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While “private meetings” and “closed-door meetings” both effectively serve as “confidential sessions” held away from the press and public observers, the terms possess a crucial distinction: “closed-door meetings” are legally regulated, whereas “private meetings” are not.

Under the Law on the Organization of the National Assembly , sessions must default to being public, allowing attendance from both the press and citizens. [1]

Because openness is the rule, holding a “closed-door meeting” requires a strict triggering mechanism. A proposal must be submitted by the president, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the prime minister, or at least one-third of the deputies.

According to Resolution 71 on the Rules of Procedure of National Assembly sessions, the Standing Committee must then submit this request to the National Assembly for consideration, where it must be deliberated and voted upon before the session can occur. [2]

This legally defined process ensures the public’s right to oversight by forcing the Assembly to explain why secrecy is necessary and justified. By contrast, “private meetings” have no legal basis. This allows the Assembly to act at its discretion without having to justify its actions to anyone.

Recently, the term “private meeting” has emerged as a euphemism. This “message” has been introduced by the National Assembly’s media channels, echoed by state media, and has effectively become a “new” mechanism to circumvent the law. It signals to journalists to step back while completely lacking formal regulatory governance.

Under this approach, the National Assembly can exclude the public from vital electoral processes and deliberations that citizens have the right to oversee.

During the first session of the 16th National Assembly in early April, the public was only able to observe the largely formal opening sessions, closing sessions, and oath-taking ceremonies. All substantive proceedings, including the nomination process, voting, and vote counting, were conducted as “ private meetings. ” [3]

Why Hold Private Voting?

For anyone observing Vietnamese politics, it is widely known that the Communist Party predetermines personnel decisions for top leadership roles during its Central Committee meetings.

The National Assembly’s role is simply to vote and approve these decisions. Historically, there has never been a single instance where a candidate “nominated by the Party” was rejected by the Assembly.

During the April session, the National Assembly immediately entered “private meetings” following the opening ceremonies to “ elect and approve top leadership positions. ” [4] If the outcomes are already decided, why is the vote not held publicly for all to see? There are two primary reasons for this approach.

First , the Party aims to mitigate risks and prevent “uncertainties.”

Even though personnel choices are decided in advance, the Constitution grants sole authority to the National Assembly to elect, appoint, or remove key figures like the president, prime minister, and chairman of the National Assembly. [5]

If unexpected issues arose, conducting a public vote under press scrutiny and public oversight would make it difficult to manage the results. The Communist Party avoids any “risk” that its chosen candidates might face resistance in an open forum.

Second , the Party relies on these methods to ensure specific voting ratios.

These ratios are far more than just dry figures; they symbolize the “unity and consensus” of the “entire political system.”

Under Tô Lâm's leadership—an era characterized by the motto of “only discussing how to move forward, not backward”—achieving "high unity" through flawless voting percentages is paramount.

As evidence of this goal, Trần Thanh Mẫn, Tô Lâm, and other officials elected during this session all secured 100% approval rates . [6] While it remains unclear if these figures reflect absolute reality, they provide the Party with a manufactured “symbol” of absolute consensus.

The Diminishing Power of the National Assembly

“Private meetings” may superficially seem like a simple mechanism to bypass legal requirements. However, this euphemism highlights a much deeper reality: the National Assembly's power has drastically diminished under Tô Lâm.

As the Assembly increasingly meets “in private,” it systematically excludes the public from the legislative chamber, strips it of oversight, and keeps it ignorant of closed-door arrangements.

There was a time when the National Assembly in Việt Nam was considered an “evolving institution within a single-party system.” During that period, it exercised questioning powers and engaged actively in policymaking instead of merely rubber-stamping Party programs. [7]

For instance, in the previous decade, deputies like Nguyễn Minh Thuyết and Dương Trung Quốc boldly demanded the resignation of then-Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. Furthermore, the Assembly successfully rejected major state projects, including the North-South high-speed railway in 2010 and nuclear power development in 2016.

However, the Assembly's already limited authority has continued to shrink since Nguyễn Phú Trọng began his second term in 2016, and this decline has accelerated since Tô Lâm assumed power in 2024. [8]

As a result, the 15th National Assembly is widely viewed as a regression, acting primarily as a “rubber-stamp” body that approves Party decrees and yields broad legislative control to the government.

Taking his oath of office, National Assembly Chairman Trần Thanh Mẫn declared that “the 16th National Assembly will inherit and build upon the achievements of previous terms.” [9]

This reference to “previous terms” likely points to the dubious “ achievement ” of “taking a step ahead” to codify Party guidelines into law—a defining characteristic of the 15th National Assembly under his previous chairmanship. [10]

Given this trajectory, “private meetings” are poised to become the new normal.

Sa Huỳnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 7, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, March 18). Luật Tổ chức Quốc hội 2014. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-To-chuc-Quoc-hoi-2014-259784.aspx

2. LuatVietnam. (2025, November 27). Nghị quyết 71/2022/QH15 Nội quy kỳ họp Quốc hội . LuatVietnam. https://luatvietnam.vn/hanh-chinh/nghi-quyet-71-2022-qh15-235881-d1.html

3. Quốc hội mới nhóm họp: Chưa bầu đã có lịch tuyên thệ nhậm chức, người dân không được theo dõi quá trình bầu . (2026, April 6). Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2026/04/quoc-hoi-moi-nhom-hop-chua-bau-da-co-lich-tuyen-the-nham-chuc-nguoi-dan-khong-duoc-theo-doi-qua-trinh-bau/

4. Dũng, L. (2026, April 6). Quốc hội họp riêng, bầu và phê chuẩn các chức danh lãnh đạo cấp cao. Báo Điện Tử Tiền Phong . https://tienphong.vn/quoc-hoi-hop-rieng-bau-va-phe-chuan-cac-chuc-danh-lanh-dao-cap-cao-post1833303.tpo

5. Xaydungchinhsach.Chinhphu.Vn. (2023, December 28). Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam. xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn . https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/toan-van-hien-phap-nuoc-cong-hoa-xa-hoi-chu-nghia-viet-nam-119231225213002261.htm

6. Trần Thanh Mẫn Re-elected as Việt Nam’s National Assembly Chairman . (2026, April 6). The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/tran-thanh-man-re-elected-as-viet-nams-national-assembly-chairman/

7. Malesky, E., & Schuler, P. (2010). Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament. American Political Science Review , 104 (3), 482–502. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000250

8. Bui, T. (2025, March 6). The declining influence of the National Assembly in Vietnam’s ‘New Era.’ The Diplomat . https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/the-declining-influence-of-the-national-assembly-in-vietnams-new-era/

9. Thành Chung, Tiến Long, Ngọc An. (2026, April 6). Chủ tịch Quốc hội Trần Thanh Mẫn tái đắc cử. TUOI TRE ONLINE . https://tuoitre.vn/chu-tich-quoc-hoi-tran-thanh-man-tai-dac-cu-20260405151513032.htm

10. Vietnamese Authorities Crack Down on Online Dissent Ahead of Party Congress; Facebooker Hoàng Thị Hồng Thái Arrested Under Article 117. (2026, January 12). The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/vietnamese-authorities-crack-down-on-online-dissent-ahead-of-party-congress-facebooker-hoang-thi-hong-thai-arrested-under-article-117/