Việt Nam’s 14th Party Congress: Why the Public Was Excluded from Leadership Selection

“Who elects the central leadership?”

“Who decides these policies?”

“Ordinary people aren’t told anything.”

“The people have no voice.”

These questions and expressions of frustration have become familiar refrains among citizens throughout the lead-up to—and during—the 14th Congress of the Communist Party.

Even now that the country’s most consequential political event has concluded, with new leadership unveiled and a five-year socio-economic agenda approved, the frustration remains. Citizens continue to ask why they are excluded from decisions of national importance, ranging from leadership selection to the country’s development direction. [1] [2]

The answer is not public apathy. Rather, it stems from the distinctive power structure of Việt Nam’s political system, in which the Communist Party acts simultaneously as the supreme governing force and the country’s sole political party.

From Constitutional Leadership to the Party’s Internalized Decision-Making

Rumors regarding personnel arrangements for the 14th Party Congress did not appear in a vacuum. This was not the first time a party congress took place behind closed doors, concealing crucial information from the public. In Việt Nam, the public’s exclusion from deliberations and policy planning has become routine, a pattern that flows directly from the regime’s distinct power structure.

Constitutionally, Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution defines the Communist Party of Việt Nam as “the leading force of the State and society,” granting it oversight of the entire political system. [3] 

Consequently, the Party is not merely a political organization subject to competition; it is the supreme locus of power. All major national decisions—from leadership appointments to development strategies—are drafted, debated, and settled internally before they ever reach the public domain. These decisions ultimately shape the county’s development and its people’s everyday lives.

This internalization is justified by the Party’s self-identification with the state and the nation. Propaganda conflates the party’s will with the people’s will [4], and party congresses are celebrated as venues that distill the “collective will” of the nation. [5] Because the party casts itself as the people’s vanguard, decisions made behind closed doors are automatically treated as expressions of popular will, even without universal elections or referendums.

The principle of democratic centralism reinforces this structure. [6] Under this core organizational doctrine, decisions may be discussed within party ranks, but once approved by a majority, absolute compliance is mandatory, and no member may express public dissent. This ensures internal unity but shields decision-making from public scrutiny. 

The oft-invoked notion that “the Party’s will and the people’s will are one” exists only as an ideal, not as a transparent process.

Barring the Public from the Congress

Discussions of Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution often focus on the Communist Party’s leadership role. [7] Yet the article also constitutionalizes another principle concerning the rights of the people. Clause 2 explicitly states: “The Communist Party of Việt Nam is closely connected to the People, serves the People, is subject to the People’s supervision, and is accountable to the People for its decisions.”

This commitment is echoed in the Party’s own Charter, which states that “the Communist Party of Việt Nam is the ruling party, respects and promotes the people’s mastery, and is subject to the people’s supervision.” [8] Furthermore, party leaders have repeatedly affirmed the guiding principle that “the people know, the people discuss, the people act, the people inspect, the people supervise, and the people benefit.” [9]

In practice, however, the reality is entirely different. The 14th Party Congress alone makes clear where the public stands—and whether citizens are truly informed or consulted.

The people are not allowed to know because the Communist Party conducts its meetings behind closed doors and makes decisions in secrecy. [10] Before and during the 14th Congress, detailed information about personnel for the upcoming term remained undisclosed, even though these decisions had already been finalized at the last Central Committee meeting—the 15th Plenum. [11]

As the Congress unfolded, the Communist Party imposed strict security controls to ensure this secrecy, including mobile signal jamming, internet restrictions, and bans on delegates using phones. [12] At the same time, the Communist Party deployed large numbers of police and military personnel to secure information and maintain secrecy.

In parallel, both domestic and foreign media outlets were barred from reporting directly from the working sessions of the 14th Party Congress, with the exception of the opening and closing ceremonies. For sessions that were not broadcast live, journalists were limited to relaying information issued by the Congress’s Press Center, which was organized by the authorities themselves.

Under such conditions, the public had no way of knowing what Communist Party delegates were debating or how decisions were being made behind those tightly guarded closed doors. Citizens were left with little more than rumors or what were believed to be leaks from so-called “internal sources.” 

The opacity produced a moment of unintended irony: online betting platforms such as Polymarket opened markets allowing users to wager on the outcomes of leadership selections for the next term of the party and the state. [13]

Beyond merely keeping the public uninformed, the regime actively prevents citizens from debating the Party Congress.

In the period before and during the 14th Party Congress, police moved aggressively to fine and detain citizens accused of posting content deemed “false,” “hostile,” or “subversive.” [14] [15] This follows a years-long pattern where individuals are imprisoned or penalized for criticizing the Party under charges of “anti-state propaganda” or “abusing democratic freedoms,” as defined in Articles 117 and 331 of Việt Nam’s 2015 Penal Code.

This enforced silence extends to the structure of governance itself. While the Constitution affirms the people’s status as the sovereign power, the political reality is defined by a rigid hierarchy. The National Assembly’s election of the state’s highest leaders—the president, the prime minister, and the chair of the National Assembly—is predetermined by nominations from the Party Central Committee.

This dynamic reflects the official principle: “the Party leads, the state manages, the people are the masters.” In this model, popular sovereignty is limited to implementing agreed-upon policies, rather than participating in the selection of personnel or policy direction.

When citizens are legally barred from debating decisions they cannot influence, the inevitable result is a widening political gap between the governors and the governed. This system ultimately allows the Party to act simultaneously as decision-maker, representative, and overseer—effectively supervising itself.

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Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on February 6, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights of its English version.