure over labor abuses.
The prohibition took effect Sept. 5, according to WWD (Women’s Wear Daily), which reported that the measure requires importers in high-risk sectors to document the origins of materials throughout their supply chains.
The Vietnamese government’s announcement identifies the measure as Decree 292/2026, issued July 22 under the Law on Foreign Trade Management. It prohibits products extracted, manufactured, or produced using forced labor, with reference to Việt Nam’s relevant international treaty commitments.
WWD reported that ministries, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, must publish lists of prohibited goods with Harmonized System codes, the numerical classifications used in international trade.
The requirements extend beyond identifying a shipment’s immediate supplier. According to the report, affected importers must upload bills of materials, certificates of origin, and verifiable records showing how goods move through the supply chain. Shipments can be seized, and companies face penalties for failing to trace inputs to their raw materials.
For businesses sourcing through Việt Nam, the implications reach beyond the factory assembling a finished product. Imported components and materials could become compliance liabilities if their production involved forced labor. That creates an incentive to examine suppliers further upstream and secure documentation before goods reach the border.
The policy follows U.S. investigations launched March 12 into 60 economies, including Việt Nam, over failures to prohibit or effectively prevent forced-labor imports.
On July 23, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced Section 301 tariffs after concluding that those failures burdened American commerce. Its decision assigned a 12.5% rate to economies outside specified lower-rate categories, including Việt Nam, subject to product exemptions.
The USTR’s framework distinguishes between governments that have adopted prohibitions, made qualifying commitments, or established partial restrictions and other investigated economies. The agency also emphasized enforcement, indicating that legislation alone does not resolve Washington’s concerns.
The distinction matters for companies weighing Việt Nam’s attractiveness as a sourcing destination: a domestic import ban and U.S. tariff treatment are separate measures, and adopting one does not automatically remove the other.
Detailed product lists, clear documentation standards, and consistent enforcement will shape how disruptive the transition becomes for importers. For workers, the more consequential question is whether tracing requirements help prevent coercion in production, rather than becoming another paperwork exercise for companies navigating trade.
Việt Nam Caught Between American Buyers and Chinese Suppliers
Việt Nam’s export boom is increasing its exposure to U.S. trade pressure, as a widening surplus and close manufacturing links with China complicate negotiations with Washington, according to a Lowy Institute analysis.
Việt Nam’s goods trade surplus with the United States reached $114 billion in the first half of 2026, exceeding Mexico’s $103 billion and China’s $74 billion. The Vietnamese figure approaches its $123 billion surplus for all of 2024.
Low wages, trade agreements, and access to Chinese suppliers have helped attract manufacturers seeking alternatives to production in China. But those same connections have fueled allegations that Việt Nam facilitates the rerouting of Chinese exports to avoid U.S. tariffs.
The Lowy Institute reported that U.S. customs officials inspected Chinese-owned factories in July. Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Văn Thắng visited Washington in late August to advance trade negotiations, which remain complicated by disagreements over transshipment and rules determining where products originate.
The diplomatic challenge extends beyond customs. The Lowy Institute argues that U.S. demands involving economic security could strain Việt Nam’s commitment to nonalignment and its careful relationship with Beijing.
Earlier research cited in the article challenges the idea that Vietnamese exports are predominantly disguised Chinese goods. Lowy economists Roland Rajah and Ahmed Albayrak estimated that Chinese content represented 28% of Việt Nam’s exports to America in 2022, up from 9% in 2018.
That still left more than 70% of export value originating in Việt Nam and other economies. Their analysis, based on Asian Development Bank data, also estimated that Vietnamese-produced value exported to the United States had increased more than 90% since 2018.
Those estimates describe production networks, rather than establishing whether particular shipments violated customs rules. The distinction matters: using imported components in manufacturing is not itself evidence of fraudulent relabeling or tariff evasion.
Washington’s stated priorities show how broadly the negotiations reach. An October 2025 U.S. Trade Representative fact sheet on the bilateral framework outlined cooperation on duty evasion, export controls, and investment security, as well as expanded access for American goods.
It also described Vietnamese commitments covering environmental enforcement, state-owned enterprises, and digital trade, while acknowledging that outstanding issues required further negotiation.
Together, the documents reveal a bargain extending well beyond tariff rates. For Hà Nội, preserving access to American buyers increasingly involves questions about how its factories source inputs, how trade rules are enforced, and what economic cooperation Washington expects in return from its partners.
Quick Takes:
Two Senior Officials Disciplined as Bribery Cases Extend Graft Crackdown
Việt Nam dismissed one deputy minister and suspended another following their arrests on allegations of bribery, Nikkei Asia reported Sept. 8.
Agriculture and Environment Deputy Minister Hoàng Trung was dismissed amid allegations involving certification for durian exports. Health Deputy Minister Trần Văn Thuấn was suspended on Sept. 6 after his arrest during an investigation into medical imports.
Police accused Thuấn of accepting substantial bribes during an expanding probe into Việt Mỹ Medical Investment.
The cases indicate that the country’s anticorruption campaign remains active despite receiving less public attention, Nikkei reported. The allegations remain subject to investigation and do not constitute criminal convictions.
China’s Paracel Expansion Could Extend Military Reach Toward Vietnamese Coast
China is expanding two artificial islands in the disputed Paracels, potentially strengthening surveillance and military operations near Việt Nam, RFI reported.
Satellite imagery shows a harbor, possible runway, and concrete structures at Antelope Reef and nearby Yagong Island. Analysts suspect the facilities could support a military base and radar installations, although their precise purposes remain unconfirmed.
Located roughly 400 kilometers from the Vietnamese coast, the sites could improve maritime monitoring and coastguard resupply.
Hà Nội has demanded construction stop, calling it illegal. Analysts say the expansion could also strengthen Beijing’s defensive perimeter and complicate U.S. naval access during a regional conflict.
Port Project Could Counter China’s Growing Influence in Cambodia
Việt Nam’s $4 billion Cà Mau–Hòn Khoai bridge and port project could preserve Hà Nội’s influence over Cambodia, according to the East Asia Forum.
Researcher Alex Bushnell argued that the development could counter the Chinese-backed Funan Techo Canal, designed to reduce Cambodia’s dependence on Vietnamese shipping routes.
The canal cannot accommodate large vessels, potentially leaving Cambodian cargo reliant on deep-water ports such as Hòn Khoai.
While presented as an economic boost for the Mekong Delta, the project could also reinforce Vietnamese leverage over Phnom Penh and help protect ASEAN consensus against Beijing’s influence, Bushnell wrote in his regional analysis.
Thailand’s New Deportation Rules Put Refugees at Risk, Rights Group Warns
Thailand’s new deportation regulations could expose refugees to persecution, torture, disappearance, or death, Fortify Rights warned on Sept. 7.
The rules, effective Aug. 28, accelerate the removal of foreigners deemed undesirable, including those without legal immigration status.
The group said the regulations lack mandatory screening for protection claims before deportation. They also allow only seven days for diplomatic requests seeking transfer to a third country.
Fortify Rights urged immediate revisions, arguing that requiring officials merely to consider international obligations provides inadequate protection. It called for enforceable safeguards against returning people to danger, consistent with Thailand’s domestic laws and international human rights commitments.
