The Dao People and the Hidden Costs of Progress in Việt Nam

In the mountainous regions of northern Việt Nam, the Dao community offers a revealing lens into the tensions between economic growth, political control, and minority rights. 

The Dao (người Dao) are migrants of Yao/Mien origin from southern China who settled in northern Việt Nam from the 12th to the 20th centuries. Nearly 90,000 migrated in waves over centuries. Today they number about 891,000 (0.93% of Việt Nam’s population in 2019), making them the largest Hmong–Mien group in Việt Nam. 

Despite formal recognition and government programs aimed at poverty reduction, a growing body of independent reports and indirect testimonies points to a more complex reality, one in which Dao communities continue to bear the hidden costs of land expropriation, cultural constraints, and restrictions on religious expression. 

Thus, examining the situation of the Dao provides important insight into the structural contradictions embedded in Việt Nam’s approach to governance of ethnic minorities.

The Dao language is a Sinitic/Yao-Mien tongue, but most Dao also speak Vietnamese. Economically, Dao farmers rely on swidden rice, maize, and mountain vegetable plots. As upland people, they have customary use of communal forests for rice terraces, hunting, and herbs. 

Việt Nam officially recognizes the Dao (瑶族 Yáo zú) as one ethnic group. The Government Committee for Ethnic Affairs notes that there were 891,151 Dao as of 2019. Smaller numbers (in thousands) live among the Dao: Yên Bái ~100k, Quảng Ninh 73k, Hà Giang 127k, etc., with broad distribution across 30+ provinces. 

Dao subgroups number over 30 by traditional classifications; Vietnamese sources list major ones such as Dao Đỏ, Dao Tiền (Thanh Y), Dao Họ, Dao Quần Trắng, Dao Quần Chẹt, Dao Thanh Phán, Dao Tân Trào, Dao Đại Bản, and Dao Ngũ Sắc. These groups share some customs but wear distinct traditional dress patterns (especially women’s headscarves and tunics). 

Legal Framework and Policies

Việt Nam’s constitution and laws nominally protect ethnic minorities, but all land is owned by the state (allocated as use rights) under the Land Law (2013) and the Constitution. 

The 2013 Constitution (Art. 5) declares all ethnic groups “equal” and the Communist Party as the leading force. Việt Nam has ethnic minority development programs (e.g., National Target Programs 135 and periodic “Master Plans” for 2011–2020 and 2021–2030). 

These pledges focus on infrastructure, schooling, and poverty reduction in minority areas, acknowledging the Dao among groups that need support. Việt Nam has also ratified many international human rights treaties but implements them via party-led policies. 

For example, Vietnam endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) but does not officially recognize any of its 54 ethnic groups, including the Dao, as “indigenous peoples” in a distinct legal or political sense. Instead, the government views all 54 recognized ethnic groups as constituent parts of a single multiethnic nation and rejects claims to separate ethnic autonomy, emphasizing national unity within a framework of “unity in diversity.”

In practice, autonomy is limited: local Dao representatives participate within the Communist Party-led system, but independent ethnic organizations are not permitted.

Land rights are also constrained. Because all land is owned by the state and individuals hold only land-use rights, Dao communities, like many other ethnic minority groups in Vietnam, have at times experienced resettlement, restrictions on access to customary forest lands, and land acquisition for conservation or development projects, typically with compensation determined by state procedures rather than market value.

Officials frequently classify agribusiness, conservation, or infrastructure projects as serving the “public interest,” allowing the state to acquire land-use rights. Although the law requires compensation and, where necessary, relocation assistance, critics often describe its implementation as inadequate. 

Dao customary practices of communal forest tenure are not fully recognized under Vietnamese land law, which can leave communities vulnerable when land is reallocated for development or conservation purposes. 

In practice, ethnic minorities seldom prevail in land disputes: pursuing claims through the courts is costly, court decisions often favor state authorities or developers, and plaintiffs may face intimidation. Vietnamese media coverage typically emphasizes the benefits of development projects while giving comparatively little attention to the impact on ethnic minority communities.

The 2016 Law on Belief and Religion requires religious groups apart from Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, and Islam to register as “new religious movements” and to obtain pre-approval before establishing places of worship. 

Officials hold broad discretion to prohibit practices deemed “superstitious” or “unauthorized.” Although Dao folk religion is not organized as a formal church, spirit mediumship rituals may attract official scrutiny and be labeled “tà đạo” (evil cult). 

Any Dao religious communities that are registered (house churches) experience harassment as “illegal” gatherings. Government sources tout legal protections for culture, but a clause on “national security” overrides rights if communities are considered separatist or influenced by foreign missionaries. 

Regarding cultural and political rights, Vietnamese policy supports and funds the preservation of “traditional festivals” associated with ethnic minority groups such as the Dao. These include, for example, Tết Nguyên Đán (the Lunar New Year, celebrated nationwide in Vietnam) and Lễ cấp sắc (a traditional Dao initiation ceremony marking spiritual and social maturity). Such programs are often presented as efforts to showcase and preserve cultural heritage.

However, this state patronage coexists with assimilation pressures. Instruction in Dao languages in formal education is rare, and schooling and employment opportunities strongly incentivize the use of Vietnamese as the primary language of instruction and upward mobility.

While regulations such as local-language broadcasting quotas exist, they are only weakly implemented. Politically, ethnic minorities have reserved seats in local People’s Councils. However, the Kinh majority continues to dominate high-level positions within the party state, and minority cadres report only token involvement in decision-making. Official policy emphasizes poverty alleviation (e.g., the Master Plan 2021–30), yet observers have noted that disparities remain entrenched. 

Dao Cultural and Religious Life 

Dao traditional religion is centered on ancestor worship and nature spirits. Every family keeps a kitchen shrine (for ancestors and household gods). Community “đình” and “miếu” (shrines) are common. The Dao people believe in tutelary forest gods (Ma rừng) and water deities, and they conduct annual offerings to ensure crop fertility. 

Unique to the Dao is the lễ cấp sắc initiation ritual, a male coming-of-age ceremony in which ritual authority is formally conferred through a complex system of texts, symbols, and ordination rites influenced by Daoist cosmology but embedded in distinct Dao religious traditions. The Nguyễn dynasty also historically recognized certain Dao ritual specialists (liễu bản shrine priests) and supported Dao weaving guilds.

The French anthropologist H. Moyroud documented Dao manuscripts written in Chinese characters, which Dao practitioners used for ritual incantations (Dao script). Now, the Vietnamese government has designated the Lễ cấp sắc of the Dao people an intangible heritage to promote. 

Some Dao have converted to Christianity (usually Catholicism or Evangelical Protestantism). According to observers, Dao Protestants often belong to denominations active in Central Highlands missions; a small Dao Evangelical Church (Dao Tiếng Kinh) also exists. 

However, authorities have targeted independent Dao religious gatherings that lack official recognition. For example, U.S. State Department reports document that local authorities have sometimes labeled Dao Christians as practicing a “heretical sect.” 

In 2004, provincial police in Gia Lai Province in the Central Highlands beat two Dao Protestants for performing unregistered services, requiring them to be hospitalized for five days. The authorities reportedly justified such actions as cracking down on “illegal religion” in remote districts, but it left Dao communities frightened. (It is unclear how many Dao in the north are Christian, but these cases suggest a small pocket of Dao believers was present even in the far south.) 

Then there’s Dao “shamanism” (spirit mediumship), a practice that is not illegal per se. However, unorthodox practices like spirit possession are routinely managed and pressured to conform to official cultural guidelines. During COVID-19 the government suspended all group ceremonies, including Dao priest rituals. 

Despite the persistence of Dao cultural practices, they continue to be tightly constrained. Younger generations are increasingly shifting toward Vietnamese-language schooling and media, which steadily dilutes native language use. To counter these trends, the government has promoted bilingual signage and some Dao-language radio programming in remote communes, but implementation remains patchy. 

Dao traditional medicine (herbalism) is widely practiced, though Dao-born healers must operate within the state-sponsored medical system or risk accusations of “unauthorized practice.” 

Land and Resource Rights 

Dao communities have a deep spiritual and material tie to the land and forests. Customarily, each clan’s sacred forest (lâm phần) was off-limits to logging and protected by ritual. However, these customary tenure systems conflict with Việt Nam’s state land regime. 

After 1954, successive land campaigns collectivized Dao holdings, later granting “use rights” to families, but with frequent reconfigurations. 

From the 1990s onwards, Việt Nam launched numerous “poverty reduction” programs and “new economic zones.” In some cases, Dao households were moved to government-built resettlement hamlets with infrastructure (roads and schools), often at a steep cultural cost. 

In other instances, Dao families lost their land entirely to reservoirs, plantations, or military sites, and they did so without receiving fair consent. Hydropower projects illustrate the pattern. 

A 2015 study (Do and Brennon) reports that the Tuyên Quang 1 Reservoir (completed in 2008) forcibly relocated ~20,138 people (4,139 households) across Tuyên Quang, Hà Giang, and Bắc Kạn, including large numbers of Dao and Tày. Each family received only 400 m² of new homelands (instead of communal rice terraces) and was allocated plots in forest reserves that were non-arable. 

Dao and Tày villagers who were surveyed said the compensation land was of poor quality, causing food shortages and land conflicts; host communities complained that the Dao received benefits that local Kinh/Tày did not. Similar issues arose in other projects (A Vuông dam, A Lưới, and Lai Châu). 

Official records tout these programs as “uplifting ethnic minorities,” but independent analysis finds many Dao resettlers are worse off. (A UN Food Rapporteur in 2018 noted remote Dao sites and persistent “adverse impacts” on food security.) 

Land conflict cases are rarely publicized. In the local language, Dao often petition for the return of communal forests or protest inadequate land titles. For example, after 2010, a few Dao families in Sơn La or Yên Bái protested against rubber or tea plantations overtaking their upland fields. 

Forest access is also curtailed. Government logging bans (for watershed protection or private concessions) have restricted Dao hunting and foraging. In northern provinces (Lạng Sơn, Cao Bằng), Dao hunters have been fined or detained for cutting wood or trapping outside their villages, accused of “illegal logging” even for traditional use. 

In some cases, villagers allege that state or private entities bribed officials to redraw forest boundaries. Such patterns echo the experiences of other minorities; e.g., a 2008 HRW report on the Central Highlands noted that the authorities had labeled indigenous land claims as threats to “national solidarity.” Similar dynamics likely affect the Dao, though English sources rarely document explicit cases. 

Documented Cases of Abuses 

Below, we summarize documented incidents involving the Dao, noting dates, locations, victims, and abuses.

In September 2004, in Gia Lai Province, in the Central Highlands, local officials beat two Dao Protestant believers and hospitalized them for 5 days. Local officials accused the Dao believers of participating in an “illegal religious gathering.” This case was unusual because it involved Dao Protestants in the Central Highlands, suggesting that even small Dao Christian groups are seen as threats.

In 2006–2007, Dao and Tay ethnic villagers in Tuyên Quang, Hà Giang, and Bắc Kạn provinces experienced forced relocation to make way for the construction of a hydropower reservoir.

From 2014 to the present, various northern communes and Dao villagers have seized land, been forced to move, and received poor compensation.

From 2000 to the present, remote Dao regions experienced restrictions on their practice of a traditional religion, surveillance of shamans, and occasional arrests on vague charges. The state monitors or suppresses religious practices it does not recognize, partly out of fear that unsanctioned spiritual groups could form independent networks.

Analysis of Patterns, Causes, and Motives

The documented incidents reveal a pattern: Dao minority rights are secondary to state development and security goals. Việt Nam’s one-party state prioritizes national unity and economic growth over minority autonomy.

Commonly, rural projects (dams, plantations, and military farms) are deemed to be “in the national interest,” making Dao land vulnerable. When Dao or other upland villagers resist displacement or legal irregularities, the authorities typically deploy police to intimidate them. 

Underlying government motives are often described as including securing natural resources such as hydropower, minerals, and forest products, sometimes through the relocation or resettlement of upland communities, including the Dao.

Another set of motivations relates to political and security concerns, including efforts to integrate ethnic minorities into a unified national identity to prevent perceived separatism, as well as to demonstrate state control over border and upland regions near the Chinese frontier where many Dao communities live.

Reports suggest that while central policy allegedly aims to improve minority welfare, local implementation is highly variable. In areas where Dao communities lack strong local advocacy, abuses go unchecked.

There is little legal recourse: Dao plaintiffs rarely win land lawsuits, and even when they breach laws, enforcement remains weak. Corruption also plays a role, with some officials profiting from granting logging licenses or mining concessions on Dao land.

Dao communities have limited capacity to resist. Some villagers petition local People’s Committees, but such complaints rarely result in a reversal of decisions. In some cases, Dao priests or youths have fled to cities or abroad.

International bodies have urged Việt Nam to improve minority rights. In UPR reviews and CERD reports, UN Member States repeatedly recommended better protection of communal lands, languages, and religious freedoms for all ethnic groups. Việt Nam’s government responses typically assert that programs and laws are in place or that reported abuses are due to “criminal elements” and not ethnic policies. 

There is no evidence of official willingness to reform regarding issues of land seizures affecting the Dao specifically. Việt Nam’s rhetoric on the Dao remains positive in state media: recent articles praise Dao culture and the importance of maintaining Dao traditions amid modernization. 

Yet this coexists with repressive practices. Notably, Dao leaders (e.g., local officials of Dao ethnicity) rarely speak out publicly about abuses, likely due to party loyalty and fear of career consequences.

Recent Developments 

In the last few years, Việt Nam has reiterated its commitment to ethnic minority development, nominally aiming for equity. There have been some improvements: basic infrastructure (roads, electricity) has reached many Dao villages, and literacy rates are slowly rising. 

However, the overall trajectory of rights remains constrained. Notably, COVID-19 control measures in 2020–21 extended long-standing travel restrictions for remote ethnic communes (requiring police permits to enter or exit), though authorities eased these restrictions by 2022.

In 2025, Việt Nam’s re-election to the UN Human Rights Council drew criticism from some NGOs due to persistent ethnic tensions. No major new land grabs were publicly announced, but anecdotal reports suggest Dao farmers continue to struggle against encroachment by state-approved agribusinesses.

A new issue is climate change: flooding (from both dams and extreme weather) threatens Dao upland farmers. The central government’s “green growth” plans may ironically target even more of the mountainous forestland that has historically been used by Dao.

In remote Việt Nam, the absence of independent media hampers the documentation of abuses against the Dao. Most available information comes from NGO/UN reports or academic studies that often focus on minorities in general. Many alleged incidents (harassment, local land conflicts, movement controls) go unreported internationally.

Vietnamese-language coverage in state media is also unlikely to mention abuses. Because Dao villages are isolated, no one can publicly verify the exact numbers of evictions or detentions. 

Official data on ethnic equity is mostly statistical (poverty rates, school enrollment) and does not reveal rights violations. Thus, communities remember some alleged abuses (e.g., forced resettlements in the 1980s or religious pressures) but lack published evidence.

Despite gaps in the available documentation, there’s a recurring pattern in which Dao communities, alongside other upland ethnic minorities, are frequently affected by development and state-led land management policies, with limited access to effective safeguards or mechanisms of redress. 

The State emphasizes a framework of unity among its 54 recognized ethnic groups and presents an image of harmonious multi-ethnic development, while minority perspectives and locally articulated grievances tend to be less visible in national-level media and policy narratives. 

International organizations and human rights reporting have raised concerns regarding these dynamics, although such external engagement has so far resulted in limited observable changes in land governance practices or in the institutional participation of ethnic minority communities.