Become a Member for $9.99/month

This article is the final installment of a special series on anti-corruption in Asia. It is based on research published in 2019 by scholars Edmund Malesky and Ngọc Phan of Duke University, using data available up to 2018. Trần Bình Thản wrote this in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 10, 2025.

Corruption in Việt Nam is a topic often described as something "we know, it's painful, and we talk about it endlessly," yet it must still be discussed.

For decades, anti-corruption movements have been largely superficial, failing to reform the systemic factors that nurture corruption. The implementation of these movements has often depended on the personal will of the leadership. The programs appear robust on paper, but their execution is largely ineffective.

Poor Global Rankings Most global indices show Việt Nam ranking very poorly on corruption, placing 109th out of 144 countries according to the World Economic Forum (WEF) and 113th out of 176 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

Simultaneously, Việt Nam also performs ineffectively on indices that measure factors contributing to corruption. According to the 2017 WEF report, the country ranked 101st out of 144 nations on the Burden of Government Regulation index—lower than Nigeria and Timor-Leste, while China ranked 19th. In terms of favoritism in the decisions of government officials, Việt Nam stood at 116th, behind Zimbabwe and Bangladesh, while China was 33rd.

Systemic corruption in Việt Nam typically involves several main types: “lubrication money” (tiền bôi trơn) to expedite processes, the illegal privatization of public assets, and the selling of positions and power.

Although high-level leaders speak frequently about fighting corruption, in reality, few institutional changes have been made to prevent it. According to analysts, cases brought to light are often motivated by desires for personal gain, rather than loyalty to the Party or the goal of strengthening institutions. Once a case is resolved, officials make no effort to build mechanisms to prevent future corruption. Instead, they sometimes issue more regulations to limit public access to information—a critical element in detecting corruption.

Ineffective Policies In public forums, anti-corruption has been a central theme since the mid-1990s. Việt Nam has issued numerous documents and laws and has arrested several high-ranking officials.

Documents such as Decision 240/HĐBT (1990) and the Prime Minister's Decision 114/TTg (1992) addressed the dangers of smuggling and corruption, which were spreading widely. These were followed by the Anti-Corruption Directive in 1998, an amended directive in 2003, the Law on Practicing Thrift and Combating Wastefulness in 2005, and the Law on Anti-Corruption in 2005.

On the Party side, a 2009 resolution by the Central Committee addressed the issue of corruption. In the same year, Việt Nam ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

During the campaign to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 2001 to 2007, Việt Nam also developed several anti-corruption legal frameworks. The most significant was the 2005 Anti-Corruption Law, which criminalized certain corrupt acts, mandated asset declarations for state officials, and offered protection for whistleblowers. In the same year, Việt Nam passed the Law on Bidding, a crucial milestone as the bidding process is considered one of the most vulnerable areas for corruption.

A Potential Turning Point: 2017-2018 At least until 2016, the timing and nature of anti-corruption cases were heavily colored by internal power struggles among top officials. Research indicates that the Communist Party launched corruption investigations strategically when localities and ministries were selecting delegates for the Party congress. Following the congress, there was a sharp decline in such investigations. In essence, corruption probes were often a means to eliminate competition among factions before the congress.

Before 2017, prominent cases like the Tamexco case (1996), the Năm Cam case (2003), PMU 18 (2006), and the Vinashin and Vinalines scandals (2011-2012) were never investigated systematically. They often originated from incidental causes such as gambling or mismanagement. Consequently, the official response was reactive, focusing only on specific allegations without any broader follow-up investigations.

The anti-corruption drive from 2017–2018, seen in the cases involving PetroVietnam, OceanBank, and the PetroVietnam Construction Joint Stock Corporation, may signal a change. Regarding timing, these cases differed from previous ones by occurring early in the new leadership's term, rather than right before a Party congress.

Furthermore, this anti-corruption wave showed another difference: it did not just target a few leaders but was also accompanied by new policies and regulations aimed at encouraging supervision and increasing transparency. Of course, these are only preliminary signs, and one should be cautious in assessing the true significance of these new regulations.

Conclusion Overall, although Việt Nam has enacted many anti-corruption laws, they have done little to improve the situation over the years. Corruption remains rampant because these laws are weak, face numerous contradictions and obstacles in enforcement, lack transparency, and have no effective mechanism to protect whistleblowers.

Beyond enforcement issues, there are two fundamental reasons why these on-paper efforts rarely yield substantial results.

First, Việt Nam does not touch the core nature of corruption itself. Appointing officials to high-level government positions often requires a large sum of money, potentially millions of dollars. Once a person has "run" for and secured such a position, they have no incentive to change the very corrupt mechanism that elevated them. In fact, they are motivated to pressure their subordinates into corruption and bribery to recoup their initial investment.

Second, unlike countries that have succeeded in reducing corruption, Việt Nam has never invested sufficient resources to comprehensively audit and investigate such misconduct within an entire ministry, agency, or sector. There have been very few significant efforts to build sustainable mechanisms to mitigate it.