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Today, we conclude the series “Zone of Dissent: Spaces for Criticism in China from the 1980s to Now,” focusing on online dissent in China. Although among our four previous articles, online dissent overlaps all the issues we discussed. We aim to provide our readers - whether Vietnamese or scholars of Vietnam's politics and human rights - an overview of this unique virtual landscape in China, from the Great Firewall to strategies of dissent unfolding under this surveillance grid.

This last focus will provide an update on one of the remaining channels for expressing criticism in the contemporary People's Republic of China. As the Vietnamese Communist Party seems to be following in the footsteps of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regarding authoritarianism, surveillance, and censorship, this article aims to shed light on online creativeness and the remaining forms of dissent netizen use under an authoritarian apparatus.

A Short Story of Online Dissent in China From the emergence of a free and accessible internet in the early 2000s to increasingly tight control pressuring online activities, the internet in China has experienced several major setbacks.

As mentioned in a previous article, the 2000s in China aligned with a liberal momentum, where access to information and advocacy addressing public problems peaked in the country.[1] The Chinese virtual landscape at that time was characterized by vibrant activity, with netizens seeking more transparency and accountability from political leaders. Massive online mobilization was possible then in reaction to corruption, governance issues, and scandals related to pollution.

Gradually realizing the power of the internet as a potential space for online convergence, discussions, and mobilization, the CCP quickly reacted with increased online scrutiny. From the early 2000s, the Great Firewall reshaped the internet landscape of China, dividing netizens into those inside the wall (墙内 - qiángnèi) and those outside the wall (墙外 - qiángwài).

This division created the Chinese intranet we know today. This turning point was followed by a gradual ban on foreign operating systems, browsers, websites, and apps, which were replaced by local versions. This new local online ecosystem aligned with the changing political climate following Xi Jinping's rise to power.

Online dissent has also progressively reshaped its dimensions, from mass online campaigns to micro-mobilization built around individual commitments and new and discreet ways to express dissent. Once again, this evolution followed the social changes of the last few decades in China, particularly relating to the rise of authoritarianism and the shrinking of civic space.

Online discussions, mobilizations, and dissent nowadays unfold according to new rules imposed by rampant surveillance and active monitoring of online activities. This evolution has forced individuals to reduce the scale and scope of their online commitments. However, this shrinking of online public space does not mean that the CCP's attempts to hinder dissent are always successful. Indeed, even as voices are subdued, dissent remains pervasive in China, with individuals designing new strategies under the scrutiny of the Great Firewall.

Online dissent voices have adapted. Constrained to operate on a more individualistic level due to the regime's paranoia about gatherings outside its supervision and control, online dissent has adapted. Since the end of the 2010s, online dissent has relied more and more on individual reactions coming together to address public problems and social events.

Emotions drive these converging, unpredictable, and unsynchronized reactions in response to injustices, shocking events, and unbearable situations. These reactions can highlight public issues to a large audience through personal online statements, videos, and hashtags.

Faced with the many affected people online and widespread support, the authorities are sometimes caught off guard and compelled to react before censorship can take effect. Online users share concerns and suffering, often using social media as a form of “group therapy.”

Examples such as the collective suffering during the “Zero Covid policy” and collective mobilizations like the White Paper Movement in November 2022 illustrate how online and offline dissent in China can still push the party to respond to situations, with the CCP lifting these unpopular restrictions.

Online Dissent, Online Strategies, Online Activism Online dissent, strategies, and activism have existed in China since the advent of the digital realm. From mass online reactions to scandals to viral microblogging on Weibo, the ways of dissenting online have evolved to the present day.

Today, some international NGOs and numerous online sources focus on dissent in China and report on activism. While around two-thirds of dissent addresses workers' rights or property owner/buyer issues primarily offline, many others tackle various concerns online.

Netizens are cautious not to cross the red lines of contention, so this dissent often targets local governments rather than directly confronting the central authorities. Due to monitoring, censorship, and repression of activities, online dissent today appears multifaceted, multi-oriented, and decentralized. Expressing public dissent online must consider these factors and find strategic ways to be articulate.

Firstly, isolated dissenting individuals can employ a constantly updated strategy based on written Chinese's monosyllabic and tonal specificity. This characteristic opens the door to many homonymous terms, allowing for hidden references to sensitive issues.

For example, during the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, some internet users expressed their concern about the situation by posting 乌心工作 (wūxīn gōngzuò, which sounds like 无心工作 wúxīn gōngzuò, meaning 'not in the mood to work'). The first character was substituted with the first character of Ukraine to show support for the Ukrainian people and express a desire to speak out on this subject.

This semantic ambiguity is also utilized on the Chinese internet through strategic word choices that are difficult to monitor and censor. For instance, Xi Jinping's name is often called 'the Beijing man'. While it's widely understood who 'the Beijing man' refers to, it remains challenging for the Great Firewall to erase all references to 'Beijing' or 'man.'

References to the Chinese president are sometimes made without directly alluding to or stating his name. The deaths of two former Japanese prime ministers in 2022 and the Iranian president in 2024 were followed by online reactions commenting: 可惜不是你 (kěxī bùshì nǐ - too bad it's not you).

Online dissent in contemporary China often employs dark humor, mockery, and satire. This characteristic appears to respond to the authoritarian context where channels of expression are monitored and censored.

Another strategic way to dissent is to transform protest into a non-protest form. Young people in online culture develop a 'hidden transcript' to critique dominant CCP discourses and mandates.[2]

When the president urges Chinese youth to work harder and “eat bitterness”() to promote nationalistic goals, internet culture responds with practices like lying flat (躺平 - tǎngpíng) and letting things rot (摆烂 - bǎilàn).

Online reactions to social phenomena, political discourse, and public issues continue to emerge in China. Despite the increasing difficulty in finding spaces for expression, isolated individuals in China still manage to get access to information that fuels their participation in online dissent.

Tracing Online Dissent Access to online resources for dissent and information remains feasible from one side to the other of the Great Firewall. Outside China, members of the diaspora, media outlets, and NGOs provide valuable coverage of what is happening in China regarding online dissent.

Individuals within China who often describe themselves as “atomized individuals” or “isolated islands” can access these resources. Using a VPN to circumvent the Great Firewall, they can obtain information, resources, and alternative narratives from what is accessible within their country.

Some activists in China even utilize methods to relay information across the firewall to publicize events in the country. Since the COVID-19 outbreak, we have observed Twitter accounts sharing videos and content from people based in China.

Within the Great Firewall, online dissent often emerges in unpredictable ways. Discussions and groups appear in unexpected virtual locations such as Q&A sections of online events, FAQs on websites, and forums on platforms like Douban and Zhihu.

Constrained to seek safer spaces, dissent in China is scattered and can be found in unconventional places. Artwork and online artistic productions frequently incorporate discreet dissenting messages and dissonant voices. Through these channels, isolated individuals can discover cultural productions that resonate with their feelings and experiences in contemporary China. They realize they are not alone in sharing dissenting views and emotions and sometimes connect with like-minded individuals.

References: Truong, O. (2024, June 26). Navigating China's Social History of Critics Under State Control . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2024/06/navigating-chinas-social-history-of-critics-under-state-control/ Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts on JSTOR. (1990). www.jstor.org . https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1np6zz