Does Việt Nam Have Press Freedom? The Answer Goes Beyond the RSF Index

The familiar war of words over press freedom between the Vietnamese government and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) resumes every year. 

On June 21, 2026, VTV4 launched “View from Hanoi,” a broadcast featuring interviews with government-affiliated experts who argued why RSF is “wrong” to consistently rank Việt Nam among the countries with the least press freedom. [1] Their core argument remains unchanged: RSF’s Press Freedom Index is a political tool designed to destabilize the nation and discredit Việt Nam’s “developed, free, and stable” press.

Because this debate has continued for years with no resolution, readers have become fatigued, leading many to question the actual state of press freedom in Việt Nam.

To answer that question, one must look beyond the rhetoric from either side and examine the realities of Việt Nam’s media environment. By relying on concrete indicators, readers can look past abstract layers of rhetoric and make a fair assessment.

The West vs. The Government

As one of the most frequently cited international organizations in assessments of press freedom, RSF ranked Việt Nam 174th out of 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, marking it as the lowest in Southeast Asia. [2] 

For more than two decades since the index was created, Việt Nam has almost always remained among the bottom 10 countries. RSF argues that the Vietnamese press lacks independence due to tight government control. Because journalists whose reporting deviates from political directives become targets of surveillance and arrest, RSF describes Việt Nam as “one of the world’s biggest prisons for journalists.” [3] [4]

However, the Vietnamese side rejects this assessment. [5] Speaking on VTV4, Vietnam Journalists Association Standing Vice Chairman Nguyễn Đức Lợi asserted that Việt Nam maintains a free and stable press. As evidence, he cited the “large number of journalists” who have uncovered numerous cases of wrongdoing and corruption. [6] 

He challenged the RSF claims directly, asking, “If there were restrictions and bans, how could works of journalism like these exist?”

What is Fact and What is Fiction?

Because the two sides begin with fundamentally different understandings of press freedom, they are unlikely to ever agree. RSF defines press freedom as the ability to work “without political, economic, legal, and social interference.” [7] Conversely, Việt Nam’s Press Law provides citizens with the right to freedom of speech within the press, yet mandates that media organizations remain under state management. Functioning as a “revolutionary press,” the media is expected to serve as a “forum for the people” while carrying the political mission of “guiding public opinion.” [8] [9]

In practice, Việt Nam’s media environment has changed significantly over the past 20 years. However, these changes are not reflected in Việt Nam’s nearly static RSF rankings or in the government’s assertion that its press has always maintained a strong watchdog role.

When Luật Khoa raised this question, RSF advocacy manager Aleksandra Bielakowska defended the index’s credibility while candidly acknowledging its underlying advocacy purpose. Although she stated that RSF checks every piece of information against multiple knowledgeable, credible, and independent sources, she also offered a caveat.

“However,” Bielakowska said, “it is important to understand that our index is first and foremost an advocacy tool. Even though it uses scientific research methods, it cannot fully capture the complex developments in a country’s media environment.”

While RSF acknowledges the limitations of its approach, the Vietnamese government continues to label any contrary position as a distortion. Hence, to truly understand the state of press freedom in Việt Nam, one must not simply choose a side to believe but instead examine what continues to happen in practice.

A Documented Reality of Imprisoning Journalists

According to statistics from several organizations, Việt Nam has one of the world’s highest numbers of imprisoned journalists.

PEN America reported that Việt Nam ranked fourth worldwide in the number of jailed writers in 2025. [10] Additionally, a Việt Nam Media Project report analyzing data from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) found that a record 14 independent journalists were imprisoned in 2020 and 2021, often facing charges related to “anti-state” activities. [11]

During this period, authorities arrested Phạm Đoan Trang, a co-founder of Luật Khoa Magazine, and sentenced her to nine years in prison. [12] More recently, on June 1, 2024, prominent journalist Trương Huy San, also known as Huy Đức and author of “Bên Thắng Cuộc” (“The Winning Side”), was arrested and later sentenced to 30 months in prison. [13]

Following repeated but unsuccessful attempts to work directly with the Vietnamese government, RSF gradually changed its strategy. The organization began working with international partners, hoping that they would raise the issue of press freedom during discussions with Việt Nam. 

Simultaneously, RSF shifted its focus away from promoting systemic change and toward the direct support and protection of independent journalists. This effort includes advocating for better detention conditions and medical care for those imprisoned, as well as assisting journalists forced into exile or seeking asylum abroad.

The Gray Area of a Once-Critical Press

While it is true that Việt Nam has no privately owned press and all legal media outlets operate under government management—with independent organizations routinely suppressed—it would not be entirely fair to dismiss every domestic outlet as a propaganda “loudspeaker.”

According to the 2023 study “Between State Tolerance and Direct Control of Mass Media in Vietnam: The Rise and Decline of ‘Quasi-Private’ Press” by Xuan-Huong Nguyen and Yooil Bae, political responsibilities and levels of dependence on supervising agencies varied. [14] By achieving financial autonomy, many major newspapers gained greater freedom in their reporting. Hồ Chí Minh City, in particular, remained the country’s most vibrant media center after 1975, hosting numerous influential publications.

This environment expanded with the growth of the internet. As the state struggled to regulate the digital landscape, technology companies developed their own news platforms, including VnExpress, Zing News, and Kênh14, which disrupted traditional government control over the press.

As a result, Việt Nam cultivated a diverse corps of journalists dedicated to advancing media autonomy and the public’s right to information. This commitment was evident during the PMU-18 corruption scandal at the Ministry of Transport between 2006 and 2008, when newspapers like Thanh Niên and Tuổi Trẻ exposed the wrongdoing of Permanent Deputy Minister Nguyễn Việt Tiến.

Subsequent reporting on the Vinashin scandal in 2010 and 2011, the Thủ Thiêm land dispute in 2018, and the Hồ Duy Hải case in 2020 further demonstrated that the domestic press was once capable of holding authorities accountable. [15] [16]

Although there were always red lines that could not be crossed, the press in Việt Nam once enjoyed a vibrant period. However, recent government actions have squeezed and eliminated that space. [17]

Mass Media Closures

On June 30, a series of long-established and prominent newspapers and magazines in Hồ Chí Minh City reached their end. [18] Tuổi Trẻ ceased its print publication, and seven other outlets—including Phụ Nữ (Women), Pháp Luật TP.HCM (HCMC Law), and Tạp chí Kinh tế Sài Gòn (Sài Gòn Economy Magazine)—shut down entirely. [19] In response, social media was filled with wistful farewells to publications that had been a part of readers’ lives for generations.

However, the death knell for these outlets had actually sounded in 2019, when the government issued a decision approving a comprehensive press development and management plan through 2025. [20] This plan has been described as “the state’s most heavy-handed intervention in Việt Nam’s press system since 1975.” [21]

Officially, the initiative was intended to “address overlap, scattered investment, lax management, and operations that stray from stated mandates and purposes.” In practice, it dealt a severe blow to the “large” and “critical” press corps that the Vietnamese government had cited when rejecting the RSF assessment.

The state reduced the number of organizations authorized to oversee media outlets and limited each organization to a single newspaper, stripping them of the multiple titles they had previously operated. As the political apparatus was streamlined, the press underwent a second round of “major surgery.” [22]

By the end of 2025, the total number of media organizations had fallen by 117, dropping from 850 to 733. The number of newspapers was nearly halved, plummeting from 179 to 98, while radio and television stations dropped from 72 to 38. [23] Many outlets, most notably Zing News, were forced to reclassify as magazines. The state either merged or shut down numerous respected publications that boasted large readerships, financial independence, and histories of investigative reporting.

At the same time, the state set a goal to build six major media conglomerates centered around party- and state-run newspapers. These favored conglomerates include outlets like Nhân Dân (The People), a publication that has historically depended on public funding and lacked market competitiveness. [24]

Online Space Under Increasingly Tight Control

The internet once provided bloggers and independent writers with a platform to perform watchdog functions; however, social media companies are now increasingly complying with government requests to remove content. [25] Furthermore, the revised Press Law, passed on Dec. 10, 2025, grants the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—the police—an authority to order media outlets to immediately remove any information deemed to violate the law. [26]

Simultaneously, authorities have imposed a wave of penalties on users for posting information classified as “false” or for interacting with pages branded as “reactionary.” Bloggers have also been arrested on “anti-state” charges. [27] [28] [29]

The government Decree 174/2026, which took effect on July 1, officially increased the familiar 7.5 million đồng fine for providing or sharing “false” information to a range between 20 million and 50 million đồng. [30] [31] Crucially, it remains up to the police and other government agencies to determine what constitutes true or false information. [32]

Beyond suppressing critical voices, the government is actively building a network of pro-government voices online. According to a draft reviewed by Reuters, Việt Nam is considering the creation of a network comprising at least 1,000 key opinion leaders (KOLs) and 5,000 artificial intelligence specialists by 2030 to spread “positive” content. [33]

More broadly, international advocacy and human rights pressure have exerted less influence on the Vietnamese government in recent years. In her interview with Luật Khoa, Bielakowska stated that “where there was once at least some room for negotiation, Việt Nam now tells its international partners bluntly that they may discuss economics or defense, but it will not accept dialogue on human rights.”

The Gaps Left Behind

Following a series of purges, the press has increasingly lost its watchdog role as self-censorship becomes deeply entrenched. [34] As Bielakowska noted, while Việt Nam may not have killed journalists, political and legal pressure has successfully paralyzed free journalism at home, forcing those who want to practice independent journalism to report from abroad.

Offering a similar assessment, a formerly imprisoned journalist who requested anonymity for safety reasons stated:

“In the past, domestic newspapers still published hard-hitting, independent investigations, some of which even touched senior leaders. Now, if you buy five newspapers, all five are the same. They all reprint government announcements, and even the images and content look nearly identical.”

This uniformity was evident when controversy over E10 gasoline erupted on social media. Domestic news outlets reported in unison that the public “supported” the fuel and were “satisfied,” while VnExpress hid the results of a survey showing that more than 90% of respondents expressed concern. [35] [36] [37] Similarly, during the clearance of the Red River dike area, the press remained almost entirely silent regarding the objections and protests of residents. [38]

A journalism researcher, also requesting anonymity for safety reasons, explained that as media outlets close, the supply of state-defined “official” information becomes thinner and more homogeneous, making people more likely to turn to “unofficial” channels.

According to this researcher, control measures cannot eliminate the human need to seek and share information. Despite the risks, citizens will still find ways to speak out when their interests are at stake. For example, residents of the Red River dike area created their own Facebook groups to exchange information and organize opposition. [39]

“The difference is that, in the near future, there may no longer be an official newspaper willing to stand with them, as some did in the past,” the researcher said. “Vietnamese people realize their press freedom has already declined without having to see a Western organization’s ranking.”

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Đặng Thanh Sơn wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on August 7, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine translated it into English.