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The prosecution of a village head in Đắk Lắk for statements made on Zalo exposes a fragile boundary between policy criticism and conduct deemed harmful to state interests. In a governance system that consistently emphasizes the importance of “listening to the people” and gathering grassroots feedback, blurring this line raises a critical question: who will still dare to act as the “bridge” between authorities and citizens?

On Feb. 3, the Đắk Lắk province investigative agency announced the prosecution and travel restriction of N.N.H.Đ., a village head in Chí Thạnh commune. [1] The charges fall under Article 331 of the 2015 Criminal Code for “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state, organizations, and citizens.” [2]

According to investigation records, Đ. managed a community Zalo group with over 240 members from October 2023 to October 2025. During this time, authorities allege that the village head posted content deemed “fabricated, distorted, and insulting to local leaders.” The specific content in question, however, has not been publicly disclosed . [3]

While the state maintains the right to address defamation, insults, or actions harming social order, this case presents a unique issue. The prosecuted individual was neither an opposition activist nor a systemic outsider; rather, the accused was a grassroots official entrusted by the government to understand public sentiment and convey local grievances upward.

Article 331 and the Legal Gray Zone

Article 331 of the Criminal Code defines the offense of “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state, organizations, and individuals.” [4] Theoretically, this provision prevents the misuse of freedom of expression that causes disorder, incitement, or harm to the lawful rights of others. The Vietnamese government repeatedly affirms the law's necessity in protecting national security, social order, and national unity, particularly as misinformation spreads rapidly online. [5]

However, international monitoring organizations frequently point out the highly ambiguous interpretation and application of Article 331. Because the concept of “abusing democratic freedoms” lacks a clear legal definition, distinguishing between peaceful criticism, policy feedback, and unlawful conduct becomes incredibly difficult . [6]

Furthermore, a report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on freedom of expression has called on “the Vietnamese authorities to cease using […] Article 331 against human rights defenders, journalists, and activists.” This cessation is necessary to comply with obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other international human rights commitments undertaken by Việt Nam. [7]

While regulations addressing false statements or defamatory speech are necessary, the criteria defining violations must be detailed and transparent to prevent abuse. Criminal measures should generally serve as a last resort following administrative or civil remedies. Instead, the broad interpretive scope of Article 331 creates a “legal gray zone,” where judgments of right and wrong depend heavily on the interpretations of enforcement authorities.

Grassroots Officials Caught in a Dilemma

The greatest paradox of the Đắk Lắk case lies in the broader context of a Vietnamese state that continuously emphasizes grassroots democracy and citizen feedback. [8] For years, policy documents have highlighted the principle of “ people know, people discuss, people implement, people supervise, ” treating such feedback as a prerequisite for timely policy adjustments. [9] Likewise, the national digital transformation program actively aims to utilize digital platforms to strengthen the interaction between the government and its citizens. [10]

In many localities, community Zalo groups have become the practical reality of these policies. These channels are frequently used to announce information, receive opinions, and resolve everyday community issues. For village- and commune-level officials, these platforms function simultaneously as management tools and as semi-public spaces for residential dialogue. [11]

However, prosecuting a village head for content posted within that very space sends a chilling message to the entire grassroots administrative apparatus. Faced with unclear legal boundaries, local officials will find that their safest option is silence or the mere transmission of “risk-free” procedural information. Consequently, self-censorship is far more likely to spread than candid communication.

This dynamic diminishes the quality of policy feedback and deprives higher levels of government of a truthful grassroots information channel. From a governance perspective, failing to protect those who convey bottom-up feedback inevitably leads to formalistic, unrealistic reporting that ultimately weakens administrative effectiveness.

Vague Laws That “Set Traps” for Citizens

The nature of the speech environment also requires careful scrutiny. Fundamentally, statements made within a limited-membership community Zalo group intended for residential interaction differ from those posted on fully public social media platforms. The current legal framework, however, fails to distinguish between these different communication spaces or clarify the rights and responsibilities of group administrators.

When legal ambiguity effectively “sets traps” for citizens, it inevitably increases legal risks and erodes public trust. This environment encourages silence over constructive feedback, which ultimately risks distancing policymaking from reality.

Laws governing digital content in many countries utilize graduated measures, including warnings, removal requests, and administrative penalties. They reserve criminal prosecution only for evident, serious, and intentional violations. For example, the European Union adopted the Digital Services Act to establish a tiered enforcement mechanism that emphasizes proportionality. [12] Without a similar framework in Việt Nam, criminalization is more likely to serve as the initial response rather than the final resort.

***

While online spaces undoubtedly present risks of misinformation, hate incitement, and public opinion manipulation that require government regulatory tools, effective governance should not rely on a prolonged legal gray zone.

Consequently, the Đắk Lắk case transcends a single individual's legal troubles. It serves as a test of how the government of Việt Nam balances the management of online spaces with the encouragement of grassroots policy feedback. If officials at the village and commune levels—the very people expected to “listen to the people”—must constantly weigh legal risks before speaking, achieving open and transparent policy discussion becomes significantly more difficult.

Lê Hảo wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

The Vietnamese. (2026, February 9). “Absolute Confidence” Messages as Tô Lâm and Senior Leaders Are Nominated for Vietnam’s National Assembly. The Vietnamese Magazine . https://thevietnamese.org/2026/02/absolute-confidence-messages-as-to-lam-and-senior-leaders-are-nominated-for-vietnams-national-assembly/

Tội lợi dụng các quyền tự do dân chủ theo Điều 331 Bộ luật Hình sự. (2023, March 2). Thư viện Pháp luật . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/chinh-sach-phap-luat-moi/vn/ho-tro-phap-luat/tu-van-phap-luat/46657/toi-loi-dung-cac-quyen-tu-do-dan-chu-theo-dieu-331-bo-luat-hinh-su

See [1].

See [2].

CAT. (2022, April 14). Yêu sách đòi xóa bỏ tội “Lợi dụng các quyền tự do dân chủ xâm phạm lợi ích của Nhà nước, quyền và lợi ích hợp pháp của tổ chức, cá nhân” theo quy định tại Điều 331 Bộ luật hình sự. Công an Sơn La . https://congan.sonla.gov.vn/yeu-sach-doi-xoa-bo-toi-loi-dung-cac-quyen-tu-do-dan-chu-xam-pham-loi-ich-cua-nha-nuoc-quyen-va-loi-ich-hop-phap-cua-to-chuc-ca-nhan-theo-quy-dinh-tai-dieu-331-bo-luat-hinh-su/

AMNESTY. (2021, January 20). Viet Nam: New leadership must seize opportunity to reverse human rights decline. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/01/viet-nam-new-leadership-reverse-human-rights-decline/

ICJ. (2022, October 11). Vietnam: UN Human Rights Council candidacy demands progress on human rights. https://www.icj.org/viet-nam-un-human-rights-council-candidacy-demands-progress-on-human-rights/

Trang, H. T. (2024, November 12). Thực hiện dân chủ ở cơ sở góp phần bảo đảm quyền làm chủ của nhân dân. Nhân dân . https://nhandan.vn/thuc-hien-dan-chu-o-co-so-gop-phan-bao-dam-quyen-lam-chu-cua-nhan-dan-post844377.html

Dơn, N. T. (2024, June 15). Thực hiện tốt phương châm “Dân biết, dân bàn, dân làm, dân kiểm tra, dân giám sát, dân thụ hưởng”. Nhân dân . https://nhandan.vn/thuc-hien-tot-phuong-cham-dan-biet-dan-ban-dan-lam-dan-kiem-tra-dan-giam-sat-dan-thu-huong-post814424.html

Vĩnh, T. (2026, February 5). “Chìa khóa” trong lộ trình xây dựng chính quyền số, phục vụ nhân dân. Vietnam Plus . https://www.vietnamplus.vn/chia-khoa-trong-lo-trinh-xay-dung-chinh-quyen-so-phuc-vu-nhan-dan-post1092619.vnp