The Montagnard Exodus: Why the Vietnamese Government Pushes for Repatriation

On April 29, Hara Y Siêu and his family returned to Việt Nam from Thailand, where they were greeted at Tân Sơn Nhất International Airport by police from Đắk Lắk Province. The authorities used the event for publicity, giving the family gifts and taking commemorative photos.

A week later, Hara sent a letter to the provincial police, and the authorities published it almost immediately on the same day. [1] They were meticulous enough to include photographs of Hara addressing the envelope to the recipient.

It remains unknown whether he wrote the letter voluntarily or authored its contents himself. However, the frequent appearances of this letter and his “return home” story across state and social media highlight the authorities’ eagerness to encourage Montagnard refugees abroad—particularly in Thailand—to return to Việt Nam. [2]

This is not the government’s first effort to repatriate refugees. 

In March 2024, internal security officials from Gia Lai Province traveled to Nonthaburi Province to persuade a large community of Montagnard refugees to return. [3] The officials promised land, housing, and vehicles, guaranteeing that they would “take care of everything.” 

Similarly, in March 2025, authorities in Đắk Lắk issued an official document declaring that returning Montagnards would receive lenient treatment and that the authorities “would not take any action against them.” [4]

Since the beginning of the year, state media have extensively reported on every family that has returned. [5]

Why does the government want the Montagnards to come back so badly instead of letting them remain peacefully in a third country such as Thailand?

A Stain That Cannot be Explained Away

Ever since the protests and crackdowns of the early 2000s, thousands of Montagnards have abandoned their ancestral lands in the Central Highlands. They did not, however, leave by choice. [6] [7]

The connection to land varies drastically among different ethnic groups. Recently, residents of Hà Nội have forcefully protested land seizures for development projects, joining communities in Thủ Thiêm, Văn Giang, Đồng Tâm, and Dương Nội who have fought against unjust confiscations for years. [8] For the Kinh majority, land represents a means of production, a livelihood built on labor, and an ancestral inheritance.

For Montagnards, the connection is far deeper. In Ê Đê culture, land is not merely an agricultural plot; it encompasses rivers, streams, caves, and trees. It is the domain of their deity, or “yang,” serving as both a spiritual dwelling and a direct link to their ancestors. [9]

Ê Đê customary law explicitly defines land as “the tray, the basket, the back of the ancestors and grandparents,” signifying a place of ancestral shelter and support (Article 29). [10]

Yet, despite this bond, they fled.

In third countries such as Thailand, Montagnard refugees endure severe hardship. They often lack legal documentation, are prohibited from working, and face repeated arrests. [11] Yet, they remain resolute in their decision not to return. The issue is not a lack of desire to go home, but rather that conditions in Việt Nam do not permit it.

Within Việt Nam, these communities have lost their land, faced cultural and religious suppression, and endured constant surveillance. [12] 

As one Montagnard refugee family in Thailand recounted in 2018: 

“In Gia Lai, we were Protestants. We were regularly prevented from attending church, forbidden from gathering, and subjected to constant harassment.” [13] 

Seeking refuge, the couple crossed into Cambodia and eventually Thailand “because we knew the United Nations helped people facing persecution.”

They accepted the perils of exile to secure a measure of cultural and religious freedom that their homeland denied them. When apprehended by Thai police, their terror stemmed not from the threat of legal punishment but from the looming dread of deportation back to Việt Nam. [14]

The Montagnard refugee population in Thailand stands as undeniable evidence of the Vietnamese government’s repressive policies in the Central Highlands. [15] 

Because Bangkok serves as a regional hub for Southeast Asian civil society and human rights organizations, the continuous presence of these refugees creates a significant public relations crisis for the Vietnamese state. 

The authorities are entirely unable to justify why the Montagnards fled or why they would rather endure poverty and arrest than return.

Hence, aggressively encouraging the Montagnards to “return home” is the government’s primary strategy to erase this unexplainable stain.

Easier to Control

While Montagnards living abroad remain outside the direct reach of Vietnamese authorities, Hà Nội still wields significant regional influence, particularly in Cambodia, and frequently exerts pressure on the Thai government.

Over the past three years, cooperation between Việt Nam and Thailand regarding refugees has expanded significantly. Vietnamese security officials have repeatedly traveled to Thailand to pressure refugees to return and, in some cases, to facilitate their deportation. [16] The recent extradition of Y Quỳnh B’Đắp stands as an example of this bilateral cooperation. [17]

Nevertheless, there are limits to what foreign security services can accomplish in a third country. The dynamic shifts entirely once individuals return to Việt Nam.

The government easily exercises absolute control in a political system where the police possess increasing authority and face limited checks on their power. [18] 

The Central Highlands have long been described as a vast prison, where numerous Montagnards have been beaten, sent to reeducation camps, and detained without trial. [19] It remains one of the most heavily securitized regions in the entire country. [20]

Human Rights Watch, an organization that has monitored the rights of indigenous Montagnards in Việt Nam for years, has stated that it can only interview those who have “escaped” to third countries. The organization describes the Central Highlands as a place “that international human rights organizations cannot access.” [21]

This region is not only closed off to outsiders but also nearly impossible to leave. 

Security forces throughout the Central Highlands have been heavily reinforced for years specifically to prevent “illegal border crossings.” [22] While some have successfully escaped, those who remain face immense difficulties in leaving. 

Consequently, Montagnards are forced to resort to desperate measures, often taking dangerous and life-threatening routes to flee the country. [23]

Reframing the Human Rights Narrative

If the government is unable to adequately explain why the Montagnards departed, their return serves as convenient evidence to support an entirely new narrative.

This is evident in Hara Y Siêu’s letter, where he stated that “bad actors” had “propagandized” and “lured” him to Thailand with promises of a prosperous life. [24] He further claimed that he wanted to return to Việt Nam upon arrival but was actively prevented by the organization BPSOS (Boat People SOS)—a claim that BPSOS subsequently and categorically denied. [25]

Through these repatriations, the government successfully crafts an alternative explanation. The new official message asserts that those who fled were “manipulated” or “misled” by an entity the state has labeled a terrorist organization. 

Consequently, its leader—Nguyễn Đình Thắng—has faced similar government accusations of terrorism. In this state-approved version of events, these refugees eventually “realized the truth” and elected to return home.

The government, by promoting this narrative, presents itself as a “lenient” state that is eager to forgive and welcome back Montagnards who “made mistakes.” This provides officials with a coherent and favorable explanation for the ongoing crisis. [26]

The more refugees the authorities persuade to return, the more they reinforce the argument that these individuals were merely “misled” into leaving and experiencing hardship abroad.

It is difficult to verify whether state pressure or voluntary choice drives these returns. Regardless of the reasons, however, their return serves a singular purpose: ensuring that the repression, injustices, and deep-seated grievances endured by this community are no longer discussed, allowing the truth to simply fade from public attention.

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Thanh Anh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 29, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.