Tô Lâm’s Power Consolidation: The End of Collective Leadership in Việt Nam?

While the state president serves as the head of state, the general secretary holds the highest position within the party. Because Tô Lâm now holds both roles simultaneously, he has emerged as the most powerful leader in Việt Nam’s political arena in recent years. 

This development has led to the view that Việt Nam may be gradually moving away from its familiar model of collective leadership, edging closer instead to a system where power is concentrated in a single individual. [1] 

Even so, it is still too early to conclude that the current situation marks the definitive end of the old model.

Collective Leadership

“Collective leadership” is a model that originated from the Soviet Union. [2] However, both there and in Việt Nam, this mechanism was sometimes severely challenged by highly personalized leadership under figures such as Joseph Stalin (1927–1953) and Lê Duẩn (1960–1986).

After Stalin’s death, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union learned from its period of excessive personal power and designed a power-sharing mechanism to prevent another general secretary from monopolizing authority, thus avoiding a “second Stalin.” 

Việt Nam drew similar lessons following the Lê Duẩn era, a prominent example of heavy power concentration. In the study “Politics and Authoritarian Resilience in Vietnam,” Nguyễn Khắc Giang observed: “The communist regime would not have been able to carry out Đổi Mới if [the conservative leader] Lê Duẩn had lived long enough to control the Sixth Party Congress.” [3]

Within Việt Nam’s political system, collective leadership is a governance mode where major decisions require majority approval rather than the decree of a single individual. This follows the Party Charter’s principle that “the individual is subordinate to the organization.” [4] 

At the central level, this collective encompasses the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee, complemented by a division of roles among key leaders; at the local level, it involves party committees and other organizations.

The study “Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China” by Edmund Malesky, Regina Abrami, and Yu Zheng demonstrates that Việt Nam’s political system has operated for many years with power distributed across multiple actors, unlike the concentration seen within a small core group in China. [5] 

This distribution has helped Việt Nam avoid an excessive concentration of authority while fostering mutual checks among top leaders. 

From this perspective, the fact that Tô Lâm simultaneously holds the two highest positions in the party and the state is a highly notable development.

Is It the End of Collective Leadership?

The answer is likely no; rather, this period serves as a major test of the model. 

In political systems governed by relatively strict internal rules, the rise of a dominant individual does not necessarily indicate that collective institutions have lost their overarching function.

According to Nguyễn Khắc Giang’s research, a defining distinction between Việt Nam and more personalized regimes is that even during periods when power concentrates heavily in one individual, it remains firmly embedded within the party framework. [6] 

This means that institutions such as the Politburo, the Central Committee, pre-congress personnel selection processes, and internal party rules continue to play a decisive role. It would be premature to declare that “collective leadership is dead” at this point.

The Lessons from Nguyễn Phú Trọng 

Việt Nam recently experienced a precedent where the general secretary also served as president, with Nguyễn Phú Trọng holding both positions from 2018 to 2021 following the death of Trần Đại Quang. 

While many analysts questioned at the time whether Việt Nam was abandoning its dispersed power model, the two roles were separated again after the 13th Party Congress.

This precedent highlights that institutional consolidation does not necessarily equate to a lasting transformation of the governing system. Instead, it can serve as a temporary solution, a method to manage a transitional period, or a tool to reinforce authority under specific circumstances.

However, the current situation differs significantly from the 2018 precedent. Tô Lâm’s consolidation of these roles at the start of his term may result in a more enduring concentration of power, rather than serving merely as a temporary measure to fill a leadership vacuum as it did in the case of Nguyễn Phú Trọng.

The Fate of Collective Leadership

To assess whether Tô Lâm will ultimately bring an end to Việt Nam’s model of collective leadership, three key indicators can be inferred from the research of Nguyễn Khắc Giang.

First is the capacity for internal bargaining. The collective framework remains functional provided that the Politburo, the Central Committee, and other key leadership groups maintain their ability to negotiate and compromise on personnel decisions. 

Second is the approach to successor selection. Historically, Việt Nam has avoided appointing a pre-designated “crown prince”—a practice formerly seen in China—by deciding leadership outcomes at the last minute during party congresses. If this process continues to feature voting, competition, and internal negotiation, the collective model endures.

The final indicator is the system’s capacity to remove an unsuitable leader. As long as the highest official faces the risk of losing consensus or being voted out, they remain constrained by established rules and must weigh the influence of competing power groups.

Hence, concluding that Tô Lâm’s consolidation of roles marks the end of collective leadership is premature. At this stage, it is more accurate to state that Việt Nam’s collective leadership model has not disappeared, although it is undeniably entering a period of intense testing.

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Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 9, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.