Việt Nam is vigorously preparing electoral districts for the 16th National Assembly election scheduled for March 15, 2026. On the surface, election day appears to truly be the “festival of the nation,” as the government proclaims. [1]
Behind this electoral formality organized along local constituencies, however, the National Assembly of Việt Nam in practice represents the balance of central power far more than it reflects the aspirations of local voters.
The composition of the Assembly concentrates power in the center and is predetermined well before election day. The Election Commission and the Việt Nam Fatherland Front strictly enforce this outcome through a top-down electoral apparatus, ensuring that directives from above are dutifully carried out below within the one-party political system.
To establish a basis for assessing the representative character of the National Assembly of Việt Nam, it is first necessary to examine the forms of representation exercised by legislative bodies around the world.
What Does a Congress Typically Represent?
According to International IDEA, a leading international organization supporting democratic development and elections, legislative representation can take at least four distinct forms: geographic representation, ideological representation, political party representation, and social descriptive representation. [2]
First, regarding geographic representation, each designated area, from a commune to a province or electoral district, elects representatives who remain ultimately accountable to that specific community.
Second, for ideological representation, the legislature reflects the ideological diversity of a society through the inclusion of representatives from various political parties, independent candidates, or a combination of both.
Third, in terms of political party representation, the legislature fairly mirrors the national proportion of voter support for various political parties. A system fails to fully reflect the will of the people if, for example, a party receives half of the electorate’s votes but secures no seats or only a negligible number of seats.
Fourth, social descriptive representation dictates that the legislature acts as a “microcosm” of the nation. To be fully representative in this manner, the composition, outlook, thinking, and actions of the legislature must mirror the broader population, encompassing diversity in gender, age, profession, economic class, religion, ethnicity, and language.
Measured against these four metrics, how representative is the National Assembly of Việt Nam? What, and whom, does it actually represent?
The Lack of Political Diversity in Việt Nam’s National Assembly
The National Assembly of Việt Nam clearly fails to reflect the diversity of political views and ideologies within society. Because the vast majority of deputies are members of the Communist Party of Việt Nam, the small proportion of “non-Party” deputies—typically between 5 and 10 percent—does not represent independent political currents.
Furthermore, other political parties are banned, meaning elections in Việt Nam lack true multiparty competition. Consequently, voters are denied a genuine choice among different political platforms, making it impossible to regard the National Assembly as a body that truly reflects the diverse political will of the people.
While a cursory reading of the Law on Elections might suggest that the representative character of the National Assembly of Việt Nam is a blend of geographic and social descriptive representation, the reality is quite different. In practice, the Assembly represents the ruling party and state institutions far more than it represents the people of each locality.
Việt Nam’s National Assembly Does Not Represent Voters in Electoral Districts
At first glance, the National Assembly might appear to embody geographic representation, given that provinces and centrally governed cities organize the electoral units. [3] However, the deputies elected from these constituencies are imposed rather than chosen by local voters. They lack direct political accountability to the communities they nominally represent.
The 2015 Law on Elections, amended in 2025, requires only that each province or city have “at least three deputies residing and working in the locality.” [4] The remaining number of deputies is “determined based on population and the characteristics of each locality” (Article 7). This vague formulation leaves ample room for central coordination.
Resolution No. 1891/NQ-UBTVQH15, released by the National Assembly Standing Committee on Nov. 10, 2025, outlined the expected number, structure, and makeup of the deputies. It assigned 217 deputies—almost half of the National Assembly seats—to the central level. [5]
The structure of these 217 central deputies is allocated as follows:
– Party agencies: 10 deputies (2.0%).
– The Office of the President: 3 deputies (0.6%).
– National Assembly bodies (full-time deputies at the central level): 145 deputies (29%).
– The Government and government-affiliated agencies: 15 deputies (3.0%).
– The Ministry of National Defense (including the Minister, ministerial bodies, military regions, and service branches): 13 deputies (2.6%).
– The Ministry of Public Security (including the Minister): 3 deputies (0.6%).
– The Supreme People’s Court: 1 deputy (0.2%).
– The Supreme People’s Procuracy: 1 deputy (0.2%).
– The State Audit Office: 1 deputy (0.2%).
– The Vietnam Fatherland Front: 25 deputies (5%).
The remaining 283 deputies, comprising 56.6 percent of the total assembly, come from localities. Within this group, 179 deputies (35.8 percent) fall into a “designated structure.” These individuals are expected to be key provincial and municipal leaders, or representatives of the Việt Nam Fatherland Front, religious organizations, the military, the police, the people’s courts, the people’s procuracies, justice departments, research institutes, universities, academies, enterprises, associations, and professional unions in production and business.
Out of 500 National Assembly deputies, nearly 400 represent central and provincial state bodies, alongside social and educational institutions. Therefore, they are accountable primarily to their respective institutions rather than to the localities where they are elected.
Furthermore, only 55 deputies from 34 provinces and cities will serve on a full-time basis to represent their local constituencies, compared with 155 full-time deputies at the central level.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the National Assembly of Việt Nam genuinely represents the communities within their electoral districts.
The National Assembly of Việt Nam Does Not Truly Represent the Diverse Components of Society
Article 7 of the Law on Elections dictates that the number of deputies is to be “determined based on population and the characteristics of each locality.” However, this raises the question of whether the National Assembly of Việt Nam truly embodies descriptive representation by serving as a mirror for the various segments of society.
Under Resolution 1891/NQ-UBTVQH15 of the National Assembly Standing Committee, 20.8 percent of deputies from provinces and centrally governed cities are allocated to “represent sectors such as science and technology, finance, education, healthcare, culture and the arts, grassroots government, internal affairs, notable figures, intellectuals, …” [6] Notably, the resolution fails to cite any population data or social surveys to justify this specific distribution.
Nationwide, workers account for approximately 15 percent of the population, and farmers make up roughly one-third. [7] [8]
Allocating only 20.8 percent of local deputies to represent these selected sectors clearly fails to accurately or adequately reflect the vast social composition of workers and farmers. Furthermore, because nearly half of all National Assembly deputies already represent central-level agencies, the Assembly cannot plausibly be considered a microcosm of Vietnamese society. Its representative character primarily reflects the balance of power among party and state institutions, rather than the actual composition or aspirations of the society itself.
A Model with Historical Precedent
Historically, the Communist Party of Việt Nam has used predetermined quotas and the deliberate structuring of National Assembly representation to minimize the influence of opposing social groups.
According to a 1972 study on elections in North Việt Nam by the late Professor Howard Penniman of Georgetown University, the number of deputies from rural areas was once reduced following local resistance to land reform. Conversely, the proportion of deputies from industrial zones was increased to guarantee that the working class was represented in accordance with its perceived “revolutionary duties.” [9]
When key government entities, such as the National Assembly Standing Committee and the Việt Nam Fatherland Front, dictate the composition of the National Assembly instead of allowing the public to choose their own representatives through free and fair elections, the resulting legislative body merely illustrates existing power dynamics rather than the true wishes of the people.
Ultimately, the National Assembly of Việt Nam does not reflect the diverse political will of the populace. Instead, it primarily reflects a prearranged power structure operating within the party-state system.
Hoàng Mai wrote this article and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 23, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights for its English version.
1. Phong, T. (2026, February 2). Đại tướng Lương Tam Quang: Tập trung cao độ để ngày bầu cử thực sự là ngày hội của non sông. Vietnam+ (VietnamPlus). https://www.vietnamplus.vn/dai-tuong-luong-tam-quang-tap-trung-cao-do-de-ngay-bau-cu-thuc-su-la-ngay-hoi-cua-non-song-post1091993.vnp
3. Xaydungchinhsach.Chinhphu.Vn. (2026, February 2). Chi tiết danh sách đơn vị bầu cử, số đại biểu Quốc hội được bầu của từng tỉnh, thành. xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn. https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/chi-tiet-danh-sach-don-vi-bau-cu-so-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-duoc-bau-cua-tung-tinh-thanh-119251223140807482.htm
4. LuatVietnam. (2025, December 16). Văn bản hợp nhất 85/VBHN-VPQH 2025 Luật Bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội và Hội đồng nhân dân. LuatVietnam. https://luatvietnam.vn/hanh-chinh/van-ban-hop-nhat-85-vbhn-vpqh-nam-2025-do-van-phong-quoc-hoi-ban-hanh-hop-nhat-luat-bau-cu-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-va-dai-bieu-hoi-dong-nhan-dan-410500-d5.html
5. See: https://a.tcnnld.vn//Images/files/1891-nq-ubtvqh.pdf
6. See [5]
7. Tạp chí cộng sản. (n.d.). Tạp Chí Cộng Sản. https://tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/thong-tin-ly-luan/-/2018/1005802/xay-dung-giai-cap-cong-nhan-viet-nam-hien-dai,-lon-manh.aspx
8. Nhập, V. N. H. (2025, October 20). Nông dân Việt Nam: Hiện tại và tương lai. Việt Nam Hội Nhập. https://vietnamhoinhap.vn/vi/nong-dan-viet-nam–hien-tai-va-tuong-lai-53726.htm
9. Penniman, H. R. (1972). ELECTIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM. World Affairs, 135(1), 71–90. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671358










