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For voters in the Mekong Delta deeply concerned about livelihood-threatening issues such as rising sea levels, saltwater intrusion, and riverbank erosion, an important question arises. If members of Việt Nam’s National Assembly were chosen through a free, competitive, and fair election, how could a ballot be utilized to create the greatest possible impact?

The answer ultimately depends on how the “rules of the game” are designed to translate the ballots of voters into seats in the National Assembly.

These rules determine whether votes are cast for individual candidates or political parties, whether each electoral district has single or multiple representatives, and how multiple seats are mathematically allocated.

Differences in institutional design can produce entirely different political outcomes, even when the preferences of voters remain unchanged.

When Most Votes Fail

The simplest electoral rule allocates a single seat to each district, where the candidate who receives the most votes wins. This principle of majority representation is commonly known as “First Past The Post” (FPTP). [1]

As discussed in a previous article , elections to the United Kingdom’s House of Commons demonstrate that FPTP inherently favors large parties. [2] Since each district yields only one winner, voters often select candidates from major, well-known parties to avoid “wasting” their ballots.

Consequently, smaller parties frequently lose out under this system, regardless of whether they possess significant nationwide support. Because of this, FPTP is frequently criticized for weak representativeness and its tendency to produce a two-party parliament that fails to fully reflect the diverse political will of the electorate.

The Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

To address these shortcomings, a proposed solution is for Việt Nam’s National Assembly to adopt a “hybrid” electoral system that combines First Past The Post and proportional representation (PR). [3]

Under this model, known as the Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) system, each method would elect exactly half of the total number of deputies. The system functions by having its majoritarian and proportional components operate entirely independently, without adjusting or compensating for one another. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico currently use the MMM system.

Proposed Structure of the National Assembly

My personal proposal outlines a 450-seat National Assembly serving a four- or five-year term, with the seats divided evenly into two categories.

The first category consists of 225 direct seats, which would be elected from single-member districts utilizing the First Past The Post method. The second category comprises 225 proportional seats, elected from 11 larger regions. Each of these regions would encompass one or more provinces or centrally governed cities to correspond with the major geographic and administrative areas of the country.

This specific arrangement ensures that the number of proportional seats per region remains moderate. Consequently, it limits the risk of excessive party fragmentation, which frequently occurs when too many seats are allocated within a single electoral district. [4]

When looking at countries with populations comparable to Việt Nam that utilize mixed electoral systems for their lower houses, similar divisions exist. Germany organizes its proportional component based on 16 Länder, Japan divides the country into 11 large regions, and Mexico divides the country into five electoral regions. [5]

Following these international examples, Việt Nam could similarly be divided into 11 proportional regions. Seats would be allocated according to population size while strictly following the 50 percent direct and 50 percent proportional rule, as demonstrated in the table below: [6]

Region Estimated Population (unit: million people) Direct seats Proportional seats Total seats 1 Northeastern 8.3 18 18 36 2 Northwestern 5.0 11 11 22 3 Red River Delta 15.3 34 34 68 4 Northern Central 10.1 23 23 46 5 South Central Coast 10.8 24 24 48 6 Central Highlands 6.2 14 14 28 7 Southeastern 5.6 13 13 26 8 Mekong Delta 12.4 28 28 56 9 Hà Nội 5.1 11 11 22 10 Hồ Chí Minh City 8.7 19 19 38 11 Total 13.6 30 30 60 Total 101.1 225 225 450 The allocation of 225 direct and 225 proportional seats to each region is based on estimated population size. The table was compiled with assistance from Grok and ChatGPT.

Two Forms of Representation

On election day, each voter would receive two separate ballots.

The first ballot, functioning as a candidate list, allows the voter to select a single candidate to directly represent their specific electoral district. Under the majority rule, the candidate who secures the most votes wins the seat.

The second ballot, functioning as a party list, allows the voter to select a preferred political party. Based on the total accumulation of these votes, parties would then be allocated seats in direct proportion to their overall level of support within each region.

Hypothetical examples of these two ballots are provided below.

Note: The following ballots are entirely fictional and were created solely for the academic discussion of a hypothetical electoral model in Việt Nam. Any names of individuals or parties appearing in these examples do not represent any real-life person or organization.

VOTES FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE YEAR 20XX Constituency No. 1 – Area/Region: Hà Nội FIRST FORM List of candidates This ballot is used to elect ONE (01) delegate representing electoral unit number 1 in the National Assembly. Voters may only select ONE (1) candidate by marking (X) in the box next to the name of the candidate they choose. 1 Tô Lâm New Era Party 2 Phan Văn Giang Communist Party of Việt Nam 3 Nguyễn Thị Bình Labor Party of Việt Nam 4 Trương Huỳnh Duy Thức Social Party of Việt Nam 5 Nguyễn Văn Đài Democratic Brothers and Sisters Party 6 Phan Nhật Vượng Patriotic Tycoon Party 7 Nguyễn Quang A Progressive Alliance of Việt Nam 8 Trương Mỹ Hoa Progressive Women’s Party 9 Lệ Phương Hằng Independent/Non-Partisan

For the second ballot, each political party publishes a fixed, predetermined roster of candidates, known as a closed list.

This transparency allows voters to know precisely who will become National Assembly deputies if the party wins proportional seats. Within these closed lists, party leadership strategically reserves the top positions for senior figures, party leaders, and individuals with significant contributions. Simultaneously, candidates possessing social prestige, notable achievements, or strong regional backing are frequently placed higher on the list to maximize overall electoral appeal and optimize seat gains.

VOTES FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE YEAR 20YY Constituency No. 1 – Area/Region: Hà Nội SECOND FORM List of parties This ballot is used to elect political parties in the form of proportional representation in the Hà Nội area. Each voter selects ONE (1) party by marking (X) in the box next to the party name of his or her choice. New Era Party Lương Tam Quang, Nguyễn Duy Ngọc, Tô Ân Xô, Mai Hoàng, Tô Long Communist Party of Việt Nam Nguyễn Tân Cương, Nguyễn Trọng Nghĩa, Trịnh Văn Quyết, Nguyễn Thị Doan, Nguyễn Anh Tú Labor Party of Việt Nam Đặng Xuân Khu, Nguyễn Sĩ Dũng, Phạm Chi Lan, Phạm Quế Dương, Nguyễn Trung Thành Social Party of Việt Nam Nguyễn Xiển, Trần Xuân Bách, Phan Chí Dũng, Ngô Bắc Truyển, Hoàng Tụy Democratic Brothers and Sisters Party Trần Độ, Nguyễn Huy Thiệp, Nguyễn Bảo Ninh, Lại Thị Công Nhân, Trần Châu Hữu Danh Green Việt Nam Party Hà Thị Minh Hồng, Ngụy Như Khanh, Nguyễn Đình Bách, Nguyễn Ngọc Tư, Nguyễn Thị Tố Nhiên Patriotic Tycoon Party Phạm Thị Phương Thảo, La Viết Lam, Nghiêm Thanh Phượng, Trịnh Đình Long, Dương Gia Bình Democratic Youth Party Lê Hữu Minh Tuấn, Tạ Thu Thâu, Nguyễn Tiến Trung, Mai Thảo Linh, Nguyễn Minh Triết Progressive Alliance of Việt Nam Nguyễn Cơ Thạch, Nguyễn Lân Thắng, Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, Ngô Ngọc Như Quỳnh, Nhượng Tống Progressive Women’s Party Sương Nguyệt Anh, Bành Trân Phượng, Vũ Nguyễn Mai Khôi, Phương Thu Hương, Trần Cẩm Tú

Illustration of the National Assembly vote in electoral constituency 1, area/region of Hà Nội. Each voter has two votes: The first vote is used to choose a candidate to represent electoral unit number 1; the second vote is used to choose the party, accompanied by a list of the party's five most prominent candidates in Hà Nội.

Campaign Strategy

Consider a hypothetical Labor Party of Việt Nam, led by politician Nguyễn Thị Bình.

Bình has the option to run for a direct seat on the first ballot in any of the 225 electoral districts nationwide. Given her residence in Hà Nội and her local advantage, she and her party decide she will contest electoral district No. 1 within the Hà Nội region. Running for a direct seat gives party leaders a valuable opportunity to demonstrate their personal competence and direct voter appeal.

Alternatively, if the Labor Party is a smaller organization that is unlikely to secure a direct seat, Bình could choose to run via the second ballot on the party list. As the leader of the party, she would likely secure a position near the top of this list, which would significantly increase her chances of being elected.

Furthermore, she could combine both approaches. By contesting a direct seat, she can test her personal electoral appeal while simultaneously utilizing a high placement on the party list as a strategic “safety net.”

How are Seats Allocated?

The allocation of seats follows a systematic, three-step process:

Step 1 : Announce winners of direct seats.

First, the 225 candidates who secure victory in their single-member direct seats are officially announced.

Step 2 : Allocate proportional seats in each region.

Next, the total number of seats a party receives within a specific region is determined by the percentage of second-ballot votes it obtains there. For example, if a region has 10 proportional seats and Party A wins 20 percent of the second-ballot vote, that party would be awarded two seats in that region. Consequently, the top two candidates on the regional list of Party A would be elected as National Assembly deputies. [7]

Step 3 : Calculate total seats nationwide.

After the direct-seat winners are announced and the proportional seats are allocated across all regions, the total number of seats for each party nationwide is finalized. Suppose the aggregated results across all 11 regions are as follows:

Labor Party of Việt Nam: 150 seats

Progressive Alliance of Việt Nam: 130 seats

Progressive Women’s Party: 100 seats

Social Party of Việt Nam: 70 seats

Under this system, each voter receives multiple regional representatives in addition to their single direct local representative. For instance, a voter residing in electoral district number 1 within the Hà Nội region would have 19 proportional representatives alongside their one directly elected representative from the first ballot. That voter could therefore contact any of these 20 deputies to raise concerns or seek assistance.

Hoàng Dạ Lan wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 3, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Hoàng Dạ Lan. (2025, October 28). Bầu cử trong các nền dân chủ – Kỳ 1: Mô hình ‘được ăn cả, ngã về không’ tại các nước Anh, Mỹ . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/08/mo-hinh-duoc-an-ca-nga-ve-khong-tai-cac-nuoc-anh-my/

2. Hoàng Dạ Lan. (2026, February 26). How Should a Democratic Việt Nam Elect Its Congress? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/02/how-should-a-democratic-viet-nam-elect-its-congress/

3. Hoàng Dạ Lan. (2025, October 28). Bầu cử trong các nền dân chủ – Kỳ 2: Thể thức đại diện theo tỷ lệ: Khi tiếng nói nào cũng đáng lắng nghe . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/08/dai-dien-theo-ty-le-khi-tieng-noi-nao-cung-dang-lang-nghe/

4. The 225 seats are allocated to 11 regions for proportional elections, equivalent to a district magnitude of roughly 20 seats per region. Under this arrangement, a party would need to obtain about 5% of the valid votes across the entire region to win one seat. The larger the number of seats in each region, the greater the chances for smaller parties to gain representation, but at the same time the risk of parliamentary fragmentation also increases.

5. Note: While Germany applies a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, Japan and Mexico use a Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) system.

6. The number of seats allocated to each region may be adjusted after each population census, which takes place every ten years. Regions with declining populations may lose seats, while regions with growing populations may gain additional seats. This approach is similar to the mechanism used to apportion seats among states in the United States House of Representatives.

7. In proportional electoral systems, seat allocation is usually carried out through mathematical formulas such as the D’Hondt or Sainte-Laguë methods, which convert vote shares into the number of seats won by parties in parliament.