Việt Nam’s Special Land Policies: The Beneficiaries are Not Ordinary Citizens – Part 3

For years, land disputes in Việt Nam have been profoundly unequal contests, pitting ordinary citizens struggling to protect their homes and livelihoods against government authorities and large corporations armed with legal documentation, administrative powers, and superior resources. [1] 

This imbalance appears to have become even more pronounced since May 1, 2026, adding further weight to the already stronger side. 

On that date, Resolution 29/2026 took effect to establish special mechanisms and policies for handling land law violations. It includes an expanded scope for exemptions from criminal liability—a special doorway that does not appear to be open to ordinary citizens. [2] [3]

Special Mechanisms Favor the Powerful

Under Article 2 of the resolution, special mechanisms and policies apply to agencies, organizations, and individuals involved in land law violations or stalled projects. While this provision appears to cover a broad range of actors, analyzing how land projects operate reveals that the true beneficiaries are individuals with power and resources, not ordinary citizens.

This disparity exists because project violations rarely arise from the isolated actions of private land users; instead, they stem from administrative decisions made by those with official authority. [4] Only officials, civil servants, and public employees have the power to allocate or recover land, determine prices, and approve projects. 

This dynamic is evident in a Ministry of Justice summary report, which notes that between July 1, 2016, and July 31, 2023, a total of 28,055 administrative decisions made by the People’s Committees were challenged in court nationwide. [5] Most of these lawsuits involved land recovery, revoked certificates, and land complaints.

The Long Thành International Airport project illustrates this issue. On Feb. 25, police in Đồng Nai Province prosecuted multiple officials—including the former chairman of the Long Thành District People’s Committee—for violations related to evaluating compensation for households whose land was recovered. [6]

Furthermore, Article 10 of Resolution 29/2026 establishes special disciplinary mechanisms for officials and armed forces members, allowing for exemptions or postponements of disciplinary action for up to two years. Project developers, who frequently commit violations such as unauthorized construction or improper land use, are similarly positioned to benefit. [7]

Ordinary citizens have virtually no opportunities or authority to commit such violations, let alone legalize them. They are typically the affected parties suffering from land recovery or delayed compensation. As a result, these special mechanisms cater primarily to those managing and exploiting projects.

Resolution 29/2026 also introduces exemptions such as deferred criminal prosecution and exemptions from criminal liability, provided that the actions serve socioeconomic or security goals and involve no corruption. [8] [9] 

Because these conditions are closely linked to the activities of state agencies and developers, the resolution—despite being framed as a broad solution to administrative obstacles—effectively clears the way only for those already possessing power and financial resources.

An Unusual Cutoff Date

Another noteworthy aspect of Resolution 29/2026 is its highly specific scope of application: the special mechanisms apply exclusively to violations that occurred before Aug. 1, 2024. Technically, this date marks the entry into force of the 2024 Land Law. [10] 

From a legislative drafting perspective, it serves as a logical dividing line between the old and new legal frameworks, aligning with the goal of resolving difficulties that existed prior to the new law’s implementation.

However, closer scrutiny reveals a striking coincidence: this cutoff date is exceptionally close to Aug. 3, 2024, the day Tô Lâm was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of Việt Nam. [11]

While the proximity of these two events does not inherently prove a causal relationship or confirm that the resolution was designed for a specific political objective, it understandably invites public skepticism. 

When a legal amnesty of sorts ties closely to a date associated with a national leader’s assumption of power, valid questions arise. 

Why should violations committed before this date receive special treatment while subsequent ones do not? Furthermore, why should the boundary of legal responsibility depend on an administrative transition rather than the severity or nature of the conduct?

If the Aug. 1, 2024, cutoff is genuinely intended only to correspond with the new Land Law, Resolution 29/2026 demands a much clearer explanation to avoid undermining public confidence in the law’s impartiality.

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Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 5, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.