The phrases “fake news,” “false information,” and “fine for seven and a half million đồng” have become highly familiar to the Vietnamese public over the years. This familiarity stems not from legal education or public awareness, but from citizens directly witnessing numerous individuals being penalized for posting or sharing content deemed “fabricated” or “false.” [1]
However, while these penalty announcements receive significant publicity, the development of a legal framework to address fake news has unfolded quietly.
Amid Lunar New Year preparations, few were aware that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was quietly collecting public feedback on a proposed decree to prevent and combat fake news and false information. [2] [3] Because state media remained largely silent, even fewer people could grasp the draft’s key contents or participate in the consultations.
Despite marking the first time Việt Nam has introduced a standalone draft specific to fake news, the text remains almost invisible to the public.
A Definition that Barely Defines
For years, public reports of citizens being punished for posting “fake news” or “false information” have prompted a recurring question: on what basis do authorities determine that information is “fake” or “false”? The MPS has finally offered an answer, defining “fake news” as “information that is not true” and “false information” as “information that is partially untrue.”
This explanation is flawed due to its circular reasoning. The phrases “not true” and “partially untrue” are just as vague as “fake news” and “false information,” providing no actual criteria for determination. Other concepts, such as “statements containing fake or false information,” “producing fake or false information,” or “storing fake or false information,” are similarly built upon these unclear foundations. This feature allows enforcement authorities to interpret the rules broadly or narrowly based entirely on their subjective judgment.
Historically, content labeled as “fake news” or “false information” has frequently involved criticism of the Communist Party, the state, or their leaders. For example, before and during the 14th Congress of the Communist Party, numerous citizens were fined for posting content described as “fabricated, false information from reactionary pages” or as acts of “opposing” the party and the state. [4]
This penalized content commonly featured so-called “internal information” regarding factional struggles and power disputes, or direct criticism of the party congress and its leadership.
Although the draft decree fails to define its core terms clearly, its accompanying explanatory report openly reflects a mandate to protect the party and the political system. [5] The report states that the decree is issued to “protect the ideological foundation, refute hostile and incorrect viewpoints, and handle fake news and false information.” It also identifies its primary objective as “protecting national security and ensuring social order and safety.”
These justifications reveal that information capable of negatively affecting the image of the party or the state can easily be labeled as “fake” or “false.” Hence, a legal framework without clear boundaries invites arbitrary application, inconsistency, and a severe lack of transparency.
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Will be Both the “Player and Referee”
As the lead drafting agency, the MPS has positioned itself to exert dominant influence over the entire mechanism for handling fake news in Việt Nam. Under Clause 1, Article 17 of the draft, the MPS is officially granted the authority to verify fake news and false information. In past penalty cases, the police never disclosed who actually conducted these verifications; the public only saw images of ordinary citizens sitting in police stations, facing uniformed officers and the familiar fine of seven and a half million đồng.
Previously, this verification authority was formally associated with the Vietnam Anti-Fake News Center (VAFC), operating under the Authority of Broadcasting and Electronic Information within the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism. [6] Transferring this authority to the MPS signals a fundamental shift from general content management to strict security and public-order management.
Moreover, agencies under the umbrella of the MPS would have the power to request verification coordination from other ministries, government bodies, and local People’s Committees at all levels. Furthermore, Clause 3, Article 8 grants the Ministry the authority to determine what constitutes fake or false information within its own managed sectors and in cases where other state agencies “do not have sufficient grounds” to do so.
In addition, Article 21 even proposes a national database center for fake news—managed entirely by the MPS—which would handle violation reports, public warnings, and data storage, requiring all other agencies to link their data to it.
The MPS is effectively proposing to control the entire lifecycle of combating fake news—from collection, verification, conclusion, publication, data management, and sanctioning. While the MPS’s traditional role of ensuring security and preventing crime might justify its involvement when fake news threatens public order, this new arrangement is highly concerning. These regulations, which empower the MPS to control information and suppress public opinion, carry significant risks.
Fines of Up to 100 Million for Individuals, 200 Million for Organizations
The familiar fine of “seven and a half million đồng” (approximately $287)—colloquially known as “bảy củ rưỡi” in Vietnamese—may soon be a thing of the past.
Under Article 22 of the draft decree, the maximum administrative fines permitted by current law would apply to eight of the ten prohibited acts outlined in Article 5. [7] Consequently, individuals could face fines of up to 100 million đồng (approximately $3,800), while organizations could be fined up to 200 million đồng (approximately $7,600).
For an individual, this means a penalty for sharing “fake” or “false” information could equal nearly an entire year of the average Vietnamese worker’s income in 2025. [8] The MPS’s explanatory report justifies this drastic increase by arguing that current fines, typically set at 7.5 million đồng, lack a sufficient deterrent effect. [9]
The scope of these penalties is vast. Article 5 covers ten categories of prohibited conduct, from directly creating fake news to “non-cooperation” (such as failing to issue corrections). It also targets instrumental acts like training activities, using artificial intelligence, or operating online platforms.
Applying maximum penalties to such a broad range of violations raises serious questions about proportionality. The explanatory report fails to demonstrate why maximizing these fines is necessary, especially when the definitions of “fake news” and “false information” remain so ambiguous.
Without precise definitions, we run the risk of using these severe penalties as a weapon to restrict freedom of expression. This environment also fosters self-censorship, pushing citizens to avoid “sensitive” topics entirely, even in good faith or for valid social critique.
Sound legislative design dictates that high administrative penalties require strict safeguards: violations must be narrowly defined, and enforcement authorities must face rigorous oversight from judicial bodies, independent institutions, and the public. However, by expanding targets, maximizing sanctions, and centralizing power within a single agency, this draft decree takes a completely opposite approach.
The ultimate policy question is not just how to deter violations but how to build a strict system that resists abuse. A proper penalty framework must handle genuinely harmful fake news without transforming minor errors or social criticism into ruinous legal risks. When a single fine can wipe out a year’s income, and the enforcing authority acts as both player and referee, the boundary between maintaining order and suppressing free expression has become more fragile than ever.
Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 26, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
