While governments worldwide routinely acquire land to expand infrastructure, develop urban areas, and execute public projects, the resolution of disputes varies significantly. In many countries, disagreements over land acquisition are standard legal matters that residents can resolve in court.
In Việt Nam, land recovery frequently devolves into a prolonged saga that begins with written complaints, spans several years, and occasionally escalates into direct confrontations between citizens and the authorities.
The underlying reason for this phenomenon is explored in a study titled “The Constitutionality of Compulsory Land Acquisition in Vietnam: Issues and Recommendations.” Authored by law professors Phan Trung Hiền (Cần Thơ University) and Hugh D. Spitzer (University of Washington), the research traces these disputes to a fundamental legal concept.
To understand these conflicts, we must examine the Constitution of Việt Nam. Because land is collectively owned by the people, individuals only possess state-granted land-use rights. Therefore, the state uses the term “thu hồi” (recover) during acquisition, signifying the reclamation of a previously allocated right. This creates a cascade of issues regarding the purpose of land recovery, procedural fairness, and compensation.
No “Land Ownership” in Việt Nam
The most fundamental point to understand is that conventional land ownership does not exist in Việt Nam. According to the Constitution, land “belongs to the entire people, with the state acting as the representative owner and exercising unified management.”
In effect, legal land use requires the state to allocate, lease, or officially recognize an individual’s land-use rights. Citizens hold only these rights, not the land itself, and the state can reclaim the property in accordance with the law when deemed necessary.
This framework contrasts with countries founded on private ownership. In those systems, private property is treated as a natural, inviolable right that must be balanced against the public interest, meaning that the state must negotiate with owners rather than make unilateral decisions.
However, in Việt Nam, the state acts as both the grantor of land and the penultimate authority that decides to recover it. This asymmetry leaves citizens feeling insecure against a disproportionately powerful entity. Lacking true ownership, people inevitably occupy a weaker negotiating position when dealing with the authorities.
Three Major Problems in Land Recovery
Because Vietnamese citizens do not possess conventional land ownership, three distinct issues emerge within the country’s land recovery mechanism: ambiguous purposes, opaque procedures, and unfair compensation models.
First, the purpose for recovery is often ambiguous.
The Land Law permits state land recovery for national defense, security, and “socio-economic development in the national or public interest.” However, the law fails to clearly define what actually constitutes a “national or public interest.”
According to the study, this ambiguity allows land to be recovered for projects that yield private commercial benefits, often disguised under labels like “urban renovation” or “residential development.”
Disputes naturally erupt here. While citizens might willingly sacrifice private interests for public roads or community institutions, seeing recovered land transformed into highly profitable commercial villas or apartments raises a critical question: is the outcome a genuine “public interest,” or merely a transfer of wealth from citizens to private investors?
Second, administrative procedures remain highly opaque.
In many Vietnamese land recovery cases, residents only discover the state’s intentions when the process is nearly complete. Although the Constitution mandates that recovery must be “public and transparent,” which includes gathering and addressing citizens’ opinions, the study highlights a gap between legal principles and reality.
The loss of their land and the initial lack of transparency equally frustrate citizens. Important questions about planning, project selection, and the specific rationale for targeting their area often get buried in inaccessible administrative documents.
Furthermore, public consultation sessions are largely procedural; attendees sign in and voice opinions, yet the original plans rarely change.
According to the study, local authorities monopolize and control nearly every stage, from planning and pricing to the execution of the recovery. When residents only learn “why their land is taken” and “how much money they receive” without understanding their broader rights, a sense of fairness is impossible to achieve.
Third, the compensation framework is complex and inequitable.
Instead of a straightforward principle, compensation depends on variables such as land type, user classification, the remaining duration of use, and whether the land was state-allocated or leased.
According to the study, individuals are compensated for their land-use rights based on a state-determined “specific land price” rather than fair market value. As a result, identical plots of land can yield drastically different compensation amounts based on bureaucratic classifications.
Furthermore, this system primarily calculates the value of the land-use rights and physical assets, ignoring profound collateral damages like the loss of livelihood or long-term disruption. In contrast, nations like South Korea, Singapore, India, and Australia offer compensation for lost income and career transition costs.
Hence, it is inaccurate to claim that citizens resist recovery merely because they “want higher compensation.” They are resisting the reduction of their lives, livelihoods, and stability to a figure that fails to reflect their true value.
Global Safeguards and Solutions
While land recovery is a mechanism utilized globally, the difference between Việt Nam and other nations lies in the imposed limits and safeguards.
According to the study, jurisdictions with more developed legal systems—such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States—constrain state recovery power through clearer purposes, transparent procedures, and realistic compensation.
For instance, South Korean law prioritizes protecting landholders’ lawful rights by limiting the discretionary power of authorities. In Singapore, land recovery requires a master plan approved by competent authorities and is executed only when absolutely necessary after thorough public consultation.
Furthermore, the study highlights Taiwan’s approach: the state does not intervene in private projects, mandating instead that investors negotiate directly with landholders.
Ultimately, the comparative difference is not the mere existence of land recovery, but rather the threshold for state intervention. In many nations, the state only intervenes for a clearly defined, justified public need, leaving private commercial projects to market negotiations and civil relations. Consequently, the same administrative act of taking land yields vastly different social outcomes.
Fortunately, the complications surrounding land recovery in Việt Nam are not insurmountable. The central question that remains is simply where and how these necessary reforms should begin.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 30, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. D, P. H. T. &. S. H. (2022). The constitutionality of compulsory land acquisition in Vietnam: issues and recommendations. ideas.repec.org. https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/lawdev/v15y2022i1p147-168n4.html
2. Regulations on land ownership rights and land-use rights. (n.d.). https://thuvienphapluat.vn/chinh-sach-phap-luat-moi/vn/ho-tro-phap-luat/bat-dong-san/56942/quy-dinh-ve-quyen-so-huu-dat-dai-va-quyen-su-dung-dat
3. Recent cases of land expropriation. (n.d.). https://thuvienphapluat.vn/chinh-sach-phap-luat-moi/vn/ho-tro-phap-luat/tu-van-phap-luat/46156/cac-truong-hop-thu-hoi-dat-moi-nhat
4. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, June 16). 2013 Constitution. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hien-phap-nam-2013-215627.aspx









