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Criminal law serves as a foundational pillar in any legal system, secondary only to a nation's constitution. By outlining crimes and punishments, it signals what the state seeks to protect using its harshest legal instruments.

In Việt Nam, however, this protection extends to a uniquely specific subject: the Communist Party and the socialist regime, which are safeguarded by the entirety of the legal framework. In 2026, lawmakers further reinforced this protective barrier as they continued to revise the Penal Code. [1]

Notably, the Ministry of Public Security—the principal force tasked with regime security— replaced the Ministry of Justice as the lead agency responsible for drafting these amendments. [2]

“Protecting National Security” and “Protecting the State”

The Vietnamese government has a long history of arresting and sentencing democracy activists, dissidents, and ordinary citizens for allegedly “ opposing ” the Communist Party of Vietnam or criticizing its leaders. [3] [4] [5]

However, the current Penal Code contains no explicit provision naming the Communist Party. [6]

This raises an important question: what is the legal basis for protecting the party?

The Communist Party protects itself by conflating with broad concepts such as “national security,” “the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” and “the people’s administration.” Authorities and state media consistently interpret these concepts as inseparable from the leadership role of the Communist Party, placing it at the absolute center of state power.

In the eyes of the ruling authorities, protecting national security is synonymous with maintaining the stability of the one-party regime. [7] Securing the socialist regime ensures the political orientation of the Communist Party. [8] Defending state interests ultimately defends a state apparatus controlled by the party.

This legislative strategy stems from Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution, which mandates the Communist Party of Vietnam as the “force leading the State and society." [9] Upon this foundation, the Penal Code establishes provisions that shield this “leading force” indirectly.

Articles such as 109 (overthrowing the people’s administration), 117 (propagandizing against the state), 118 (disrupting security), and 331 (abusing democratic freedoms) are all weaponized to this end.

These provisions share a crucial flaw: they fail to distinguish between the state and the political party. This ambiguity allows authorities to prosecute criticism of the ruling party as an attack on the state itself. In reality, these are distinct concepts.

The nation represents the people, the state serves as the governing apparatus, the political regime dictates the organization of power, and the ruling party is merely the temporary political force in leadership.

By conflating these distinct entities using vague terminology, the law creates immense legal ambiguity, granting enforcement agencies the power to interpret offenses arbitrarily.

A rigorous criminal code must separate violent incitement from peaceful criticism and legitimate threats to national security from the exercise of free speech. Instead, the Vietnamese authorities have manipulated the Penal Code into a shield against dissent.

According to Human Rights Watch, during the first 10 months of 2025, authorities arrested at least 40 individuals under vague statutes like Articles 117 and 331 for allegedly criticizing the government. [10] This crackdown included the imprisonment of prominent figures such as lawyer Trần Đình Triển and journalist Trương Huy San . [11] [12]

Without ever naming the Communist Party in the Penal Code, the state has created a highly effective legal mechanism to protect it.

The Push for a Separate Offense to Protect the Communist Party

During the 2026 revisions to the Penal Code, the Ministry of Public Security proposed the introduction of a separate offense specifically targeting “propagandizing against the Communist Party.” [13]

While the proposal remains a legislative direction with unclear definitions of what constitutes “opposition,” it represents a “new step forward” for the regime’s self-preservation—and a regression in legislative development.

Historically, the party relied on indirect protection through offenses tied to state interests, most notably Article 117 of the Penal Code. Prosecutions under this article deliberately blurred the distinction between the state and the party, a conflation frequently echoed by domestic media when describing dissidents as “ opposing the Party and the State. ” [14]

Now, however, the party would be treated as a “particularly important subject deserving protection” through a standalone criminal offense. The Ministry of Public Security has indicated that the revised code will explicitly clarify both the acts that constitute “propagandizing against the Communist Party of Vietnam” and the corresponding penalties.

This signals a dangerous change in legislative perspective in which the Communist Party demands protection not as an extension of the state, but as an independent sovereign subject.

If adopted, this proposal would fundamentally violate democratic legal norms. Criminal law should never function as a shield to protect a political organization from criticism, opposition, or competition. An entity possessing absolute power must always be fundamentally subject to absolute public scrutiny and accountability.

Introducing a standalone offense for “propagandizing against the Communist Party” would create a chilling effect on civil society. The boundary between legitimate civic oversight and criminal opposition would vanish.

Citizens would face immediate peril if they questioned party policy, criticized leaders, or demanded institutional reform, as authorities could instantly criminalize and prosecute these actions.

This maneuver perverts the core purpose of criminal law. Instead of serving as a measure of last resort to protect people and society from genuine danger, the law is reduced to an arbitrary instrument wielded to secure the dominance of a single political party.

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 15, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Lê Sáng. (2026, April 20). Việt Nam’s Penal Code revision: Police propose deferring prosecution for economic crimes. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/viet-nams-penal-code-revision-police-proposes-deferring-prosecution-for-economic-crimes/

2. See: https://moj.gov.vn/Pages/bien-nien-su-nganh-tu-phap.aspx

3. The Vietnamese. (2026, January 12). Vietnamese Authorities Crack Down on Online Dissent Ahead of Party Congress; Facebooker Hoàng Thị Hồng Thái Arrested Under Article 117. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/vietnamese-authorities-crack-down-on-online-dissent-ahead-of-party-congress-facebooker-hoang-thi-hong-thai-arrested-under-article-117/

4. The Vietnamese. (2026, January 5). Trial in Absentia Ends With 17-Year Prison Sentences for Lê Trung Khoa and Nguyễn Văn Đài. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/trial-in-absentia-ends-with-17-year-prison-sentences-for-le-trung-khoa-and-nguyen-van-dai/

5. Lam, T. (2025, December 30). Expose the tactic of exploiting freedom to sabotage the Party and the state. Laodong.Vn; Báo Lao Động. https://laodong.vn/thoi-su/vach-tran-chieu-bai-loi-dung-tu-do-de-chong-pha-dang-nha-nuoc-1629029.ldo

6. Office of the National Assembly of Vietnam. (2025). Integrated document No. 135/VBHN-VPQH on the Criminal Code (consolidated version). Thư Viện Pháp Luật. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/EN/Trach-nhiem-hinh-su/Integrated-document-135-VBHN-VPQH-2025-Criminal-Code/676519/tieng-anh.aspx

7. Tạp chí cộng sản. (2018). Tạp Chí Cộng Sản. https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/chi-tiet-tim-kiem/-/2018/1061502/view_content

8. Nghĩa, L. (2013, September 23). Respecting and defending the socialist regime means protecting the nation’s values — People’s Public Security Online. Báo Công an Nhân Dân Điện Tử. https://cand.com.vn/Su-kien-Binh-luan-thoi-su/Ton-trong-va-bao-ve-che-do-XHCN-la-bao-ve-gia-tri-cua-dan-toc-i239756/

9. Thúc Kháng. (2026, February 3). Article 4 of the Constitution: A “Golden Immunity Token” for the Communist Party of Việt Nam. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/02/article-4-of-the-constitution-a-golden-immunity-token-for-the-communist-party-of-viet-nam/

10. Human Rights Watch. (2025, October 20). Vietnam: Former political prisoner rearrested. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/20/vietnam-former-political-prisoner-rearrested

11. Bảo Khánh, Lê Giang. (2025, June 23). The Price of Speech: Lawyer Jailed for Criticizing Việt Nam’s Judiciary. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/06/the-price-of-speech-lawyer-jailed-for-criticizing-viet-nams-judiciary/

12. Huỳnh Kha. (2025, February 19. The Case Against Osin Huy Duc: Unpacking the Controversial Article 331. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/02/the-case-against-osin-huy-duc-unpacking-the-controversial-article-331/

13. Hoàng Nam. (2026, April 23). Penal Code Revision: Police Propose Criminalizing ‘Propaganda Against the Communist Party’. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/penal-code-revision-police-propose-criminalizing-propaganda-against-the-communist-party/

14. Lam, T. (2025, December 30). Vạch trần chiêu bài lợi dụng tự do để chống phá Đảng, Nhà nước. Laodong.Vn; Báo Lao Động. https://laodong.vn/thoi-su/vach-tran-chieu-bai-loi-dung-tu-do-de-chong-pha-dang-nha-nuoc-1629029.ldo