Resolution 29/2026 not only moves ahead of the Penal Code, but it also creates an excessively broad mechanism for exemption from criminal liability. [1]
This framework closely mirrors the direction of the Penal Code amendments that the Ministry of Public Security released for public consultation from April 17, 2026, to May 7, 2026. [2] [3]
The primary difference is that one involves specific provisions already in force, while the other is still a set of broad proposals.
What is most concerning, however, is that the active provisions in Resolution 29/2026 are nearly as vague as the general proposals found in the draft policy for amending the Penal Code.
Vague Legal Definitions Loopholes
Under Resolution 29/2026, special mechanisms such as deferred prosecution and exemption from criminal liability depend on several conditions.
These include serving the purpose of socio-economic development or national defense and security, involving no corruption, committing to remedying consequences, and generating socio-economic benefits. [4] [5]
However, the resolution attempts to define these conditions in an extremely vague manner without specific criteria. The concept of “generating socio-economic benefits,” for instance, is explained broadly as promoting economic growth, attracting investment, creating jobs, improving infrastructure, enhancing living standards, and ensuring social welfare.
Because these criteria are highly expansive, nearly any land-related project could be framed using such favorable language. [6] A new urban development can claim to improve infrastructure, an industrial park can highlight job creation, and a commercial or tourism project can boast about attracting investment and promoting local economic growth.
Furthermore, the resolution sets no concrete thresholds for what qualifies as “beneficial.” It does not specify how many jobs must be created, what level of budget contribution is significant, or when these benefits should be measured—whether upon project completion, after years of operation, or at the moment criminal liability is evaluated.
Without clear benchmarks, the “generating socio-economic benefits” condition can be applied to virtually any project.
The requirement to act “for the purpose of socio-economic development” is equally vulnerable to abuse. Most land sector projects are linked to broader goals like urban renewal or improving living standards, rather than being purely profit-driven. Yet, the noble objectives stated in project documents do not always reflect reality.
These broadly worded provisions may allow land-related violations to hide behind claims of development, while primarily serving the commercial interests of investors. Hence, these vague definitions create significant opportunities to abuse the mechanisms intended to exempt offenders from criminal liability.
Compromising Legal Integrity
Beyond providing vague definitions, the conditions required to benefit from the special leniency mechanisms under Resolution 29/2026 are inherently problematic because they promote a distorted understanding of the law.
By tying exemptions to “generating socio-economic benefits” and “the purpose of socio-economic development,” the legislation prioritizes outcomes over lawful processes.
This logic suggests that if a project ultimately achieves positive developmental results, we can overlook any violations committed during its implementation. However, a rigorous and fair legal system can not be built on such a foundation.
No matter how beneficial a project may be, stated goals do not erase the non-transparent land acquisitions or fraudulent practices that enabled it.
Focusing solely on results creates dangerous loopholes, particularly in the land sector, where development goals and public-interest justifications are frequently used to arbitrarily encroach upon citizens’ land-use rights.
Another highly concerning aspect of Resolution 29/2026 is its reliance on the full remediation of consequences as a central requirement for criminal exemption. While pragmatic for state asset recoverythis approach effectivelyly transforms criminal liability into a matter of financial capacity.
Two offenders causing identical harm may face vastly different outcomes simply because one is wealthy enough to pay for remediation. This disparity is glaring in real estate, where well-funded developers can easily satisfy these financial requirements, while ordinary citizens can not.
While remediation is valuable, it should remain a mitigating factor in sentencing rather than a decisive basis for total exemption. Elevating it to an exemption requirement turns legal violations into transactional business expenses. Offenders can simply calculate the costs of breaking the law, reasoning that compensating for harm later will suffice.
Furthermore, this purely financial metric ignores the immeasurable non-material harms of unlawful land recovery, such as the long-term deprivation of homes, livelihoods, and public trust.
It is true that not all land-related violations stem from corruption; many arise from overlapping regulations and administrative errors accumulated over multiple terms. Criminalizing every infraction would indefinitely paralyze both investors and normal citizens.
Nevertheless, the solution to legal inconsistency is not an excessively broad escape route. The state must instead carefully classify wrongdoing, ensure transparent damage assessments, and separate public interests from special interests. Without these guardrails in place, these leniency mechanisms become selective avenues of escape that favor those wealthy enough to purchase the law’s indulgence.
Unfortunately, since Resolution 29/2026 took effect on May 1, 2026, these exemptions have expanded significantly.
Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 4, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. Government of Việt Nam. (2026). Resolution No. 29/2026/QH16 of the National Assembly: Special mechanisms and policies to address land-law violations committed by organizations and individuals before the 2024 Land Law took effect and to resolve difficulties and obstacles facing delayed and prolonged projects. Chinhphu.vn. https://vanban.chinhphu.vn/?pageid=27160&docid=218062&classid=1
2. Trường An. (2026, May 15). Việt Nam’s Penal Code Reform: The Contradictions of the New Leniency Policy. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/05/viet-nams-penal-code-reform-the-contradictions-of-the-new-leniency-policy/
3. Lê Sáng. (2026, April 20). Việt Nam’s Penal Code Revision: Police Proposes Deferring Prosecution for Economic Crimes. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/viet-nams-penal-code-revision-police-proposes-deferring-prosecution-for-economic-crimes/
4. Lê Sáng. (2026, May 5). Việt Nam National Assembly Passes Resolution 29/2026: Criminal Liability Deferral for ‘Non-Corrupt’ Land Violations—The Resolution Came Before the Penal Code. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/05/viet-nam-national-assembly-passes-resolution-29-2026-criminal-liability-deferral-for-non-corrupt-land-violations-the-resolution-came-before-the-penal-code/
5. Lê Sáng. (2026, May 5). Việt Nam’s Resolution 29/2026 Grants Exemption from Criminal Liability if Fully Remedied. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/05/viet-nams-resolution-29-2026-grants-exemption-from-criminal-liability-if-fully-remedied/
6. DoanhNhanVn. (2024, November). Billion-dollar megaprojects expected to give Việt Nam a new look. Doanh Nhan Viet Nam. https://doanhnhanvn.vn/nhung-dai-du-an-ty-usd-se-mang-lai-dien-mao-moi-cho-viet-nam.html










