Building Việt Nam’s ‘National Champions’: A New Era of Crony Capitalism?

The Politburo’s Resolution 68, in effect since May 2025 under General Secretary Tô Lâm’s leadership, has been described as a major economic policy shift since the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms. [1] By identifying the private sector as “a driver of economic growth,” the resolution aims to develop at least 20 large private conglomerates by 2030.

These “national champions” would be capable of leading the economy and participating in global value chains, a model that has drawn comparisons to South Korea’s chaebol during the Miracle on the Han River in the 1960s. 

Which Businesses Could Become “National Champions”?

The proposal raises several questions about which private businesses in Việt Nam will have a chance to become national champions and whether this agenda will simply allow a handful of dominant companies to further consolidate their market power.

Of the country’s 1 million registered businesses, only 20,276 companies qualify as large enterprises. About a third of those, or roughly 6,000, are considered potential candidates. [2]

Yet, the government’s plan to select at least 20 globally competitive conglomerates significantly narrows the field, making the economy more dependent on a select group when over 100 leading private companies already dominate the markets.

An objective assessment must account for Việt Nam’s starting point: Unlike countries with long-established market economies, it began with a fully state-directed economy. [3] The private sector has only had 40 years to develop since 1986.

Even so, businesses have consistently had to seek opportunities under state protection, resulting in a small group of politically connected companies possessing preferential access to economic and social resources. 

International analysts describe this as an economy operating on the basis of an alliance among the state, the party, and politically connected businesses. [4]

Others characterize it as the model of a “rent-seeking society,” where state monopolies control markets and private companies seeking greater market access must align their interests with political groups that oversee the economy. [5] 

The resulting squeeze has substantially restricted competition and created barriers to entrepreneurship. Another study, covering 500 businesses across 10 provinces and cities in Việt Nam, including Hà Nội, Hồ Chí Minh City, and Hải Phòng, between 2011 and 2015, found that politically connected firms could outperform their competitors. [6] 

These government ties provide opportunities to obtain public land and bank credit, expedite administrative procedures, gain bidding advantages, and learn about new policies earlier. 

Red Crony Capitalists Get Preferential Access to Land and Government Information

Access to public land is particularly significant, as most of Việt Nam’s leading conglomerates operate in real estate, a sector dependent on land resources under complete state control.

According to researchers Tuong Vu and Thuy Nguyen, key institutional changes following the 1986 Đổi Mới reforms reinforced a system of red crony capitalism. [7] This system gradually took shape as the Communist Party allowed members to engage in private business in 2006 and formally began admitting entrepreneurs in 2011, mirroring trends in China. These changes turned party members with authority over land approvals, projects, and administrative permits into direct economic actors.

Consequently, party officials can establish companies in relatives’ names to secure contracts, bid for licenses, and speculate on land using advance knowledge of policy changes. 

In an analysis, Đỗ Mạnh Hồng of Obirin University in Japan said that such companies often rely on exclusive information to win project bids. [8] Once they secure the contracts, they sell the projects to other contractors and pocket the difference.

Tân Sơn Nhất airport offers one example. After 1975, authorities gave a company access to about 157 hectares, or 388 acres, of the airport’s military land for a golf course project instead of reserving it for airport expansion. [9] The project’s developer was Long Biên Co., known as Lobico. [10] The project sparked intense controversy in 2017, when experts and National Assembly members urged the government to reclaim the 157 hectares to expand the airport. [11]

Another notable case involved VinSpeed, a company under Phạm Nhật Vượng, in mid-2025. [12] Despite being newly established and having no experience delivering a project of comparable scale, VinSpeed proposed becoming the developer of the North-South high-speed railway, the country’s largest public project to date, with a total investment of $61 billion.

Their proposal called for the state to provide a $49 billion interest-free loan—covering 80% of the project’s total cost—for 35 years, while giving the company exclusive rights to develop real estate along the entire railway without bearing land clearance costs.

On May 11, 2025, multiple domestic news outlets published reports on the Vingroup proposal, praising the conglomerate as the only investor willing to take on the project. After the proposal provoked swift public outrage online, several outlets removed their articles within 24 hours. Two days later, the VinSpeed proposal resurfaced in the press, recast as a patriotic initiative by Vingroup aligned with Communist Party policy. 

Under continued public pressure, VinSpeed eventually withdrew the proposal, and the state altered the project’s investment model. Nevertheless, VinSpeed remains one of the few companies the state has entrusted with several other railway projects, albeit smaller ones. These include the Bến Thành-Cần Giờ and Hà Nội-Quảng Ninh lines, as well as five new metro lines in urban Hà Nội. [13] 

They Also Often Have Banks Under Their Control

Furthermore, a handful of large companies in Việt Nam also receive preferential access to state credit at very low interest rates. The state says the purpose is to promote growth. [14]

Yet among banks included in Việt Nam’s 50 largest private business groups, as many as 93% share ownership links with other major companies. [15] 

This cross-ownership structure creates a closed credit system, allowing large, politically connected businesses to obtain preferential financing from state-owned commercial banks while funneling capital through banks they control into their own projects.

In this system, access to capital—and thus economic opportunity itself—flows exclusively through networks of political privilege, not merit, leaving smaller businesses and entrepreneurs locked out of the financing necessary to compete to become one of the national champions.

---

Thiên Lương wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on September 15, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine owns the copyright for this English translation.