Throughout modern political history, numerous leadership figures have transcended their historical realities to become “meta-historical” symbols. These symbols gradually detach from the actual individuals, evolving into images that serve distinct political, moral, and emotional functions within society.
Hồ Chí Minh stands as an example of this phenomenon. Although his historical role as a political figure is undeniable, it is essential to analyze how his image has been actively constructed, reproduced, and utilized as an “illusory symbol” within Việt Nam’s political and cultural space.
Hồ Chí Minh’s Mythologization
First, it is necessary to clarify the concept of “illusory.” In this context, “illusory” is not used critically to suggest complete fabrication, but rather to describe a symbolic structure built through discourse, ritual, and media until the symbol transcends its historical reality.
According to sociologist Max Weber, a leader’s power can be maintained through “charismatic authority,” or the “sacralization of the individual.” [1] Once that individual dies, however, this charisma must be institutionalized, reconstructing the leader’s image into a stable political symbol.
Roland Barthes analyzes a similar process in his theory of “political myth,” which addresses how historical images are often transformed into signs carrying moral and national meaning. [2]
Initially, Hồ Chí Minh was a revolutionary operating within the international communist network and the national liberation movements of the early 20th century. Following the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Việt Nam and the conclusion of the Indochina War, the party gradually transformed him from a historical figure into a national symbol. This transformation occurred through three primary mechanisms.
(1) The Mythologization of Biography:
Many Vietnamese people are familiar with stories about Hồ Chí Minh that function as moral lessons, carrying the definitive structure of a myth: a young man leaves his homeland to save his country, endures great hardships, and returns to lead his nation to independence.
This narrative mirrors the “hero’s journey” motif of folk epics. Through retelling, complex elements regarding the individual and his historical choices are simplified, ignored, or distorted.
A typical example is that Hồ Chí Minh’s historical mistakes during the Land Reform campaign have never been mentioned in official history books, while moral qualities such as simplicity, humility, love for the people, and lifelong sacrifice have been widely emphasized and praised. [3] As a result, he is viewed as a moral model rather than a political figure with historical contradictions.
(2) The Ritualization of Memory:
Commemorative rituals, the mausoleum, monuments, and holidays associated with Hồ Chí Minh have forged a symbolic space akin to a “political religion.”
Political science has studied this phenomenon across modern regimes, noting how states create collective rituals to reinforce political identity. By participating in rituals such as visiting the mausoleum or commemorating the birthday of the leader, citizens are not merely remembering an individual; they are partaking in a continuous ritual that reaffirms the identity of their political community.
(3) The Reproduction of Symbols in Daily Life:
In Việt Nam, Hồ Chí Minh’s image is omnipresent in public spaces, appearing in schools, on currency, on monuments, and within slogans urging citizens to emulate his example.
From the perspective of cultural theorist Louis Althusser (1970), institutions such as schools and the media operate as “ideological state apparatuses.” [4] Through repeated reproduction within these institutions, the leader’s image becomes a naturalized part of social life, shifting from a political entity to an unquestionable truth.
This deeply rooted truth fosters a conservatism that reacts fiercely against perceived threats. The case of Professor Ngô Bảo Châu, who was ostracized and denounced simply for touching the “symbol” of Hồ Chí Minh—despite his countless contributions to Việt Nam—is a clear example of this phenomenon. [5]
Together, these three mechanisms transform Hồ Chí Minh into a symbol of political illusion, operating on emotional and moral planes rather than history. The public no longer discusses him as a leader making specific political decisions but as an abstract image such as “Uncle Hồ” or “the father of the nation.”
In the language of Jean Baudrillard (1981), this symbol can be understood as a form of “simulacrum,” an image reproduced to such an extent that it becomes independent from its original reality. [6]
Sociologically, this symbol provides symbolic capital, helping the state build national identity and maintain historical continuity while sustaining the legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist Party. However, this approach carries a fatal downside: it detaches the symbol from concrete history and severely impoverishes the capacity to discuss or critique the past.
History then ceases to be an open field of inquiry and becomes a rigidly standardized moral narrative.
Contemporary Powerlessness of the Hồ Chí Minh Symbol
As Việt Nam integrates into the global market economy, the Hồ Chí Minh symbol reveals limitations in its capacity to resolve contemporary economic, political, and social issues. While the symbol remains a dominant force in political discourse, its practicality in regulating social structures is in steady decline.
This impotence manifests across three primary domains.
First, the symbol lacks efficacy in the economic sphere. Officially, Hồ Chí Minh is synonymous with revolutionary morality—diligence, thrift, integrity, righteousness—and the pursuit of a socialist society. [7]
However, capitalist logic and global integration fundamentally drive Việt Nam’s modern economic structure. Economic factors now include market competition, capital accumulation, and foreign investment, a reality that the Vietnamese Communist Party itself also acknowledges. [8]
In this environment, 20th-century revolutionary ethics cannot serve as a practical framework for modern economic policy, which relies on calculations of market efficiency and macroeconomic stability. The Hồ Chí Minh symbol is instead reduced to a moral veneer used to legitimize these policies, creating a contradiction: an economy running on profit-seeking logic justified by a language of selfless revolution.
Second, the symbol fails to resolve systemic governance failures. Political campaigns routinely present Hồ Chí Minh as the ethical standard for public officials, asserting that studying his morality will enforce discipline and combat corruption, bureaucracy, and interest groups. [9]
Yet, these issues persist and even worsen within the state apparatus. This reflects the reality that a moral symbol, no matter its discursive power, cannot dismantle entrenched structures of interest and power.
Political science categorizes this phenomenon as “symbolic compensation”: when a regime faces a crisis of practical control, it intensifies its reliance on moral symbols to inflate its legitimacy. Because these symbols cannot alter actual power mechanics, their real-world impact is negligible.
Third, the symbol is incapable of generating forward-looking political ideals.
Forged during the 20th-century struggles against colonialism and fascism, the Hồ Chí Minh image was highly effective at mobilizing the masses for wartime unity. However, the Việt Nam of the 21st century faces vastly different challenges, including the transition to a digital knowledge economy, widening social inequality, and complex geopolitical shifts.
A symbol rooted in a distant era of socialist revolution and warfare cannot provide the visionary framework required for a post-revolutionary society. As a result, the Hồ Chí Minh symbol has been relegated to ritualistic spaces and historical memory, entirely stripped of its ability to inspire future political projects.
When the Hồ Chí Minh Symbol Weakens
The question of what will happen in Vietnamese politics if the Hồ Chí Minh symbol loses its strength is essentially a question about the structural transformation of political legitimacy.
A significant weakening of the symbol would create a historical legitimacy vacuum for the political system. For decades, the narrative of revolution and national independence has closely linked state legitimacy to Hồ Chí Minh as its focal point. As this symbol fades, the claim that the current system inherits the revolutionary legacy will become far less persuasive.
Consequently, the state will be forced to seek alternative sources of legitimacy—such as governance effectiveness, economic growth, and social problem-solving—shifting political discourse from revolutionary rhetoric to the language of development. This shift aligns with the trajectory Tô Lâm currently appears to be pursuing.
Furthermore, this decline is necessary to cultivate diversity in historical memory. When the Hồ Chí Minh symbol held a monopolistic position, historical interpretation revolved entirely around it. As its power wanes, society can begin examining the past through varied lenses. This does not necessarily erase his historical role; rather, it situates him within a multidimensional historical picture instead of utilizing him as the absolute standard for judging other figures.
Similarly, national identity construction will shift. Rather than relying on the wartime legacy of national liberation, the state must pivot toward elements like national culture, economic achievements, and Việt Nam’s global standing. This mirrors the trajectory of other post-revolutionary nations, which gradually transition their collective identity from war memories to achievements in development and integration.
However, the decay of a political symbol is rarely sudden; it is a protracted process driven by generational turnover and shifting social conditions.
Revolutionary symbols often survive in historical memory even after losing their political centrality. Even if Việt Nam eventually experiences regime change, the Hồ Chí Minh symbol would be unlikely to face total erasure. Instead, he would transition from a mobilizing political icon to a reinterpreted historical figure.
Societies must manage historical legacies when entering new political phases, and Hồ Chí Minh would likely be viewed more multidimensionally—akin to kings in feudal history—rather than as an infallible ideological anchor.
Đan Thanh wrote this op-ed in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 19, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights to the English translation.
- Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922.
- Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang, 1972.
- Vũ Quí Hạo Nhiên. “Land Reform, Part 2: Hồ Chí Minh Could Have Saved Cát Hanh Long, But Did Not.” Luật Khoa Tạp Chí, March 14, 2024. https://luatkhoa.com/2024/03/cai-cach-ruong-dat-ky-2-ho-chi-minh-da-co-the-cuu-ba-cat-hanh-long/
- Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses by Louis Althusser, 1969–70.” Marxists.org, 2026. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm
- Chu Dẩn. “Crying Again for Those Who Flew Without a Horizon.” Luật Khoa Tạp Chí, August 5, 2025. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/08/lai-khoc-nhung-nguoi-bay-khong-co-chan-troi/
- Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1981.
- “Hồ Chí Minh’s Teachings on ‘Diligence, Thrift, Integrity, Uprightness, Impartiality, and Selflessness.’” Tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn, August 5, 2019. https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/c-mac-angghen-lenin-ho-chi-minh/ho-chi-minh/nghien-cuu-hoc-tap-tu-tuong/di-huan-ho-chi-minh-ve-can-kiem-liem-chinh-chi-cong-vo-tu-3485
- Robert. “What Role Do FDI Investment Tax Incentives in Vietnam Play, and What Are the Policies?” Blue Ocean Realty, October 6, 2022. https://blueocean-realty.com/uu-dai-thue-dau-tu-fdi-tai-viet-nam-co-vai-tro-va-chinh-sach-nhu-nao/
- “Study and Follow Hồ Chí Minh’s Ideology, Morality, and Style.” Tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn, November 3, 2025. https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/book/sach-chinh-tri/hoc-tap-va-lam-theo-tu-tuong-dao-duc-phong-cach-ho-chi-minh-219










