If Việt Nam Abolishes the Procuracy’s Investigative Agency, Who Investigates the Investigators?

A recent proposal that could abolish the Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy and transfer its authority to investigative bodies within the People’s Public Security forces and the People’s Army is currently being debated by the public and legal experts. [1]

​Drafted by the Ministry of Public Security, it was among the most notable proposals presented to the National Assembly on Aug. 20, when the 16th National Assembly considered the policy direction of a revised Law on the Organization of Criminal Investigation Agencies. [2]

​At the heart of this debate is a central question: will transferring this authority make investigations more impartial, as supporters contend, or will it merely shift the conflict of interest from one agency to another?

Remaining Concerns

The Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy is currently responsible for handling a specialized category of crimes. These include offenses against judicial activities, as well as corruption and office-related crimes committed during judicial proceedings by officials, civil servants, or other authorized personnel working for investigative agencies, procuracies, courts, or judgment enforcement agencies. 

This specific jurisdiction is defined in Article 20 of the 2014 Law on the Organization of People’s Procuracies, Clause 3 of Article 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and Article 30 of the 2015 Law on the Organization of Criminal Investigation Agencies. [3] [4] [5]

If the announced schedule proceeds, the National Assembly will consider and pass the bill during its second session in October 2026, with the law potentially taking effect on March 1, 2027. [6]

The Ministry of Public Security has defended its proposal to abolish the agency by arguing that allowing the Supreme People’s Procuracy to exercise prosecutorial authority, supervise judicial activities, and operate its own investigative body at the same time could undermine impartiality and weaken the checks and balances between investigation and prosecution. [7]

This is not a novel criticism, as the procuracy’s dual role in Việt Nam has long sparked academic debate. [8] The current model bears the imprint of the Soviet-era prokuratura—a system with documented deficiencies that differs substantially from prosecutorial institutions found in Western legal systems. [9]

However, the main concern is that the proposed alternative might not offer true improvement. If this authority is transferred, a police officer under investigation would be probed by an investigator operating under the exact same Ministry of Public Security umbrella. 

Even though the procuracy would technically retain its authority to prosecute and supervise investigations, its actual power to enforce oversight could be substantially diminished.

The 0.04% Caseload Argument 

One of the primary arguments presented to demonstrate that the Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy is unnecessary is that it receives and handles very few cases.

Between Jan. 1, 2018, and March 2026, the agency processed 390 cases, representing 0.04% of all cases handled by investigative bodies. [10] While this statistic might suggest that transferring the agency’s authority would have little impact on overall investigative operations, it ignores the exceptionally narrow scope of its jurisdiction.

The agency is specifically tasked with addressing conduct that corrupts the administration of justice, such as coercing confessions, utilizing torture or corporal punishment, falsifying case files, failing to prosecute offenders, issuing unlawful decisions, and accepting bribes during judicial proceedings. Consequently, the low volume of cases is a direct reflection of this highly specialized mandate.

Although infrequent, these offenses carry enormous consequences. Severe harm results when an investigator falsifies evidence, a detention officer employs torture, or an official deliberately permits an offender to escape justice. Such misconduct undermines confidence across the entire continuum of investigation, prosecution, and trial.

Two prominent cases highlight the agency’s role in fostering transparency and preventing wrongful convictions. 

In July 2025, the agency launched a criminal investigation and detained five correctional officers, guards, and noncommissioned officers from the former Kiên Giang provincial police detention center over allegations that they utilized corporal punishment resulting in a prisoner’s death. [11] 

Furthermore, in March 2026, the agency detained a former deputy head of a police investigation agency and a former investigator with the Trà Ôn District Police in Vĩnh Long, investigating them on allegations of “failing to prosecute a guilty person” following a fatal traffic crash involving a female student. [12]

Social media users have repeatedly pointed to these specific cases as proof of the agency’s enduring necessity. The resistance to dismantling the agency is further fueled by longstanding apprehensions concerning the Ministry of Public Security’s expansive authority and the inherent risk of creating conflicts of interest.

The Risk of Conflicting Interests

The proposal to transfer the investigative authority of the Supreme People’s Procuracy to the People’s Public Security forces has sparked fears that the Ministry of Public Security will effectively be “both playing and refereeing the game.” Because investigators and their subjects would operate under the same branch and chain of command, a conflict of interest is inevitable, regardless of individual efforts to remain impartial.

In 2018, the United Nations Committee Against Torture recommended that Việt Nam establish an independent mechanism to process complaints against the police and investigate allegations of excessive force or deaths in custody without any hierarchical ties to the accused. [13] Issued while the Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy was fully operational, this recommendation highlighted the agency’s existing limitations regarding true independence. It remains an important point of reference, underscoring that genuinely independent oversight is necessary to ensure fair trials and impartial investigations.

While the current Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy certainly warrants scrutiny regarding its effectiveness, resources, and accountability, dismantling an oversight body requires caution. Proponents of the abolition must prove that a leaner structure will not compromise the state’s ability to detect and penalize misconduct.

Despite ongoing public and expert apprehension, the National Assembly’s Committee on Legal and Judicial Affairs has endorsed the abolition policy, though it has requested measures to mitigate potential implementation challenges. 

Furthermore, while the committee emphasized that the organizational structure of investigative agencies must be codified in law rather than left to the discretion of ministers, [14] it paradoxically supported granting the ministers of public security and national defense the power to assign or transfer jurisdiction within their own systems.

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Việt Nam’s political system currently relies on two principal layers of oversight regarding criminal proceedings and law enforcement: supervision by the procuracy and oversight from elected bodies such as the National Assembly, its respective agencies, and People’s Councils at all levels. This dual structure is intended to ensure state power remains tightly controlled, transparent, and aligned with the Constitution.

However, a gap remains, as no clearly separate institutional or hierarchical mechanism exists for cases where the subject under investigation is a police officer.

This reality raises a series of questions. How can impartiality be guaranteed when the Ministry of Public Security’s Security Investigation Agency is authorized to investigate officers within its own branch? Who will handle complaints or investigate evidence that officers have failed to pursue crimes? If a conflict of interest arises, what mechanism permits a case to be transferred outside the public security system? Furthermore, what evidence exists to prove this proposal will not concentrate excessive power in a handful of agencies, and what will happen to judicial independence if the already dominant Ministry of Public Security expands its authority?

This proposal will only become persuasive if the Ministry of Public Security can adequately resolve these structural concerns. Until then, valid doubts will persist, making the retention of the Investigation Agency of the Supreme People’s Procuracy the most prudent option.

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Nguyễn Quốc Toàn wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on August 25, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine translated it into English.