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In 2020–2021, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, Việt Nam’s Việt Á Technology Corporation secretly bribed officials to sell domestically produced RT-PCR test kits at prices inflated to nearly three times their cost. This scheme illicitly generated roughly 1.23 trillion đồng (around $50 million) in profits.

When the trial concluded in 2023, the Procuracy proposed sentences ranging from eight to twenty years for high-ranking defendants charged with “taking bribes,” as reported by Nhân Dân (The People) newspaper. [1] [2]

However, some of these proposals drew criticism, particularly the recommendation that former Minister Chu Ngọc Anh and former Deputy Minister of Science and Technology Phạm Công Tạc receive only three to four years for “violating regulations on the management and use of state property, causing loss and waste.”

Despite the public outcry, these recommendations appear technically sound under Việt Nam’s 2015 Penal Code regarding crime classification and proportional sentencing.

Yet, a review of the prosecution's focus and press coverage suggests that money is the only issue deemed worthy of attention. The narrative is dominated by financial details: how much money Nguyễn Thanh Long received, how many hundreds of billions of đồng Phan Quốc Việt prepared, and how foreign currencies were converted.

Meanwhile, vital questions remain unanswered regarding the human cost. What was the fate of those forced to undergo daily testing, which heightened the risks of cross-infection? What of those who died or lost loved ones during the pandemic response? Ultimately, how did those hundreds of billions of đồng influence the policy decisions that isolated children and tore families apart?

Four years on, these victims are reduced to nothing more than lifeless statistics.

<img src="https://thevietnamese.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/data-src-image-0088e860-e348-4b65-9019-372339d4b76a.png" class="kg-image" alt="" loading="lazy" width="1200" height="628" srcset="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/size/w600/2025/12/data-src-image-0088e860-e348-4b65-9019-372339d4b76a.png 600w, __GHOST_URL__/content/images/size/w1000/2025/12/data-src-image-0088e860-e348-4b65-9019-372339d4b76a.png 1000w, https://thevietnamese.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/data-src-image-0088e860-e348-4b65-9019-372339d4b76a.png 1200w" sizes="(min-width: 720px) 720px"> Photo: Vietnamnet, Báo Thanh Niên. Graphics: Luật Khoa Magazine. Corruption Through a Purely Material Lens Viewing corruption as a purely economic or administrative crime is not new in Việt Nam. This is clearly reflected in calls to decriminalize corruption offenses and the growing tendency to prioritize asset recovery. For instance, the goal of “prioritizing financial penalties to increase the recovery of misappropriated assets” was outlined in the Resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the 10th Party Central Committee dated Sept. 19, 2011, and has since become a central theme in legal research. [3]

Frequently, the rising rate of asset recovery is cited to justify this policy orientation. Domestic studies often highlight statistics such as: [4]

“Over the ten years of 2012 to 2022, a total of 61 trillion đồng ( $2,32 billion USD) was recovered, reaching 34.7%. Of this, nearly 50 trillion đồng recovered in cases monitored by the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption and Negative Practices accounted for only 41.3%.” “In the Hứa Thị Phấn case, more than 12 trillion đồng has been recovered to date.” “In the Phạm Công Danh case, over 5,405 trillion đồng has been recovered.” “The Supreme People’s Procuracy participated in an online hearing of the Singapore court to implement a judicial assistance request for asset recovery in the Phan Sào Nam case; as a result, nearly 68.83 billion đồng was recovered.” “Notably, in the AVG case, authorities recovered 100% of the misappropriated amount (more than 8 trillion đồng).” This material focus is codified in the 2018 Law on Anti-Corruption . Clause 4, Article 92 of the law states:

“A person who commits acts of corruption and voluntarily reports before being detected, actively cooperates with competent authorities, contributes to limiting damage, voluntarily returns corrupt assets, and remedies the consequences of corrupt acts shall be considered for mitigation of disciplinary measures, mitigation of criminal liability, exemption from punishment, or exemption from criminal liability in accordance with the law.” [5]

The view that resolving the financial component can effectively “wipe clean” the corruption problem has become dominant. Dr. Đinh Văn Minh of the Government Inspectorate has argued that “…encouraging corruption and economic crime offenders to remedy consequences to increase asset recovery rates and limit criminal penalties is necessary. Decriminalizing economic crimes is a trend adopted by many countries. Of course, serious violations must still be handled criminally.” [6]

While technically defensible, this approach raises questions regarding legal fairness: Why are foreign legal trends applied only when they benefit officials? Why is cooperation required to recover assets when modern financial oversight—both domestic and global—is increasingly robust? Finally, why is corruption treated solely as an economic crime, with its impact measured exclusively by financial indicators?

Corruption Also “Kills” Corruption does not kill just a few individuals in the manner of the brutal crimes that headline newspapers. Instead, it kills hundreds, thousands, even tens of thousands of people.

This is not a novel observation. In their study “ Corruption Kills ” (2011), Nicholas Ambraseys and Roger Bilham analyzed three decades of data (1980–2010) and found a direct correlation between corruption and death tolls from building collapses during earthquakes. [7] Severe corruption undermines quality control in construction, leaving structures vulnerable and resulting in higher fatalities.

The human cost is further detailed in a 2014 report by the U.S.-based NGO ONE Campaign, which estimated that bad actors siphon up to one trillion U.S. dollars out of economies annually. [8] This colossal sum, if invested in healthcare and essential infrastructure, could prevent millions of deaths caused by traffic accidents, epidemics, and systemic healthcare deficiencies.

There are indeed arguments to downplay the severity of corruption or to “live with it” in developing countries. Some argue that allowing corruption “within limits” eases salary burdens on state budgets in emerging economies. Others suggest that “grease payments” can accelerate administrative procedures and investment processes, optimizing development where local institutions are weak, as noted in studies regarding China. [9]

However, these arguments must not act to reframe corruption as a purely “economic crime.” If the material value of recovered assets becomes the sole metric for evaluating judicial reform, the human lives and destinies destroyed by corruption are reduced to nothing more than surplus data.

Nguyễn Quốc Tấn Trung wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on January 11, 2024. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: Reuters. (2024, January 12). Vietnam jails ex–health minister for 18 yrs over COVID‑19 test kits scandal, media . Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-jails-ex-health-minister-18-yrs-over-covid-test-kits-scandal-media-2024-01-12 TTXVN. (2024, January 8). Vụ Việt Á: Cựu Bộ trưởng Y tế Nguyễn Thanh Long bị đề nghị từ 19-20 năm tù . Báo Nhân Dân Điện Tử; Báo Nhân Dân điện tử. https://nhandan.vn/vu-viet-a-cuu-bo-truong-y-te-nguyen-thanh-long-bi-de-nghi-tu-19-20-nam-tu-post791157.html Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, ‘Nghị Quyết Trung Ương 3 (Khóa X) Của Đảng về ” Tăng Cường Sự Lãnh Đạo Của Đảng Đối Với Công Tác Phòng Chống Tham Nhũng’ http://quantri.tanphu.hochiminhcity.gov.vn//data/tanphu/laodongthuongbinhxahoi/attachments/2021_5/datasoytehcmtytphuong3qtbattachments20197nghiquyettrunguong3khoax237201910_75202114.pdf > accessed 10 January 2024 Trích từ ‘Bài 1: Nhận Diện Chế Định Thu Hồi Tài Sản Tham Nhũng’ ( https://dangcongsan.vn ) accessed 8 January 2024. Luật Phòng chống Tham nhũng năm 2018. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-Phong-chong-tham-nhung-322049.aspx ‘TS Đinh Văn Minh: “Phạt Tiền Thay Xử Tù Với Tội Phạm Kinh Tế Là Xu Hướng” – VnExpress’ accessed 8 January 2024. Ambraseys, N. N., & Bilham, R. (2011). Corruption kills. Nature , 469 (7329), 153–155. https://doi.org/10.1038/469153a ONE Organisation, ‘The Trillion-Dollar Scandal’ (ONE Organisation 2014) https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/Trillion_Dollar_Scandal_report_EN.pdf >. Lu Xiaobo, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004): 192–215.