Việt Nam’s Law on the State of Emergency: A Risk to Human Rights?

On the afternoon of Dec. 3, 2025, the National Assembly passed the Law on the State of Emergency. [1] It was one of 51 laws approved during the Assembly’s 10th session. [2] However, this legislation has once again raised concerns regarding the risk of abuse of power and human rights violations. [3]

This raises several important questions: Is the substance of the law appropriate? Are the provisions causing these concerns truly reasonable? And finally, was it necessary to enact such a law at this particular moment?

Abuse of Power and Human Rights Violations

The draft law outlines three categories of emergency: disasters, national security/public order, and national defense (Article 2). [4] On paper, the text seems progressive. It mandates compliance with the Constitution, Vietnamese law, and international treaties (Clause 1, Article 3) and requires that any restriction of rights be necessary, based on clear grounds, proportionate, and non-discriminatory (Clause 5, Article 3).

However, these safeguards are undermined by Clause 5, Article 5, which prohibits “providing false information about the state of emergency.”

This provision is dangerously vague. It lacks a clear definition of “false information” or due process safeguards, mirroring the controversial laws of Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, where similar bans have been used to silence dissent. [5] [6] [7]

In Việt Nam, this effectively legalizes a long-standing pattern of information control. [9] For instance, just prior to the law’s passage, Đắk Lắk police sanctioned 52 social media users for “spreading false information” simply because their estimates of flood casualties exceeded official figures. [8]

In this sense, Clause 5, Article 5 effectively legalizes measures that authorities have long employed in their efforts to control information. [9]

In a system where the courts, executive, and legislature are controlled by a single party, there is no independent arbiter to determine “truth.” Individuals accused of spreading fake news have no impartial forum in which to defend themselves. “Truth” becomes whatever serves the interests of those in power.

Because the search for truth requires free dialogue—something this law actively suppresses—the progressive clauses in the Law on the State of Emergency will likely mean very little in the protection of human rights.

For the People or for Those in Power?

Recent practices demonstrate that law in Việt Nam functions not to limit state power, but to serve the legitimacy of the Communist Party. As studies of socialist legal systems have observed, the law acts as an instrument of governance for the “ruling class”—in this case, the Party itself. [10]

This instrumentalist approach was on full display in 2025. The National Assembly rushed through Constitutional amendments in just 43 days and approved 51 laws and 39 resolutions in a mere 40 days. [11] [12] These expedited procedures reveal a mindset focused on “clearing the way” for Party policy rather than careful deliberation.

The drive to amend laws is largely performative. On the international stage, such as during the review of the Fourth National Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Việt Nam cites these “legislative achievements” as evidence of human rights progress. [13]

However, this is often the only area receiving credit. The UN Human Rights Committee has previously noted this disparity; in Concluding Observations from July 2025, the Committee acknowledged legislative updates but expressed deep concern over serious, unacknowledged human rights violations. [14]

Global Standards for Regulating Emergency Powers

Global constitutional trends increasingly favor regulating emergency powers directly within constitutions to preserve the balance of power. [15] These provisions typically establish a hierarchy of rights: while some (like freedom of movement) may be restricted for public safety, others are deemed “absolute” or “non-derogable”—meaning they cannot be suspended, even in a crisis. [16] These are sometimes referred to as “absolute rights” because they are grounded in fundamental humanitarian values.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Việt Nam is a party, explicitly defines these non-derogable rights. They include:

• The right to life (Article 6)
• The prohibition of torture and slavery (Articles 7 & 8)
• The prohibition of imprisonment for debt (Article 11)
• The principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law (Article 15)
• Recognition as a person before the law (Article 16)
• Freedom of religion (Article 18)

Many nations codify these protections to prevent executive overreach:

• The Bahamas: Article 29 allows restrictions on expression and assembly only if they are “reasonably justifiable” and “required” for the emergency. Crucially, it forbids any restriction on the right to life or the prohibition of torture, ensuring courts can still review government actions.
• Estonia: Article 130 guarantees that even in a state of emergency, citizens retain rights to procedural guarantees, fair trials, and the presumption of innocence, alongside the standard protections for life and against torture.

By explicitly listing what cannot be touched, these countries make it clear that emergency powers do not give those in power a license for arbitrary rule.

Conclusion

The Law on the State of Emergency restricts the constitutional right to freedom of expression without offering any safeguards against abuse. In the current context of Việt Nam, this omission is dangerous: citizens fined or imprisoned under these provisions have no institutional recourse to protect their rights.

However, this law is just a reflection of a much larger problem. It reflects the core philosophy of the socialist legal system, where law acts as a tool for single-party governance rather than a check on power.

Without an independent judiciary to deliver impartial judgments and arbitrate disputes over human rights, laws that appear progressive will continue to serve as instruments of control rather than protection.

---

Hoàng Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 29, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

---