Boxed In? Việt Nam Counters China’s Regional Reach With Quiet Diplomacy

Graphic: The Vietnamese Magazine.

Key Events

  • Hà Nội Needs to See Chinese Encirclement in the New Laos Air Facility.
  • Việt Nam Can Now Design Its Own Chips. Making Them Is The Hard Part.
  • Thailand’s SCG to Reopen Hormuz-Hit Việt Nam Plant on U.S. Ethane in 2027.
  • FPT Pitches AI to Japan as Clients Seek to Halve Costs and Staff.
  • Government Ranks Provinces on Pollution but Still Rewards Growth, Analyst Says.

China’s New Air Facility in Laos Nearly Closes the Circle Around Việt Nam, Commentary Warns

A Chinese-backed military training facility in Laos may look modest today, but for Việt Nam it nearly completes a ring of potential Chinese military pressure, according to a commentary published in the South China Morning Post on Nov. 14.

China and Laos jointly announced the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy in Ban Keun on Sept. 29. Construction began in late 2025, officially to train Lao pilots, but neither government said anything publicly until China’s defense ministry announced the launch ceremony, which Lao Defense Minister Gen. Khamlieng Outhakaysone attended. The project’s duration, cost, and staffing remain undisclosed. Reuters reported on Sept. 30, based on satellite imagery, that the facility was built up over the preceding year.

Analysts agree the facility matters most for Việt Nam and, to a lesser degree, Thailand. Bangkok has said it has no immediate concerns and will monitor the site. Hà Nội’s Foreign Ministry said on Nov. 5 that it hoped its neighbor would develop in “peace, independence, and self-reliance.” 

Việt Nam has quietly been strengthening its political and defense ties with Laos and Cambodia to secure its western flank.

Satellite imagery shows a runway of about 2,000 meters, a modest apron, and eight K-8 jet trainers. Security expert Olli Pekka Suorsa has noted in The Diplomat that this infrastructure suits training rather than power projection. But the commentary calls that “a snapshot, not a trajectory.” Construction continues, and the runway could be extended by up to 1,000 meters, long enough for larger aircraft, including bombers.

Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base offers a precedent. After China funded upgrades there, Chinese corvettes berthed at the base for months beginning in December 2023, even as Phnom Penh insisted the deployment was not permanent.

The main risk to Việt Nam lies in peacetime rather than war. Chinese combat aircraft can already reach all of Việt Nam from bases inside China. In peacetime, however, access and operating permissions matter more. With Vientiane’s consent, Ban Keun could eventually host sustained Chinese aviation activity, as well as radar, drones, and intelligence-gathering aircraft that could monitor military activity along Việt Nam’s western edges and in Thailand.

Seen from Hà Nội, the Ban Keun facility “nearly closes the circle of potential military pressure.” Việt Nam already faces China’s military to the north, the disputed Hoàng Sa (Paracel) Islands to the east, and the Trường Sa (Spratly) Islands to the southeast, along with Chinese coast guard, survey, and maritime militia activity in Việt Nam’s maritime exclusive economic zone. Ream and now Ban Keun add pressure from the southwest and the west.

Beijing’s approach is similar to weiqi, or Go, a game of gradually surrounding an opponent until it has no room to move. While China pressures the Philippines openly, it appears to be constraining Việt Nam, its weaker, nonaligned neighbor and an ideological and trading partner, through long-term encirclement combined with economic dominance.

Beijing plays this game patiently. In the South China Sea, it said that the artificial islands were mainly for civilian use, but they were later fitted with hangars and missiles. The Ban Keun base, the commentary warns, could follow a similar path.

Hà Nội Bets on Homegrown Chips as Military-Backed Viettel Unveils First Domestic Security Chip

Việt Nam is courting foreign help to build a semiconductor industry while trying to create something it has never had: a domestic chip supply chain stretching from design to fabrication, Nikkei Asia reported on Nov. 13.

In Tokyo on Nov. 9, President Tô Lâm and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi witnessed the exchange of documents on cooperation in semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Japan pledged next-generation official development assistance in both areas and support for training 250 Vietnamese doctoral-level semiconductor specialists. 

The two countries also agreed to fund 11 semiconductor research projects worth nearly 500 billion đồng ($19.5 million), covering low-power AI chips, next-generation electronic components, and new semiconductor materials.

At home, the most prominent push comes from Viettel, the military-backed telecommunications group tasked with developing strategic technologies. Last week, Viettel and the Government Cipher Committee unveiled VGC v1.0, the country’s first domestically designed security chip. It came with a platform that includes a processor, cryptographic blocks, supporting software, and standardized testing procedures.

Viettel told Nikkei Asia that the platform lets its engineers design and adapt future chips without “starting from scratch,” calling it “the tangible value of self-reliance in chip design.” The company said the work would lay the groundwork for chips used in AI, 6G networks, smart cameras, the Internet of Things, drones, and robots, gradually reducing Việt Nam’s reliance on imported chips in key sectors.

But Việt Nam still cannot manufacture the chips it designs. Viettel began building the country’s first semiconductor fabrication plant in Hà Nội in January and is targeting trial production by the end of 2027. The company acknowledged that the lack of a domestic fab made VGC v1.0 harder to develop. “With no suitable fabrication facility available in Vietnam, each prototype fabrication run was complex and costly,” it said.

The government’s targets are ambitious. By 2030, it wants at least 100 chip design companies, one small-scale fabrication plant, and 10 assembly, packaging, and testing plants, with industry revenue reaching $25 billion. The drive supports Hà Nội’s goal of becoming a developed, high-income country by 2045, as it races to move beyond an economy built on low-cost labor before its rapidly aging population shrinks the workforce.

Roger Sheng, a Shanghai-based analyst at Gartner, the world’s largest technological research and consulting firm, said Việt Nam appears to be following the path China has taken over the past 25 years on chip production. The new chip “shows the strong ambition of Vietnam to build its sovereign semiconductor industry,” he said, adding that government backing could attract more global companies seeking to manufacture outside China.

But Sheng cautioned that building a local chip supply chain presents “a very high barrier” to entry and will require huge investment over at least a decade. “It is a good start,” he said. Success, he added, will depend on consistent state investment and sustained participation from industry.

That the first homegrown chip came from a military-backed conglomerate and the government’s cryptography agency also signals how Hà Nội sees semiconductors: as a matter of national security, not just economic growth.

SCG to Reopen Its Hormuz-Hit Petrochemical Plant in Việt Nam in Mid-2027, Switching to U.S. Ethane

Thailand’s Siam Cement Group (SCG) plans to reopen Long Son Petrochemicals (LSP), its core plastics plant in Việt Nam, in mid-2027 after suspending it when the Strait of Hormuz closed, CEO Thammasak Sethaudom told Nikkei Asia in an interview published Nov. 11. He spoke on the sidelines of a Fortune summit in Hồ Chí Minh City.

SCG announced the pause in April after it struggled to obtain naphtha, the key oil-derived material used to make plastics. The complex sits in Vũng Tàu, a former beach town known for its oil industry that is now part of Hồ Chí Minh City. 

LSP is Việt Nam’s first fully integrated petrochemical complex, a roughly $5 billion investment that began full commercial operations on Sept. 30, 2024, with an annual capacity of about 950,000 tons of ethylene and 400,000 tons of propylene, according to TNGlobal.

Thammasak said SCG had originally planned to reopen the plant “by now.” Instead, it is using the downtime to speed up the plant’s conversion from naphtha to cheaper ethane imported from the United States, finishing the upgrade six months ahead of its original schedule. “We see that saving six months next year is far better than keep running a few months this year,” he said. “That’s the economics of it.”

Even before the Middle East crisis, SCG was building ethane tanks at the site to compete with Chinese plastics and other goods flooding Southeast Asia. The company says ethane is about 40% cheaper than naphtha, and Thammasak said it also brings “lower security risk” and lower emissions.

The U.S.-Iran war also forced SCG to halt some chemical operations in Thailand and declare force majeure. “When Hormuz closed, and then we announced we have to shut down half of our complex, governments in Thailand, and around the world … called us and said, ‘Don’t cut the supply of plastic to them because it will impact their industry,’” Thammasak said.

Before the Iran war, SCG sourced 50% of its feedstock, such as naphtha and propane, from the Middle East. It now aims to push that share down to below 25%. “No one will trust Hormuz anymore,” the CEO said.

Separately, SCG announced a deal in late October with Thailand’s state oil group PTT to form a plastics joint venture, which Thammasak said will add $200 million a year to SCG’s net profit. SCG has told the Vietnamese media that the venture covers assets in Thailand and does not include LSP.

For Việt Nam, the delay shows how far the U.S.-Iran war reaches: a closed shipping chokepoint in the Gulf will have idled one of the country’s largest foreign-invested industrial plants for more than a year.

FPT Says Japanese Clients Want AI to Halve Costs, Time, and Staff as Its Japan Revenue Slips

Demand for AI adoption among corporate clients is growing in Japan, Chu Thị Thanh Hà, chairperson of FPT Software, told the Global Management Dialogue in Tokyo on Nov. 10, Nikkei Asia reported. Nikkei and Swiss business school IMD organize the annual forum.

Hà said FPT often receives requests from Japanese clients to use AI to achieve a “triple half”: half the cost, half the time to market, and half the human resources.

She said Japanese companies have “great potential for physical AI adoption” because of their long-held advantage in manufacturing and robotics. In July, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced a government push to develop physical AI, systems that combine AI models with robotics. Speaking at the same forum, Shota Imai, a professor at the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, warned that Japan’s high-quality manufacturing data may not be enough to outcompete the United States and China.

Hà also tied demand to geopolitics. “When geopolitical risk increases, many Japanese companies want to bring jobs back to Japan or diversify to the safer area,” she said, adding that AI can help clients restructure information, bring operations back home, and run them more efficiently.

FPT Software was founded in 1999 as a subsidiary of FPT Corp., Việt Nam’s biggest tech company, and grew rapidly by offering systems development built on low labor costs. It set up its Japanese subsidiary in 2005. Japan is now FPT’s largest overseas market: 

FPT Software has about 5,000 employees across 18 offices and research centers in the country, serving more than 450 customers, VnExpress reported in July. At an FPT summit that month, FPT Software CEO Phạm Minh Tuấn cited estimates that Japan could be short 800,000 IT professionals by 2030.

The optimism comes as the numbers soften. In the third quarter, FPT’s Japan revenue fell 10.1% from the previous quarter, according to brokerage HSC data cited by Bloomberg Businessweek Vietnam. Growth in overseas IT services revenue slowed to 8.2% year on year, down from 16.3% in the second quarter. About 300 billion đồng in revenue was pushed into October and November after pricing talks with suppliers delayed some integration projects.

FPT’s AI and data analytics revenue still rose 55% to 2.915 trillion đồng in the first nine months of the year. On Nov. 10, the day Hà spoke, FPT shares closed at 50,900 đồng, their lowest level since November 2023.

It marks a turn for FPT: a company that grew by supplying low-cost Vietnamese engineers now promises Japanese clients they will need half the staff.

Government Scores Its Provinces on the Environment, but Growth Still Wins, Analyst Argues

Việt Nam has environmental laws and a way to score provinces on them, but those scores rarely shape the decisions that drive local development, Đỗ Nam Thắng, a fellow at the Australian National University’s Crawford School of Public Policy, argued in Fulcrum on Nov. 10. “The harder problem,” he wrote, “is making environmental performance count.”

Việt Nam adopted its first Law on Environmental Protection in 1993 and has assessed provincial environmental performance since 2019, most recently through the Provincial Environmental Protection Index (PEPI). Yet provinces face far stronger pressure to deliver growth and investment. 

For 2026, the government set growth targets of 13% to 13.5% for Hải Phòng and 10% for Đồng Nai. It is unclear how much PEPI results count when officials are evaluated. Limited enforcement resources, overlapping responsibilities, and weak coordination tilt priorities further toward growth.

The cost is high. Citing the World Bank, Thắng wrote that air pollution causes about 71,000 premature deaths a year in Việt Nam, costing $13.3 billion, or 3.9% of 2020 GDP. Broader environmental degradation is estimated at 6.9% of GDP, or 10.3% when wider welfare losses are included.

He pointed to the Biên Hòa 1 Industrial Park in Đồng Nai as an example. Founded in 1963, it became a pollution concern because of aging infrastructure and inadequate wastewater treatment. Its relocation was proposed more than two decades ago, but the plan has only moved forward recently.

Two reforms this year could change the incentives. Decision 1248/QĐ-TTg, issued July 9, adds 11 environmental indicators to the criteria for industrialization, alongside economic and social measures. The Communist Party’s Conclusion 75, also issued in July, links environmental protection to the quality of development and calls for at least 2% of the annual state budget to be spent on it.

So far, accountability has mostly followed disasters. Officials were disciplined in 2017 over the 2016 Formosa pollution disaster, which devastated fisheries along the central coast. Thắng argues that punishing failure after the fact is not the same as routinely rewarding good performance and that recent reforms to how officials are evaluated could tie environmental goals to their careers.

He recommends that environmental indicators feed into provincial assessments, investment approvals, and resource allocation. These assessments should rely on verified data, judge provinces on outcomes they can actually influence, support coordination across provincial borders, and allow time for improvements to show.

The real test of the 2026 reforms, he wrote, is whether they change the incentives behind environmental harm, not just measure it.

Quick Takes:

Japan Turns to Việt Nam for Critical Minerals, but Replacing China Is ‘Unrealistic.’

During Tô Lâm’s visit to Tokyo, the two countries agreed in their Nov. 9 Joint Vision Statement to “look into the possibility” of joint projects in critical minerals, the South China Morning Post reported. Việt Nam holds about 3.5 million metric tons of rare earth reserves, but its output remains low for technological reasons. Japan needs alternatives. Amid tensions over Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan, Beijing has cut some rare earth and gallium exports to Japan to “near zero” this year. China mines about 60% of the world’s rare earths and processes 90%. Akira Igata, a lecturer at the University of Tokyo, called replacing China in the short term “unrealistic.”

U.S. Extends Intellectual Property Probe Into Việt Nam to Feb. 28

The U.S. Trade Representative has extended its investigation into Việt Nam’s intellectual property protections by three months to Feb. 28, citing “complex or complicated issues that require additional time,” Reuters reported on Nov. 10. The probe was launched in May over Việt Nam’s alleged “persistent failure” to resolve long-standing IP concerns, and it could lead to new tariffs. Washington has named Việt Nam a “priority foreign country,” marking the first addition to its most serious IP watchlist category in 13 years. Vietnamese exports already face 12.5% U.S. tariffs over forced labor concerns, and talks on a trade deal have run for more than a year.

Ex-U.S. Ambassador Says Few of Việt Nam’s Exports Are Illegally Transshipped

Only a “very small percentage” of Việt Nam’s exports to the United States are illegally transshipped, former U.S. Ambassador Marc Knapper said on Nov. 3 at the Fortune Southeast Asia 500 Summit in Hồ Chí Minh City, Fortune reported. Knapper, who served in Hà Nội from 2022 to 2026, said Việt Nam has been “cracking down pretty hard” on exporters who falsely label Chinese goods as Vietnamese. But he warned that “some have falsely labeled normal supply chain activities as transshipment.” Việt Nam’s goods trade surplus with the U.S. reached $140 billion in the first 10 months of 2026, despite U.S. tariffs.

Japan’s Sojitz Takes Stake in Vietnamese Tungsten Producer to Cut Reliance on China

Japanese trading house Sojitz will take a 5% stake in Masan High-Tech Materials, a Vietnamese tungsten producer, as it seeks supply outside China, which controls roughly 80% of global production, Nikkei Asia reported on Nov. 10. Masan Group announced a memorandum of understanding on Nov. 6, with a final agreement expected by year-end. Tungsten is used in ultrahard cutting tools and semiconductors. Masan High-Tech, which mines and refines the metal in northern Việt Nam, has drawn interest from Japan, the U.S., South Korea, and Europe. U.S. firm Elmet bought about 5% in October, in a deal valuing the company at roughly $2.5 billion.

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